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INTRODUCTION 
 
Communication is a risky adventure without guarantees.  Any kind of 
effort to make linkage via signs is a gamble. To the question, How can 
we really know we have communicated? there is no ultimate answer 
besides a pragmatic one that our subsequent actions seem to act in 
some kind of concert. All talk is an act of faith predicated on the 
future’s ability to bring forth worlds called for. Meaning is an 
incomplete project, open-ended and subject to radical revision by later 
events.  
  John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air 
  
In 2005, I observed1 twenty prenatal genetic counseling sessions at Vanderbilt 
University Medical Center. With each patient’s permission, I sat as a student observer in 
a small patient education room listening and watching the conversations that unfolded 
between the genetic counselors, patients, and family members.  The sessions usually 
involved a pregnant woman who had been referred for amniocentesis2 either because she 
was of advanced maternal age3 (AMA) or because a screening test indicated she was in a 
                                                
1 This opportunity informed my research on the theoretical and ethical issues of genetic counseling and 
prenatal diagnosis.  These sessions were not recorded nor did I take notes during the session. My 
observations were not intended to produce data for empirical research.  Listening and watching these 
sessions enriched my understanding of the literature and allowed me to imagine more realistic cases.      
2 Amniocentesis is a procedure that involves inserting a long thin syringe into the woman’s abdomen and 
drawing a sample of amniotic fluid.  Before inserting the syringe, the sonographer scans to detect fetal 
viability, age, number, normality and position in the uterus. Knowing where the fetus is provides the 
optimal position for needle insertion by establishing the position of the fetus and placenta Typically done as 
an outpatient procedure in the 15th or 16th week but it can be done with increased risk as early as 10 to 14 
weeks.  Robert L. Nussbaum and others, Thompson & Thompson Genetics in Medicine, 6th / ed. 
(Philadelphia: Saunders, 2001). 
3 E. B. Hook, P. K. Cross, and D. M. Schreinemachers, "Chromosomal Abnormality Rates at 
Amniocentesis and in Live-Born Infants," Jama 249, no. 15 (1983): 2034-8.  Hook’s study and subsequent 
revisions by other authors indicate that the risk of chromosomal abnormalities is affected by advancing 
maternal age. Pregnant women who will be 35 or older at their delivery are classified as advanced maternal 
age by health care professionals providing prenatal care.  This status entails routine referrals for a detailed 
ultrasound and amniocentesis.  35-years of age is significant because the risk of miscarriage from 
amniocentesis intersects with the risk of having a child with Down Syndrome.  For revised numbers used 
below, see L. J. Heffner, "Advanced Maternal Age--How Old Is Too Old?," N Engl J Med 351, no. 19 
(2004).  1927-9.   
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high-risk group for having a child with a chromosomal abnormality.  Initially, what 
attracted me to this area of research was the ethical complexity of decision making in 
pregnancies diagnosed with genetic abnormalities, but my observations confronted me 
with the equally complex phenomena of communicating about genetics.  The interest in 
comparing and contrasting the styles of four different genetic counselors prompted the 
research question that guides this project:  What are and what should be the dominant 
model(s) of communication between genetic counselors and patients?  
Seymour Kessler, a leader and scholar in genetic counseling for over 30 years, 
describes the communicative challenges of genetic counseling this way: 
On rare occasions, the lid lifts and we are granted a fleeting 
glimpse into the black box of genetic counseling. What we 
view generally are human beings interacting and striving to 
understand one another. We try to overhear a few words 
they exchange and realize that they do not always seem to 
be speaking a common language. Their assumptions about 
things seem vastly different and there are other 
impediments to communication and mutual understanding. 
The professionals in these colloquies often seem resolved 
to talk about certain specific matters, numbers and 
statistics, for example, regardless of whatever else might be 
happening in the counseling interaction. Some seem to 
have an overriding agenda of educating the clients about 
the complex world of human genetics. On their part, the 
latter do not always seem to be certain about what they 
want from the professionals; their motives, wishes, 
thoughts and feelings seem complex and unclear, perhaps 
even to themselves. Communication in the session can be 
labored, opaque, indirect, at times incomprehensible.  
Clients have difficulty making themselves understood; 
professionals have difficulty understanding them.  The 
result is a misdirection of efforts.4 
Kessler’s characterization invites the reader to observe with him how difficult 
communication and understanding are in the process of genetic counseling.  Once the lid 
                                                
4 S. Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling: Xii. More on Counseling Skills," J Genet 
Couns 7, no. 3 (1998): 263-64. 
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has been lifted, notice that Kessler does not begin with the image of professional and 
client; instead he describes two people struggling to be understood.  This generalization 
provides a standpoint to see communication and understanding first as a human problem 
and second as a problem specific to professional tasks such as genetic counseling.  All 
humans have some, if not vast, differences in their assumptions about ‘things.’ If it were 
otherwise, the need to communicate would not arise.  The roles we inhabit and the 
spatiotemporal details of communicative acts constrain all of our efforts to be understood.  
Kessler pans in to show the challenges specific to genetic counseling.  In his picture, 
professionals pursue an educational agenda that involves pre-selected content--including 
a genetics lesson-- that lacks sensitivity to client needs.  In turn, clients often lack the 
clarity or certainty to elicit what she or he needs from the counselor.  Kessler lifts the lid 
not only to observe the general properties of genetic counseling but also to make 
evaluations about the proprieties of this practice.  
This study elaborates and evaluates the proprieties of genetic counseling as they 
are accounted for in three models: 1) the teaching model 2) the psychotherapeutic model 
3) the responsibilist model.  The elaboration of these involves an identification of the 
larger traditions, visions and theories of communication that underwrite them; the 
evaluation entails an assessment of each model’s theses and ultimately a comparison of 
their adequacy in response to two important concerns in genetic counseling: the values of 
nondirectiveness and the assessment of spirituality.  These are discussed in reference to a 
case study introduced below. These theoretical efforts will ultimately support the claim 
that the responsibilist model when underwritten by a pragmatic theory of communication 
provides the most adequate understanding of the proprieties of genetic counseling.   
   xii 
Before mapping the project, a brief explication of my methodological commitments and 
terminological choices is needed. 
   
Methodology and Terminology 
The methodological strategy for this inquiry can be characterized as a dialectical 
movement from inferences drawn in my observations of and readings about genetic 
counseling and its models;  to analysis of these inferences in relation to a normative 
understanding of communication; and finally a return back to specific concerns and cases 
in genetic counseling and their assessment in reference to analytical insights. Undertaking 
this strategy involves several steps at the tactical level.  I identify and explicate the 
positions of key interlocutors who have shaped the conversation about models in the 
genetic counseling literature. The teaching model is articulated primarily through the 
work of Edward Hsia and James Sorenson; the psychotherapeutic model through the 
writings of Seymour Kessler and John Weil; and the responsibilist model in the thought 
of Mary White. I elaborate and evaluate these models primarily with the insights of three 
theorists. H. Richard Niebuhr, John Durham Peters, and Robert Brandom.  Niebuhr’s 
notions of responsibility and sociality are key concepts in Mary White’s proposal that I 
call the responsibilist model.   Peters’ intellectual history provides a philosophical 
breadth that allows an identification and assessment of two traditions and two visions of 
communication that influence the models under consideration.  Brandom’s pragmatic 
theory of communication, which combines insights from hermeneutic and analytic 
understandings of linguistic practice, gives a detailed vocabulary that demonstrates the 
centrality of responsibility in communication.      
   xiii 
Four terms are used to signal moves between different levels of analysis: 1) 
tradition 2) vision 3) theory 4) model.  If the goal of this project is the elaboration and 
evaluation the three genetic counseling models, then traditions, visions, and theories 
provide important analytical standpoints to pursue this end.  The family resemblance of 
these terms requires stipulative definitions to show their specific usage in this study.  A 
tradition refers to an ongoing set of general attitudes and arguments about an established 
phenomenon such as communication. In this study, two traditions of human 
communication are introduced, one is what Peters calls the “spiritualist tradition” and the 
other is termed the embodiment tradition.5  From traditions we inherit the problems and 
solutions that constitute more specific visions of communication.  A vision of human 
communication refers to an operational understanding of communication that can be 
plotted within a larger tradition.  Visions can be plotted on a continuum somewhere 
between a full-fledged theory and a complete absence of reflection on communication.  
Visions like full-fledged theories answer important questions about the structures and 
functions of communication.   
A vision and a theory of communication have some differences.  Visions of 
communication are often operational in the attitudes of practitioners but seldom receive 
the kind of critical reflection a theoretical model undergoes in scholarly exchange.  
Because visions provide a manageable framework for practitioners to grasp, the practical 
need for scrutiny usually only comes about when there is consistent communication 
breakdown. Inadequate visions tend to simplify structures that are complex; globalize 
                                                
5 John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1999), 109-36.  From the spiritualist tradition, Peters moves ‘Toward A More Robust 
Vision of Spirit’ in chapter three.  He directly compares the spiritualist tradition and the robust vision of 
spirit as working at the same level of explanation.  He also places the technical and therapeutic visions of 
communication within the spiritualist tradition.       
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features that are local variations; and over- or underestimate the challenges involved in 
communication. Unlike a vision of communication, a fully developed theory of 
communication is rarely operational in the run-of-the mill concept mongering we do.  
Theories of communication, when diligently worked out, offer a complex set of 
expressive resources that allow practitioners to become self-conscious about global 
characteristics, e.g. perspectival difference, and local features, e.g. professional-client 
relationships, of discursive activity. Theoretical models can be prompted by practical 
circumstances such as communication failure as well as by academic aspirations to give 
systematic accounts of an important human phenomenon.  Inadequate theories of 
communication tend to simplify and reify the messy retail business of discursive 
exchange.  In this way, they can share some of the same shortcomings of visions but are 
expected to be defended by those who avow them.   
These terminological distinctions serve the methodological goal of identifying 
how different levels and qualities of accounts shape the various models under 
consideration.  A model in this inquiry refers to a schematic and normative representation 
of a practice such as genetic counseling. The representation consists of a distilled set of 
theses that articulate features of the activity such as the goals, assumptions, and tasks of 
genetic counseling. The models presented in this study do not seek to describe but rather 
guide what happens in the practice. 
          
Debbie’s Case 
The methodology of this project tests the adequacy of the theoretical terms by 
using them to interpret a case based on my observations. The three models are compared 
   xv 
in relation to Debbie’s case below. This case describes the contours of an actual 
conversation that I observed with specific details changed or added to insure anonymity. 
Most components of this case are unremarkable when compared with the many prenatal 
counseling sessions undertaken everyday in large medical centers across the nation.  The 
circumstances of Debbie’s pregnancy and her referral are common in this area of 
medicine. The offering of a risk assessment, a description of amniocentesis, and potential 
outcome scenarios are all standard parts of a prenatal genetic counseling session.  These 
mundane qualities are strengths when comparing counseling models because the models 
are being applied under conditions of common practice. Two features of this case are less 
common but not unusual.  Debbie’s expression of religious concerns and the counselor’s 
offer to leave Debbie and her spouse alone to deliberate are by no means unique or even 
exotic occurrences but they are not standard features of the practice.  
Entering a room labeled ‘Patient Education,’ a 40-year old woman, Debbie, 
mother of two teenagers, is 16-weeks pregnant, her first time without the use of fertility 
treatments.  She is accompanied by her spouse.  She had not intended to get pregnant.  
The genetic counselor asks the patient to share her understanding for the referral.  
Debbie says that her OB/GYN referred her because of her age.  The genetic counselor 
affirms this reason, elaborating that the patient’s age puts her in a higher risk category 
for giving birth to a child with specific health problems. The genetic counselor does a 
pedigree and finds no factors that would increase the current risk assessments. She tells 
the patient that every pregnancy has 3-4% background risk for birth defects and that she 
specifically has a risk of 1/106 for Down syndrome and 1/66 risk for any chromosomal 
abnormality.  The patient nods her head. The genetic counselor asks Debbie whether she 
has any questions and Debbie indicates that she does not.     
The genetic counselor asks the patient whether she knows what an amniocentesis 
is, reminding her that this is the test for which she has been referred.  The patient 
indicates that she has read some information on the internet and asks whether they stick 
the needle through the belly button.  Reassuring the patient that her bellybutton will not 
be stuck, the genetic counselor tells the patient that an amniocentesis will not be done 
without her informed consent and that the role of genetic counselor is to discuss what the 
procedure entails highlighting the risks that it carries.  Having gone through the 
mechanics of the procedure, the genetic counselor informs the patient that the general 
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risk of miscarriage is 1/2006, which is .5% higher than the background risk for 
miscarriage at this stage, and the risk of serious infection is less than 1/1000.   
The patient expresses her concern over putting the baby at risk and her 
willingness to consider abortion if the baby has Down syndrome.  She says that she might 
terminate the pregnancy because she does not want to leave her other children the 
responsibility of care giving when she is gone.  The genetic counselor gives her four 
scenarios to assist in the deliberation.  
1) She can refuse the amniocentesis, avoid increased risk of 
miscarriage, and have a healthy baby. 
2) She can refuse the amniocentesis, avoid increased risk of 
miscarriage, and have a special needs child.  
3) She can undergo amniocentesis and miscarry a healthy 
baby. 
4) She can undergo amniocentesis, an abnormality is found 
and then she must decide whether to continue the 
pregnancy. 
The patient asks what is the probability of getting pregnant at 40 and then before the 
genetic counselor can answer she says that this baby is a miraculous gift.  She indicates 
no matter what she decides that God’s will would be involved adding that it would be 
God’s will if she gave birth to a child with Down syndrome and it would be God’s will if 
she underwent amniocentesis and a miscarriage resulted.  The genetic counselor asks 
whether Debbie and her husband would like to be alone to discuss the options. She says 
yes.  After five minutes, Debbie calls the genetic counselor back into the room.  Debbie 
decides not to make a decision about the amniocentesis until she has the ultrasound 
results. 
 
Many aspects of Debbie’s case are generalizable and have received significant if 
not sufficient attention by researchers interested in the ethical, legal and social 
implications (ELSI)7 of offering genetic information to patients.  The category of 
advanced maternal age8 (AMA)  and the technological system called prenatal diagnosis9 
                                                
6 This risk level is the standard and lacks sensitivity to the level of experience of the physician performing 
the procedure.  
7 When the Human Genome Project (HGP) formally began in 1990, the National Institute of Health and the 
Department of Energy dedicated a portion (3-5%) of the HGP budget to investigate the ethical, social, and 
legal implications of the human genome project.  This funding generated what is called E.LS.I research. 
8 R. L. Berkowitz, J. Roberts, and H. Minkoff, "Challenging the Strategy of Maternal Age-Based Prenatal 
Genetic Counseling," Jama 295, no. 12 (2006): 1446-8, R. G. Resta, "Changing Demographics of 
Advanced Maternal Age (Ama) and the Impact on the Predicted Incidence of Down Syndrome in the 
United States: Implications for Prenatal Screening and Genetic Counseling," Am J Med Genet A 133, no. 1 
(2005): 31-36. 
9 See Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s “Women’s Role in the History of Amniocentesis and Chorionic Villi 
Sampling” in Karen H. Rothenberg and Elizabeth J. Thomson, Women and Prenatal Testing : Facing the 
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have been shown to affect women’s attitudes about pregnancy.10  Researchers have  
identified the variability in patients’ understandings of risk information and genetic 
conditions.11   Theologians, philosophers, and advocacy groups have identified many of 
the ethical and religious issues that arise in the connection between prenatal diagnosis 
and pregnancy termination.12  One area that has received far less attention is how 
understandings of communication and meaning affect models of and ultimately the 
practice of genetic counseling.  This project focuses on the relations between general 
accounts of communication and models of genetic counseling with the goal of 
establishing more adequate theoretical resources to inform better models of practice. 
              
Mapping the Project 
In chapter one, the teaching model and the psychotherapeutic models of genetic 
counseling are introduced as two dominant ways of thinking about the communication of 
genetic information.  The claim pursued in this chapter is that these models have 
inherited problematic notions of communication.  Appropriating the work of 
                                                                                                                                            
Challenges of Genetic Technology, Women and Health Series (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1994), 35-48.  
10 Barbara Katz Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy : Prenatal Diagnosis and the Future of Motherhood 
(New York: Viking, 1986).  
11 S. Kessler and E. K. Levine, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Iv. The Subjective 
Assessment of Probability," Am J Med Genet 28, no. 2 (1987): 361-70, A. Lippman-Hand and F. C. Fraser, 
"Genetic Counseling--the Postcounseling Period: I. Parents' Perceptions of Uncertainty," Am J Med Genet 
4, no. 1 (1979): 51-71, A. Lippman-Hand and F. C. Fraser, "Genetic Counseling: Provision and Reception 
of Information," Am J Med Genet 3, no. 2 (1979): 113-27, J. R. Sorenson, C. M. Kavanagh, and M. 
Mucatel, "Client Learning of Risk and Diagnosis in Genetic Counseling," Birth Defects Orig Artic Ser 17, 
no. 1 (1981): 215-28, D. C. Wertz, J. R. Sorenson, and T. C. Heeren, "Clients' Interpretation of Risks 
Provided in Genetic Counseling," Am J Hum Genet 39, no. 2 (1986): 253-64.  
12  Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights, Hastings Center Studies in 
Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000).; R. C. Baumiller, "Ethical Issues in 
Genetics," Birth Defects Orig Artic Ser 10, no. 10 (1974): 297-300, Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of 
Genetic Counseling: Xii. More on Counseling Skills," 263-78.;Ted Peters, For the Love of Children : 
Genetic Technology and the Future of the Family, 1st ed., Family, Religion, and Culture (Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1996).  
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communication theorist, John Durham Peters, I trace this inheritance to distal 
philosophical stories told by Augustine and Locke and more proximate accounts whose 
chief narrators are Claude Shannon and Carl Rogers.  I elaborate the theses of these 
particular understandings of communication and then identify how they operate within 
the respective models. Finally, I evaluate their shortcomings in an attempt to show that a 
different model of genetic counseling is needed.  
A constructive move is made in chapter two.  The responsibilist model of genetic 
counseling is introduced by way of Mary White’s critique of nondirective counseling and 
her proposal for dialogical counseling and responsible decision making. Incorporating 
White’s insights, I offer the core elements of the responsibilist model and its reliance 
upon a embodied, normative and pragmatic description of communication.  Similar to the 
other two models, I locate the responsibilist model within what is termed the embodiment 
tradition of communication.  Within this tradition, I enlist Robert Brandom’s pragmatic 
theory of communication as an effective working out of a detailed account of 
communication that is responsible to insights about embodiment and difference.  With 
these expressive resources in place, I return to and develop the theses of the responsibilist 
model of genetic counseling. 
In the last two chapters, the three models are applied to two important practical 
concerns in genetic counseling. Nondirectiveness has been a constitutive value of genetic 
counseling for over forty years but its meanings are contested. Although genetic 
counselors agree that patient decisions should be free of coercion, they cannot agree on a 
model for facilitating responsible decision making.  In chapter three, I rehearse the 
history of nondirectiveness in genetic counseling and elaborate the way nondirectiveness 
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is understood by the three models.  These efforts culminate in an evaluation of how each 
of the models respond to Debbie’s case in reference to the issue of nondirectiveness.       
Chapter four addresses the fledgling practice of spiritual assessment within 
genetic counseling. After briefly introducing the relationship between spiritual 
assessment and the practice of medicine, I explicate and analyze the findings from two 
studies that explore and assess the feasibility of addressing religion and spirituality in 
genetic counseling.  Several questions direct the analysis: 1) How should spirituality and 
religion be defined for the purposes of spiritual assessment? 2) Are the obstacles to 
undertaking spiritual assessment surmountable? 3) What are the potential benefits and  
harms in spiritual assessment within genetic counseling?  The final move in chapter four 
is a return to Debbie’s case and the three models under consideration.  I attempt to trace 
out their stances toward spiritual assessment and evaluate their adequacy as guides on 
handling spiritual and religious matters in genetic counseling.    
The focus throughout this project is on models of genetic counseling and the 
accounts of communication they presuppose.  Both of these phenomena are relatively 
new developments on the human stage. The ability to talk about genetics has produced 
great tragedies in human history and also promises to bring great benefits.  The ability to 
talk about communication has led to insights about how linguistic practice provides ways 
to coordinate a shared world in the presence of real differences.  My hope for what 
follows is that a greater awareness about the normative features of communication will 
allow genetic information to be coordinated with other domains of meaning that make 
life worth living
 1 
CHAPTER  I 
 
GENETIC COUNSELING:  MODELS AND VISIONS 
 
The professional attitudes and competencies of genetic counselors are often 
informed by either a teaching model or a psychotherapeutic model.1  This bifurcation 
within the profession is generally accepted in the genetic counseling literature despite a 
diversity of modeling strategies.2  Evidence of the pervasiveness of the two-model 
approach can be seen in the analytic schemes of empirical studies that distinguish 
educational and counseling communication styles.3  An interest in a unified model has 
motivated discussion of how to combine the teaching and the psychotherapeutic models.  
Attempts have been made to subsume one model under another or to combine them by 
simple addition.  In this project, I endorse an alternative model of genetic counseling; in 
this chapter, I claim that the teaching and psychotherapeutic models are underwritten by 
problematic visions of communication that disqualify them as theoretical contenders. 
 
Teaching and Psychotherapeutic Models of Genetic Counseling 
                                                
1 S. Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Ix. Teaching and Counseling," Journal of 
Genetic Counseling 6, no. 3 (1997): 287-95.;L. J. Lewis, "Models of Genetic Counseling and Their Effects 
on Multicultural Genetic Counseling," J Genet Couns 11, no. 3 (2002): 193-212. Also see Ann C. Smith’s 
“Patient Education” and Luba Djurdjinovic’s “Psychosocial Counseling” in Diane L. Baker and others, A 
Guide to Genetic Counseling (New York: Wiley-Liss, 1998), 99-170.  
2 Ann Platt Walker, “The Practice of Genetic Counseling” in Baker and others, 1-26. In a widely used 
genetic counseling text book Walker identifies four models: 1) Eugenic 2) Medical/Preventive 3) Decision-
Making 4) Psychotherapeutic .  Whereas the concern of the present study is to analyze models that are 
currently operational, Walker’s analysis is concerned with representing changes along a historical 
trajectory.  
3 L. Ellington and others, "Exploring Genetic Counseling Communication Patterns: The Role of Teaching 
and Counseling Approaches," J Genet Couns 15, no. 3 (2006): 179-89.;L. Ellington and others, 
"Communication Analysis of Brca1 Genetic Counseling," J Genet Couns 14, no. 5 (2005): 377-86.;D. 
Roter and others, "The Genetic Counseling Video Project (Gcvp): Models of Practice," Am J Med Genet C 
Semin Med Genet 142, no. 4 (2006): 209-20.  
 2 
Seymour Kessler, a proponent of the psychotherapeutic model, has summarized 
both approaches for the purpose of comparison. His synopsis, which will receive scrutiny 
below, serves as a heuristic for the rest of the project. The teaching model, according to 
Kessler, entails the following commitments: 
1. Goal: educated counselee 
2. Based on perception that clients come for information 
3. The model assumes that if informed, client should be 
able to make their own decisions. 
4. Assumptions about human behavior and psychology 
simplified and minimized; cognitive and rational processes 
are emphasized 
5. Counseling task is to provide information as impartially 
and as balanced as possible 
6. Education is an end in itself 
7. Relationship with client is based on authority rather than 
mutuality4 
The psychotherapeutic model, what Kessler terms the ‘counseling model,’ involves the 
following theses: 
1. Goals a) understand the other person b) to bolster their 
inner sense of competence c ) to promote a greater sense of 
control over their lives d) relieve psychological distress if 
possible e) to support and possibly raise their self-esteem f) 
to help them find solutions to specific problems 
2. Based on perception that clients come for counseling for 
complex reasons 
3. The model has complex assumptions about human 
behavior and psychology which are brought to bear in 
counseling 
4. Counseling task complex: a) requires assessment of 
client’s strengths and limitations, needs, values and 
decision trends b) requires range of counseling skills to 
achieve goals and c) requires individualized counseling 
style to fit client’s needs and agendas; flexibility d) requires 
counselor to attend to and take care of his own inner life 
                                                
4 Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Ix. Teaching and Counseling," 288. 
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5. Education is used as a means to achieve above goals 
6. Relationship aims for mutuality5   
The teaching model on Kessler’s account equips the health care professional (HCP) to 
send an objective, unbiased message to an autonomous client who will make a rational 
decision once he or she possesses the right information; whereas the psychotherapeutic 
model conjoins HCP and patient to explore genetic information in the context of a 
personal relationship that seeks mutual understanding as the basis for optimal decision 
making and adaptation.  Kessler’s theoretical account of the two different models has 
found empirical purchase in recent studies.  
Ellington’s study of communication styles in genetic counseling sessions 
reinforces this two-pronged understanding of available approaches.6  The researchers 
analyzed 167 genetic counseling sessions that involved explaining to the patient the 
circumstances and consequences of undergoing a genetic test for susceptibility to breast 
cancer. They identified four styles: 1) client-focused psychosocial 2) biomedical question 
and answer 3) counselor-driven psychosocial 4) client focused biomedical.7  One and 
three were designated as consistent with the counseling model; two and four were 
compatible with a teaching approach. The categorizations were based on the amount of 
biomedical and psychosocial content discussed and the process of discussing with 
particular interest in who initiated what content.  This study along with others indicate 
that there are different approaches to genetic counseling and that one way to 
conceptualize the differences is through the teaching and psychotherapeutic models. 
Although the present project focuses on the theoretical aspects of these models, empirical 
                                                
5 Ibid., 290.  
6 Ellington and others, "Exploring Genetic Counseling Communication Patterns: The Role of Teaching and 
Counseling Approaches." 
7 Ibid., 183. 
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accounts provide valuable information about how theses approaches are adopted in the 
performances of practitioners.  
Kessler’s synoptic characterization leaves little doubt that the two models 
although not contradictory entail distinct approaches to genetic counseling.  The teaching 
model has a less ambitious agenda than the psychotherapeutic model.  Under the teaching 
approach, the HCP primarily needs to be able to explain genetic information to different 
types of patients, correct misunderstandings and answer any questions the patients may 
have. Under the psychotherapeutic model, explaining the genetic information is only one 
part of a psychological equation that leads to optimal adjustment by the patient.  The 
HCP must elicit not only the genetic history from the patient but also expressions of the 
patient’s experience of hearing the information and other relevant collateral commitments 
that allow the genetic counselor to understand the patient’s perspective and to intervene 
appropriately. Such interventions include skillful responses to the intense emotional 
states of some patients and to the ambivalence that some patients experience in the 
decision-making process.  Whether these models produce the respective outcomes to 
which they aim is an empirical question but their differences in goals and tasks raises a 
normative question:  How should these models be related to guide clinicians in this 
professional task? 
One straightforward solution is to combine them.  The most common route has 
been to subsume the teaching model under the psychotherapeutic model.  Kessler’s 
summary above attempts to incorporate the teaching model by acknowledging it as an 
important means to reaching larger psychological ends.  The most recent definition of 
genetic counseling offered by the National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) 
 5 
combines the two models and incorporates the teaching and counseling approaches 
seemingly without taking sides:   
Genetic counseling is the process of helping people 
understand and adapt to the medical, psychological and 
familial implications of the genetic contributions to disease. 
This process integrates the following: 
•  Interpretation of family and medical histories to assess 
the chance of disease occurrence or recurrence. 
•  Education about inheritance, testing, management, 
prevention, resources and research. 
•  Counseling to promote informed choices and adaptation 
to the risk or condition.8 
Helping people understand is consistent with teaching goals; helping people adapt 
follows from the psychotherapeutic model.  The three kinds of implications and the three 
components to be integrated are an acknowledgment of both models.  A question left 
unanswered by this definition is how to integrate all of these components if tensions exist 
between them.  The differences between the two models entail not only kinds and 
quantities of goals and tasks but also the normative commitments that motivate these 
ends and means.  Some advocates of the teaching model claim that it is inappropriate to 
do psychotherapy in a genetic counseling session; whereas proponents of the 
psychotherapeutic model claim that addressing psychological needs of the patient is a 
necessary aspect of genetic counseling.    
In light of the NSGC definition, those who undertake genetic counseling would be 
expected to employ pedagogical skills such as articulating complicated information in 
ways accessible to a diverse client base; and to offer psychological assessments and 
interventions that would enhance a patients ability to make decisions and cope with them.  
                                                
8 R. Resta and others, "A New Definition of Genetic Counseling: National Society of Genetic Counselors' 
Task Force Report," J Genet Couns 15, no. 2 (2006): 77. 
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Kessler concludes that combining these skills into a unified approach to short-term 
counseling requires an “unusually gifted and flexible professional” and yet he says this is 
the challenge of the profession.9  I accept Kessler’s claim that utilizing this combined 
skill set is a challenge but question whether the details of this integration can be 
understood from the standpoint of either model.  What both lack is an adequate account 
of communication that specifies the process of coordinating meanings across different 
perspectives. 
Communication is a key term in the American Society of Human Genetics 
(ASHG) definition (1975) that continues to have an authoritative status in the field: 
Genetic counseling is a communication process which 
deals with the human problems associated with the 
occurrence or risk of occurrence of a genetic disorder in a 
family. This process usually involves an attempt by one or 
more appropriately trained persons to help the individual or 
family to (1) comprehend the medical facts including the 
diagnosis, the probable course of the disorder and the 
available management; (2) appreciate the ways heredity 
contributes to the disorder and the risk of recurrence in 
specified relatives (3) understand the alternatives for 
dealing with the risk of recurrence (4) choose a course of 
action which seems appropriate in view of their risk, their 
family goals and their ethical and religious standards and 
act in accordance with that decision and to (5) make the 
best possible adjustment to the disorder in an affected 
family member and/or to the risk of recurrence of that 
disorder.10 
The NSGC acknowledges the influence this definition has had but concludes that a more 
concise one is needed to circulate in the growing number of medical circumstances that 
require genetic counseling.  The need for a shorter definition may be justified but it also 
increases the need to elaborate its meaning. The omission of communication from the 
                                                
9 Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Ix. Teaching and Counseling," 294. 
10 Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Counseling, "Genetic Counseling," Am J Hum Genet 27, no. 2 (1975): 
240-2. 
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most recent definition, by my lights, is a theoretical loss because it is the shared practice 
that defines the genetic counseling relationship.  Some, including Kessler, welcome the 
jettisoning of the term ‘communication process’ because it seemingly refers to a 
mechanical transmission of information rather than a mutual relationship.11  This 
transmission view of communication is impoverished and raises the question of what is 
an appropriate understanding of communication.     
In this chapter, I propose that both models of genetic counseling are underwritten 
by problematic visions of communication that lack the expressive resources to be 
responsive to the rapidly changing contexts in which genetic counseling is undertaken.12 
These visions of communication are referred to henceforth as the technical and 
therapeutic visions of communication.13  First, I rehearse what is referred to as the 
spiritualist tradition from which the technical and therapeutic visions inherit their 
problems. Next, I elaborate what these visions entail including the problems they inherit 
and their respective attempts to overcome them. I then demonstrate how the technical 
vision of communication underwrites the teaching model of genetic counseling and how 
the therapeutic vision underwrites the psychotherapeutic model.14  The next few sections 
serve the purpose of relating a very specific discussion about genetic counseling to a 
more general conversation about communication and its challenges. 
 
                                                
11 S. Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Xiv. Nondirectiveness and Counseling 
Skills," Genet Test 5, no. 3 (2001): 187. 
12 I have borrowed the term ‘expressive resources’ from Robert Brandom.  It refers to linguistic phenomena  
that allow us to relate explicitly to features of our world, i.e. rocks and logic, rather than remain implicit. 
Having expressive resources allows to talk about and judge our world in ways not possible by 
nondiscursive means.  To recognize that expressive resources are lacking one must have access to the 
missing resources.  
13 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 63-108. 
14 In the next chapter, I introduce a responsibilist model of genetic counseling and underwrite it with a 
pragmatic theory of communication.  
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Spiritualist Tradition 
The technical and therapeutic visions of communication have a more or less 
precise set of meanings that once set out can be traced alongside the teaching and 
psychotherapeutic models in genetic counseling.  In telling the story of these visions and 
the tradition they inherit, I largely rely on the work of communication theorist, John 
Durham Peters.  In Speaking into the Air, Peters ascribes a two-pronged understanding of 
communication in U.S. culture following World War II:  
In the postwar ferment about communication, then two 
discourses were dominant: a technical one about 
information theory and a therapeutic one about 
communication as cure and disease.  Each has deep roots in 
American cultural history.  The technicians of 
communication are a diverse breed, from Samuel F.B. 
Morse to Marshall McLuhan from Charles Horton Cooley 
to Al Gore, from Buckminster Fuller to Alvin Toffler but 
they all think the imperfections of human interchange can 
be redressed by improved technology or techniques.  They 
want to mimic the angels by mechanical or electronic 
means...The therapeutic vision of communication in turn 
developed within humanist and existential psychology but 
both its roots and its branches spread much wider, to the 
nineteenth century attack on Calvinism and its replacement 
by a therapeutic ethos of self-realization and the self-
culture pervading American bourgeois life.  Both the 
technical and therapeutic visions claim that the obstacles 
and troubles in human contact can be solved, whether by 
better technologies or better techniques of relating and 
hence are also latter day heirs to the angelogical dream of 
mutual ensoulment.15 
If Peters’ argument holds, then it should not be surprising that these dominant narratives 
about communication are found in many of the cultural practices in the U.S. especially in 
the biomedical sector where disease, technology, and cure are core concepts.     
                                                
15 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 28-29. 
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The two visions that Peters articulates have inherited a set of problems from what 
he terms the spiritualist tradition.  The account he gives of this tradition is highly 
selective in its retrieval of representative texts and is almost exclusively an intellectual 
history. Its importance for this project is that it provides a sketch of a genealogy that 
traces an ongoing set of attitudes about understandings of communication.  If we are to 
understand genetic counseling as a specific kind of communication, then Peters’ account 
provides one interpretation of the problems and solutions that genetic counseling inherits 
and addresses.     
Peters ascribes a movement between two basic problematics that informs the 
technical and therapeutic visions under consideration:  “The spiritualist view of 
communication oscillates between the dream of shared interiorities and the hassle of 
imperfect media. The middle ground of pragmatic making due is rarely noted.”16 
Before cultivating pragmatic ground in the next chapter, these two problematic attitudes 
toward communication need elaboration. The first stance articulates the problem of 
human communication by comparing it to an ideal of perfectly shared interiorities. The 
second stance diagnoses the problem as stemming from our flawed resources for 
mediating interiorities.         
The dream of shared interiorities is a communicative ideal that prescribes how 
creatures who have ‘interiors’ should connect.  The concept of interior refers to a 
spatiotemporal location where attitudes, ideas, norms and preferences reside.  The ideal 
state of connection between interiors is transparent access or complete identity with 
another’s interior. In this state, I would actually be able to see the world completely from 
                                                
16 Ibid., 65. 
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your perspective.  The concept of interior entails an exterior. In the case of people, the 
exterior is bodily and hides or obstructs this interior sphere of reality.  Bodies also have 
the property of being located in a spatiotemporal field that prevents them from being able 
stand in the same spot at the same time.  Our interiors or spirits are trapped and separated 
by this incarnate reality.   
Although the intellectual history of interiority is not traced here, its expanse is 
hinted at by Peters’ motif of angels and the role they have played in creating the dream of 
sharing what is inside of us.17  Angels represent on Peters account the Christian 
tradition’s symbol of a communicative ideal marked by the immaterial (non-mediated) 
contact of spirits tracing back to Augustine.18  This ideal contrasts with the human 
experience of communication as a mediated, fleshly activity. The angels have no material 
bodies and thus do not need to incarnate their spiritual contents.  But this leaves the 
question of whether the interior/exterior distinction applies to angels at all?  Aquinas, 
who was more explicit about the speech of angels than Augustine, takes up this question 
in the Summa Theologica:  
External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on 
account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit 
an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this 
includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but 
also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. 
So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the 
angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept.19 
Aquinas notion of “interior speech” and “its being ordered to another’s knowledge” can 
only be understood in reference to external speech between distant bodies but this order 
                                                
17 The observable existence of angels is not at issue here but rather their existence within a conceptual 
imaginary that specifies communication.   
18 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 76.  
19 Thomas Aquinas and Dominicans. English Province., Summa Theologica, Complete English ed. 
(Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981). Part 1, Question 107, Article 1. 
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of understanding should not confused with the ordering of existence.  Angels as pure 
spirit can logically exist and communicate prior to humanity and yet can be understood 
only from our standpoint as embodied spirits.  What is important for this project is that 
Aquinas and Augustine are using what may be a problematic ontological picture to do 
some important reflective work on the practice of communication. They are comparing 
our discursive lot to angels, and the grass is clearly greener on the angelic side.   
This theme of a spiritual interior trapped inside an opaque exterior has run 
through many other influential narratives.  A dominant reworking of this story gets 
expressed as the public and private domains of meaning.  As Peters continues the 
narrative of the spiritualist tradition, the idea of interiority links Augustine to Locke who 
developed the notion of communication in innovative ways.  Locke’s individualistic 
account of communication combines an “Augustinian semiotic of inner and outer, a 
political program of individual liberty and a scientific imagination of clean processes of 
transmission.”20  These elements are ultimately incompatible.  In trying to work out the 
relation between public and private meanings, Locke needed to start with the sovereignty 
of the individual and his ideas, but this left the public dimension of meaning under 
theorized.21 His account could not square with the notion that meanings must be 
understood first as social practical phenomena that get appropriated by individuals.   
Nonetheless, his influence on ideas of communication can be summarized in the 
often-quoted statement in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding:     
To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it 
is necessary, as has been said, that they excite in the hearer 
exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the 
speaker. Without this, men fill one another's heads with 
                                                
20 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 88. 
21  Ibid., 87. 
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noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, 
and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the end 
of discourse and language.22 
In the sentences that follow this passage, Locke does acknowledge that complex ideas 
cannot be replicated in the same way as simple ideas – he gives the example of moral 
ideas – in part because these concepts are not stable ideas within the individual.  Locke 
clearly knew that communication rarely reached its ideal end.  The acceptance of this 
limitation reinforced his assumptions that ideas are private and prior to their formulation 
in language and that language is a rough bodily instrument that fails in comparison to the 
sharing of pure spirits.23 
Although Locke’s project failed to reconcile its incompatible parts, Peters points 
out that his thinking continues to script many of the ways we understand communication.  
An enduring and dominant understanding of meaning, which reflects Lockean insights, is 
what Peregrin calls a psychologico-semiotic semantics.24  Successful communication is 
one person’s matching of psychic entities with signs that are then conveyed to another 
person who experiences the same psychic entities in recognizing the signs.  The inability 
to communicate comes either from inadequate signs to express psychic entities or 
unstable psychic states that make the matching of signs difficult.  The experience of not 
being understood or having private thoughts is easily caught up in this picture of 
                                                
22  John Locke and P. H. Nidditch, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, The Clarendon Edition of 
the Works of John Locke (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1979), Book 3, 
Chapter 9, Section 6.    
23 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 87. Peters directs attention to 
Locke’s comments on the communication of spirits in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(2.23.36): “That, in our ideas of spirits, how much so ever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, 
even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one 
to another: though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter 
knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their 
thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds; which are 
therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of.” 
24 Jaroslav Peregrin, Meaning and Structure : Structuralism of (Post)Analytic Philosophers, Ashgate New 
Critical Thinking in Philosophy (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001), 16. 
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mismatched signs. Despite the proximities of bodies and the exchange of words, spirits 
can remain unmatched and distant.  If the ideal of communication is the complete unity of 
understanding as shared interiors, one is entitled to frustration with available expressive 
resources.     
This frustration leads to the second stance of the spiritualist tradition that 
identifies our communication problems as being caused by imperfect media.  Language 
and the bodies that produce it are the usual suspects in discursive hassles.  Many 
language users recognize the experience of knowing what needs to be said but not having 
the words to say it; or the frustration of being ‘tongue tied’ where the mouth and tongue 
as instruments do not functioning properly on occasion. In the spiritualist account, these 
discontents warrant either an acceptance of trapped interiors or a hopeful resolve to 
understand and change the problem.  Locke placed confidence in the scientific 
knowledge of nature, ethics and communication leaving open the possibility that science 
and technology could overcome discursive constraints.   
The problem of imperfect media gets developed in responses to the medieval 
scholastic question about action in distans. 25  How do objects/creatures at distant points 
on a spatiotemporal grid have an effect on one another?  The concept of media, as did the 
English word ‘communication,’ emerged as scientist offered answers to this question.26     
Scientists who addressed this question included intellectual mainstays of the 16th 
and 17th centuries such as Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton.  Bacon offered a list of 
                                                
25 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 75.  
26 Despite their development of notions of thought and language, Augustine and Aquinas writing in Latin 
did not have access to a word that plays a similar role as ‘communication’ does in English. Peters 
introduces Locke after the early scientific materialist development because he is organizing his account 
chronologically.  I place Locke before the materialists because I am ordering my account around the two 
problematics  of the spiritualist tradition.  Etymologically, Locke inherited communication as a concept 
from the materialists.  
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phenomena that can be transmitted such as light, heat, sound and “immateriate virtues.”27  
He did not work out exactly how such transmissions took place but linked nonnormative 
and normative phenomena i.e. heat and virtues, in his exploration of how separated 
objects affect one another. Newton also wrestled to understand forces and their pathways.  
Peters highlights several key concepts introduced by Newton that have endured: 
Newton’s description in 1687 Principia of universal 
gravitation and its operation was first and foremost an 
account of action at a distance.  Like magnetism, light and 
heat, he thought gravity traveled via an “imponderable” or 
insensible fluid.  The word Newton used for this fluid, in 
both his English and Latin writings, was “medium.” 
Newton call this “universal and subtle medium” the 
sensorum dei (sensorium of God). He saw the cosmos as 
bathed in a cosmic intelligence communicating at a 
distance through a marvelous, intangible essence.  This 
force or intelligence prevented us from flying off into 
space…Like his late nineteenth century British successors 
in physics, Newton took this medium not simply as a sterile 
physical fact but as full of spiritual suggestion.  In Newton 
“communication” and “medium” have much of their 
modern senses without their modern spheres of use. One 
means the transmission of immaterial forces or entities at a 
distance and the other the mechanism or vehicle of such 
transmission.28 
Both Newton and Bacon were trying to understand transmissible phenomena, some 
observable, some not. In these efforts, they blur the line between physics of the cosmos 
and the metaphysics of intentionality.  Their thoughts reinforced the link between 
communication and transmission and raised further questions about the material nature of 
communication and its mediums.  
Peters characterizes Bacon’s and Newton’s thinking as transitional, moving away 
from scholasticism’s highly metaphysical answers and inching closer to material 
                                                
27 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 78. 
28 Ibid., 80. 
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explanations and technical solutions to the problem of transmission.  The most important 
development of the link between communication and media was the telegraph.  “What 
hath God Wrought” was the first electrical, telegraphic message sent from Washington 
D.C. to Baltimore by Samuel Morse in 1844.  From the spiritualist standpoint, this 
technical feat chipped away at the spatiotemporal challenges of communication between 
remote bodies.  Technology had overcome one kind of distance and maybe it could 
eventually close all the gaps between persons. An unintended consequence of the 
telegraph is that it reinforced the idea of disembodied spirits. As a result, a variety of 
cultural phenomena such the emergence of professional mediums arose that combined 
technological and spiritual vocabularies in a way that has continued to shape the way we 
think about communication. No longer did spirits seem limited by “natural” constraints.29  
The progression of technological feats in the hundred years after Morse’s breakthrough 
reinforced the belief that humans could overcome their discursive distances either 
through improved mechanisms of transmission or better interpersonal techniques. 
Peters’ genealogy of the spiritualist tradition traces a trajectory of ideas that shape 
the backdrop of specific visions of human communication.  The dream of unmediated or 
transparent contact and the despair over available media may seem like remote fantasies 
of a bygone era; however, these dreams and dissatisfactions play a part in the ongoing 
political, professional, and personal conversations about responses to human differences.   
The discussions about genetic counseling should be understood within this larger 
argument and inherit its potential benefits and harms.  On the one hand, the spiritualist 
                                                
29 Peters notes that four years after the telegraph the first organized version of spiritualism began in the U.S. 
with the rapping sounds of Kate and Margaret Fox of Hydesville, New York.  These women became well 
known mediums that allegedly channeled the spirits of the dead.   Communicating with the dead, although 
an ancient practice, helped to coordinate technological and spiritual vocabularies. 
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tradition hopes for the kind of transparency that can lead to greater understanding and 
responsibility.  This aspiration can clearly benefit health care communication. On the 
other hand, it strives for a certain kind of identification with others that overrides 
differences requiring a kind of doubling or replication of self in the other through 
communication.  This aim should cause concern that powerful institutions like medicine 
have hegemonic tendencies that undermine other vocabularies and perspectives.  Keeping 
in mind both the benefits and the harms, the spiritualist tradition’s goal of shared 
interiorities and its aspiration to more perfect mediums should be interpreted as 
motivating important visions of communication that have affected genetic counseling. 
 
A Technical Vision of Communication  
One proposed solution to our communication problems is to understand them as 
technical problems that require technological solutions. This solution is referred to in this 
project as the technical vision of communication.  Mathematics is the preferred 
vocabulary to explain how communication works and objective information is the most 
promising candidate to achieve the goal of sharing interiors.   
Communication theorists refer to the 1949 publication of Claude Shannon and 
Warren Weaver’s The Mathematical Theory of Communication as the watershed moment 
not only for information theory but also for the coalescence of the technical vision of 
communication.30  Fed by wartime research on cryptography and telecommunications, 
information theory offered a new and systematic way to think not only about technical 
communication systems but to think technically about communication.  A message 
                                                
30 Claude Elwood Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana,: 
University of Illinois Press, 1949). 
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begins with an information source that is sent by an encoding transmitter through a 
channel with variable amounts of noise to a decoding receiver that allows the message to 
reach its destination.  Although Shannon stated that his theory had a limited scope, his 
model became a powerful metaphor to describe all aspects of linguistic communication. 
Noam Chomsky recollects that: 
Virtually every engineer or psychologist with whom I had 
any contact and many professional linguists as well, took 
for granted that the formal models of language proposed in 
the mathematical theory of communication provided the 
appropriate framework for general linguistic theory.31 
Why would a mathematical theory delimited to encoding, sending and decoding 
syntactically recognizable messages find such fertile ground in the minds of academics?  
The conceptual possibilities for extending the theory were easily recognizable and were 
developed from the start.  
The process of expanding the scope of information theory begins in Weaver’s 
introduction to Shannon’s model.  Weaver lists three levels of communication problems: 
Level  A - How accurately can the symbols of 
communication be transmitted? 
Level  B – How precisely do the transmitted symbols 
convey the desired meaning? 
Level  C – How effectively does the received meaning 
affect the conduct in the desired way?32 
He acknowledges that Shannon’s model addressed only the problems at Level A.  At the 
same time, he suggests that the theory could be extended to the issues at the other levels. 
Radford and others argue that Weaver’s extension of information theory draws upon 
available philosophical and psychological conceptions of communication.   
                                                
31 Lily E. Kay, Who Wrote the Book of Life? : A History of the Genetic Code, Writing Science (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 304. 
32 Gary P. Radford, On the Philosophy of Communication, Wadsworth Philosophical Topics (Belmont, 
Calif.: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 72-73. 
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Weaver’s first sentence of the introduction reads: “The word communication will 
be used here in a very broad sense to include all procedures by which one mind may 
affect another.”33 Radford notes that this conception of communication is consistent with 
the Lockean notion of communication as words exciting the same idea in the minds of 
speaker and audience. It should also be noted that the scholastic question about action at a 
distance is perpetuated in this claim. Radford cites three more passages where Weaver 
could not resist translating the information model to the complex practice of linguistic 
communication: 
1) In oral speech, the information source is the brain, the 
transmitter is the voice mechanism producing the varying 
air pressure (the signal) which is transmitted through air 
(the channel)… 
2) The receiver is a sort of inverse transmitting, changing 
the transmitted signal back into a message and handing this 
message on to the destination. When I talk to you, my brain 
is the information source, you’re the destination; my vocal 
system is the transmitter and your ear and the associated 
eighth nerve is the receiver.  
3) The semantic problems are concerned with identity or 
satisfactorily close approximation, in the interpretation of 
meaning by the receiver as compared with the intended 
meaning of the sender. This is a very deep and involved 
situation.34           
The first two passages reinforce that Weaver is combining information theory with 
vestiges of a Lockean account.  The third passage indirectly addresses semantic problems 
and associates meaning with the intentions of the sender.  Radford cites a subsequent 
piece by Weaver that restates the problem as specifying the pathway of meaning “through 
some as yet unknown mind-brain process.” Weaver, according to Radford,  “is taking 
Shannon’s mathematical model into the discourse of psychology, unknown mental 
                                                
33 Ibid., 74. 
34 Ibid., 74-75. 
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processes, the unconscious, and the problem of discovering those information processing 
routines.”35 If Radford is right, then Weaver’s efforts generate connections between 
information theory and a dominant philosophical understanding of communication as 
transmission; and an emerging psychological narrative about internal communication 
processes between the conscious and the unconscious.  What Weaver demonstrates is the 
heritability of Shannon’s model into other vocabularies.  If the claim of this section is that 
genetic counselors are influenced by information theory and its technical vision of 
communication, then a story must be told about how information theory gets recombined 
into a genetic idiom.  
Lily Kay has offered a detailed history of the influence that information theory 
had and continues to have on the development of the conceptual schemes in molecular 
biology.  In a Foucauldian genealogy, she goes to painstaking lengths to show how the 
powerful information and controls systems produced by a conglomeration of 
governmental, academic and industrial agencies in 1940’s and 50’s were appropriated by 
molecular biologists such as Sol Spiegleman, Henry Quastler, James Watson and Francis 
Crick. Crick marks the borrowed status of information in an account of the central dogma 
of genetics: 
Once “information” has passed into protein it cannot get 
out again.  In more detail the transfer of information from 
nuclei acid to nucleic acid, or from nucleic acid to protein 
may be possible, but transfer from protein to protein from 
protein to nucleic acid is impossible.  Information means 
here the precise determination of sequence, either of bases 
in the nucleic acid or of the amino acid.36  
                                                
35 Ibid., 74. 
36 Kay, 174. 
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Crick’s use of information theory to understand a biological process gave birth to a host 
of analogies.  Seminal metaphors such as the ‘genetic code,’ Kay points out, have 
become literal and hide important incongruities such as: DNA is not a code but a chain of 
base pairs involved in a complex process of biological specificity. The grip of the 
information metaphor was strengthened by the efforts of reputable linguists such as 
Roman Jakobson who adopted information transmission both as an adequate conception 
of linguistic practices and as the key to understanding biological heritability.37 Kay’s 
account and analysis provides insight into the conceptual resources of the academic 
communities that shaped genetic specialists who would eventually pioneer the task of 
genetic counseling. 
 A sketch of the technical vision’s key theses will make the stance more explicit 
and recognizable in the teaching model of genetic counseling. Each vision and theory in 
this project are organized and compared by their respective answers to the following 
questions: 1) What are we doing when we communicate?  2) What is meaning?  The 
answers provide criteria for recognizing how the vision motivates the respective genetic 
counseling model. 
 
 Theses of the Technical Vision 
What are we doing when we communicate? Communication according to the 
technical vision is an act of transmitting information from a source to a destination. In 
terms of interpersonal communication, the information idiom provides a vocabulary to 
understand several phenomena in conversation: choosing what to say, how to say it, the 
                                                
37 Ibid., 304-5. 
 21 
speaking and hearing of an utterance, the interpretation and understanding of the 
utterance. As an act of transmission, conversational phenomena are roughly aligned with 
the processes of selecting, encoding, sending, decoding, and receiving messages.  Weaver 
suggests that we 1) select messages from the brain 2) encode them into language 3) 
transmit them through an air channel by vocalizing 4) receive the message through the 
ear 5) decode the message from language into a form of mental state of the brain.  One 
does not have to stretch to far to see this as a technological updating of the Lockean 
understanding of having mental ideas that are then matched to the linguistic signs and 
conveyed to a recipient who then has the same mental ideas.  
What is meaning?  Although Shannon’s and Weaver’s version of information 
theory claims no insight into semantics, its appropriation as a general theory of 
communication necessitates a theory of meaning.  It is compatible with a representational 
theory of meaning, which is a theoretically informed account of the psychologico-
semiotic theory of meaning referred to above.  Meaning begins with individual words that 
refer to objects and properties and when combined into expressions (or sentences) 
represent states of affairs.  This account of meaning is often characterized as atomistic in 
at least two respects. First, it is an explanatory strategy that begins with parts of a 
sentence and their corresponding referents, and puts them together to form expressions or 
sentences.  It is also atomistic in that the meaning of one expression does not depend on 
other expressions but only on the sum of a sentence’s parts.  
Interpretation and understanding are explained in terms of decoding and receiving 
the meaning of an utterance or text.  It should be noted here that this view runs counter to 
influential accounts of interpretation that can be traced to the Gadamerian insight that 
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every text or utterance has a plurality of meanings.  For the technical vision, the meaning 
is contained in the expression that the speaker or author forms by matching signifiers 
with signifieds.  The circumstances and consequences of an utterance are deemphasized 
because the literal meaning is found in a grammatically correct form of a sentence.38  
Interpretation requires that a recipient be able to pick out (decode) expressions as 
sentences and have familiarity with the referents in the sentence.  Education is needed in 
genetic counseling because patients are often not familiar with referents, i.e. 
chromosome.   
One reason that emotions and feelings are more difficult to interpret is that what is 
signified remains hidden in the body of the person signifying.  This might be termed a 
decoding problem that is compounded by the difficulty of encoding an emotional 
‘message’.  The person who is signifying must meet the challenge of moving from a fluid 
awareness of a complex physiological response to an articulation of it using pre-
established signifiers. As a result, the interpreter of an utterance of emotion does not have 
access to what the speaker is actually feeling and therefore lacks familiarity with the 
referent.  Education is not available in the same way for this highly subjective state.     
Understanding the meaning of a message is achieved in communication when the 
interpreter’s mental state of ideas reflects the same expressions and meanings as the 
speaker.  The same message that is sent is the same one that is received.  Achieving 
understanding is more likely when the messages are objective in the sense of being 
observable and/or testable; understanding is unlikely when expressions signify subjective 
feelings and metaphysical realities.            
                                                
38 John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning : Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge, Eng. ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 117. Searle challenges the notion that most sentences have literal 
meaning independent of context or in “zero context.” 
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In a strict sense, information theory is almost pure syntax.39 It refers to a highly 
syntactical process of taking message forms, i.e. sentences, encoding them as numeric 
formulae to be decoded on the receiving end.  Meaning is presupposed in the message.  In 
terms of interpersonal communication, the technical vision proposes that the probability 
of effective transmission is increased when highly probable syntactic forms are sent and 
received.  One of the challenges of genetic counseling is that complex information must 
be communicated in highly probable syntactic forms, i.e. forms that a patient will likely 
recognize.  For example, if a genetic counselor carefully crafts a script with as simple 
sentence structure and as little jargon as possible it makes the decoding easier on the 
patient.  Patients who can easily access and apply this information are more likely to 
make rational decisions. 
     
The Technical Vision and the Teaching Model of Genetic Counseling 
James Sorenson’s description of genetic counseling from mid 1940’s to the late 
1960’s suggests that academic geneticists were pulled into genetic counseling because 
they were only ones with knowledge to address the problems of the recurrence of genetic 
diseases.  He characterizes their approach as “more ‘scholarly’ than ‘consulting’ 
professionals.”40  Using the work of medical sociologist, Eliot Friedman, Sorenson 
elaborates that genetic counseling was undertaken in this period with the attitude of 
transmitting objective information, what Friedman describes as the “ideology of technical 
                                                
39 Body language and other non-linguistic structures lack clear rules for usage and therefore tend to be 
neglected by this vision. 
40 J. R. Sorenson, "Genetic Counseling: Values That Have Mattered," in Prescribing Our Future: Ethical 
Challengs in Genetic Counseling, ed. D. M. bartels (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1993), 7. 
 24 
neutrality.”41  This idea of neutrality, according to Sorenson, helped to create the 
principle of nondirective counseling that one finds both in the writings of early genetic 
counselors such as Sheldon Reed and in contemporary discussions about best practices.42   
Sorenson’s account combined with Kay’s history above indicates a high probability that 
genetic counselors at the outset understood themselves as embodying a teaching model 
underwritten by a technical vision of communication. Along with recent empirical 
studies, Kessler’s 1997 schematic summary of the teaching model above suggests that 
this approach to genetic counseling persists.  In rehearsing the tenets of the teaching 
model, Kessler relies most often on Edwards Hsia’s work.   
Hsia’s 1979 essay, “The Genetic Counselor as Information Giver”  represents the 
clearest example of the technical visions influence on the teaching model of genetic 
counseling.43  The essay appears within an influential compilation of articles that address 
the conceptual, social, psychological, moral and legal issues that accompany genetic 
counseling.  In his article, which precedes Seymour Kessler’s “The Genetic Counselor as 
Psychotherapist,” Hsia claims:  
Informing a client about genetic facts and options is the 
essence of genetic counseling. The other responsibilities of 
a genetic counselor are essential adjuncts but these other 
responsibilities are not genetic counseling.  In this chapter 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 For a review of this debate, see Sheldon Clark Reed, Counseling in Medical Genetics (Philadelphia: 
Saunders, 1955).; J. L. Benkendorf and others, "Does Indirect Speech Promote Nondirective Genetic 
Counseling? Results of a Sociolinguistic Investigation," Am J Med Genet 106, no. 3 (2001): 199-207, S. 
Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling: Analysis of a Transcript," Am J Med Genet 8, no. 2 
(1981): 137-53, S. M. Suter, "Value Neutrality and Nondirectiveness: Comments On "Future Directions in 
Genetic Counseling," Kennedy Inst Ethics J 8, no. 2 (1998): 161-3.  
43 Y. Edward Hsia, "The Genetic Counselor as Information Giver," in Genetic Counseling: Facts, Values, 
and Norms, ed. Alexander Morgan Capron, Birth Defects: Original Article Series (New York: Alan R. Liss, 
1979), 169-86. The 28 years that have passed since this article was published do not undermine its 
relevance.  The importance of the article is that it presents the teaching model in sufficient detail to 
articulate the complexities of an approach whose prevalence is significant if not still dominant in actual 
practice.     
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the theme will be that the focus of genetic counseling is to 
inform.  My own attitude built on my experience as a 
medical geneticist and as a genetic counselor strongly 
favors this concept of genetic counseling as a 
communicative process with an educational aim.  I 
advocate the responsibility of genetic counselors to be 
nondirective, nonpsychoanalytic and nonjudgmental.44 
Hsia’s interprets all the efforts of a genetic counselor as contributing to the central act of 
“Information Transfer from Counselor to Counselee.” For this to be done effectively, the 
genetic counselor should gather appropriate information and know the kinds of 
information that patients seek.   
One might expect his model to ignore counselee circumstances and psychosocial 
issues; instead, it incorporates these elements into the information gathering stage. In 
order to encode the message appropriately, a genetic counselor must assess the 
destination of the information by gathering several kinds of information.  These include 
the 1) patient’s prior understandings, 2) the stability of the patient’s “emotional, 
psychiatric, socioeconomic, and family” circumstances 3) general attitudes 4) 
reproductive attitudes.45  How Hsia frames this data gathering is significant.  The purpose 
of collecting this information is to “become aware of and remain sensitive to these factors 
because the way in which these are addressed will determine whether the delivery of the 
genetic information is successful or unsuccessful.”46  What is implied in Hsia’s 
description is that addressing the psychosocial dimensions of patients clears the channel 
through which the genetic information will be sent.  If the patient is too unstable or too 
suspicious of the whole enterprise, then the genetic counselor must acknowledge that the 
                                                
44 Ibid., 169. 
45 Ibid., 170-3. 
46 Ibid., 170. 
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information is not ready to be received and that the patient may need to be referred to the 
appropriate professional for further help. 
As Hsia suggests at the opening, his model has a core that involves the pure 
exchange of genetic information from counselor to counselee and everything else is 
important but peripheral. The genetic counselor should acknowledge not only the 
psychosocial elements of patient but also the “nongenetic” motives for seeking 
information:  
However earnest the genetic counselor might be about 
giving genetic information, when nongenetic concerns are 
uppermost a family will not be receptive to this 
information. A counselee’s motives for seeking 
consultation can include any or all of the following:47 
His list of nongenetic motives reinforces his strict criteria for what is and is not included 
in the core. Patients who seek information about causes of disease, kinds of care, natural 
history of a disease, and family planning are in his model pursuing nongenetic concerns.  
This does not mean that the genetic counselor ignores these issues.  They should be 
addressed sufficiently to clear the channel for the genetic information.  Once these 
concerns have been addressed then the stage has been set to transfer the information.   
Hsia identifies several factors that must be considered when transferring genetic 
information from counselor to counselee. The first is spatiotemporal.  The space must be 
private and free of interruptions. The dimensions and décor of the room must not be 
distracting. Any of these details can “hinder receptiveness of a sensitive counselee.”48  In 
terms of timing, he acknowledges that patient receptiveness and session length are 
important variables that have to be discerned in each case.  The second factor considers 
                                                
47 Ibid., 173. 
48 Ibid., 175. 
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who should be in the room. Hsia does not indicate a formula but cautions against any 
person who might be distracting to the patient in this case a couple, i.e. small children or 
a relative. The third set of factors and probably the most important is headed under, “The 
Manner and Content.”49   
The manner of the counselor should be “simultaneously authoritative and 
sympathetic.”50 Hsia elaborates on the issue of sympathy but not authority:  
a total lack of sympathy can antagonize a counselee, 
preventing effective transfer of information.  Too 
sympathetic or reassuring a manner can be equally 
misleading because the purpose of the counseling is to 
convey facts and to reassure only when the reassurance is 
compatible with reality.51      
Presumably, the genetic counselor must strike the same balance in undertaking authority. 
She must show enough authority to demonstrate competence in explaining the 
information and at the same time refrain from overreaching the bounds of her 
competencies.  This restraint includes explicit acknowledgment of the limitations of 
genetic knowledge and accuracies of screens and tests. The correct manner needs to be 
matched with the right content. Having carefully planned an explanation of the genetic 
facts and options, Hsia cautions counselors not to give mini-genetic courses or to spend 
too much time on numbers because most patients are either overwhelmed or do not find 
these useful.  Jargon should be kept to a minimum and words that evoke emotions should 
be avoided when possible. “The purpose of counseling is to inform without upsetting; so 
euphemisms are perfectly acceptable, provided they do not obscure meaning.”52  In two 
                                                
49 Ibid., 176. 
50 Ibid., 177. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 178. 
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sentences, he notes the role of nonverbal communication claiming that it can reinforce or 
challenge the genetic information offered. 
Although Hsia emphasizes the transfer of information from the counselor to the 
counselee, he does not ignore the need for listening and observing. He acknowledges that 
throughout the entire genetic counseling session the counselor must attend to nonverbal 
clues that express the attitudes of clients and must be “willing to be interrupted whenever 
the counselee wishes to ask a question.”53  The respect and interpretation of silence is also 
a skill that the counselor needs to hone. He notes that when the counselor talks 
constantly, the possibility of exchanging information is removed.                       
Having reviewed Hsia’s model, I want to highlight features that depend on the 
technical vision of communication.  First, his model of communication is one of 
transmission.  This commitment is especially apparent in his consistent use of the ideas of 
transferring and receiving information. Most of tactics within the model serve the general 
strategy of removing obstacles to the patient’s receptivity to genetic information.  One 
consequence of adopting the transmission model is that a successful act of genetic 
counseling is defined by transferring the genetic information from the sender to the 
receiver with as little noise as possible. Noise in this case are the misconceptions of the 
patient, unresolved emotional issues, nongenetic issues or literally the chatter of small 
children.  The mixed message of the Hsia’s account is that all of these are important but 
they are not genetic counseling        
A second feature of Hsia’s model that reflects the technical vision is its atomistic 
account of meaning.  Much effort is put forth to distinguish the “essential adjuncts” of 
                                                
53 Ibid., 179. 
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genetic counseling from genetic counseling proper, which is the explaining of genetic 
facts and options.  Genetic information presumably has a highly circumscribed set of 
meanings that can be isolated from other meanings that express emotions, desires, or 
religious belief.  His position implies that genetic counseling proper is about conveying 
objective information whereas its essential adjuncts include responding to subjective 
attitudes of the counselee.  He suggests that genetic counselors should draw a bright line 
between facts and values and should understand that their core function is the delivery of 
facts not values. 
This semantic account is operational in genetic counseling when the meaning of 
genetic information is thought of as combining references to genes/chromosomes with 
their properties -- or likelihood of having certain properties -- such as a mutation or 
translocation. Since genes and their properties are not readily observable like the redness 
of apples, visual aids and short lessons in genetics are often used to show the meaning of 
genetic information. When patients comment on the genetic information in terms of 
feelings or personal experiences, these utterances create transmission problems. 
Subjective or personal messages are more difficult to encode and decode because they 
involve interior meanings without an objective referent.  They ultimately create noise in 
the channel.  In semantic terms, the technical vision and in turn the teaching model 
prioritizes extensional accounts of meaning (referents/properties to external things) over 
intensional ones (intentions, beliefs, feelings).  
Hsia’s assumptions about meaning depend on the technical vision’s account of 
interpretation and understanding.  Interpretation on Hsia’s account consists of being able 
to receive the genetic facts and options in a form that is recognizable by the counselee.  
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The avoidance of jargon, “flowery phrases” and emotion-laden words promote 
interpretation by removing unknown referents and emotional distortions from the 
process.  A counselee has the best chance of interpreting a genetic fact when its signifiers 
are familiar and his or her emotions are suppressed.  Successful interpretation results in 
understanding.  This is a mental state of possessing the sentences that contained the 
genetic facts and options as the genetic counselor intended.  Understanding is then 
achieved when the intended meaning of the genetic counselor is fully possessed by the 
counselee.      
Hsia’s account of genetic counseling is the most explicit adoption of the technical 
vision and is often referred to when discussions of the teaching model or its components 
arise.54  His appropriation of the transmission metaphor enacts the technical vision of 
communication and allows him to articulate genetic counseling almost completely within 
the idiom of information theory.  But is the relationship between the teaching model and 
the technical vision of communication a necessary one?  In other words, does the 
teaching model of genetic counseling have to be underwritten by this particular vision?  
The short answer is no.  In light of the rich variety of pedagogical traditions available, the 
teaching model of genetic counseling could be revised and underwritten by a much more 
robust understanding of education and communication. Such a generative effort would 
contribute to the value of the teaching model but would require drastic revisions that 
would make the model under consideration unrecognizable.  I have tried to show that in 
                                                
54 Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Ix. Teaching and Counseling," 287-95. Kessler’s 
work has in many ways set the terms of the discussion about genetic counseling models.  His consistent 
reference of Hsia’s work as a paradigm of the teaching model has in a sense revived Hsia’s perspective 
twenty years later.  Charles Bosk cites Hsia as a representative figures in debates about nondirectiveness in 
his Charles Bosk, "The Workplace Ideology of Genetic Counselors," in Prescribing Our Future: Ethical 
Challenges in Genetic Counseling, ed. D. M. Bartels, B. LeRoy, and Arthur L. Caplan (New York: Aldine 
de Gruyter, 1993), 27.    
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the material and intellectual history there is a probable relation between the teaching 
model and the technical vision of communication. 
 
Evaluation 
Having introduced the technical vision and demonstrated its presence in at least 
one influential version of the teaching model, I will now briefly propose some reasons 
why the teaching model of genetic counseling and a technical vision of communication 
are insufficient resources to comprehend the task of genetic counseling.  If this model and 
its concomitant vision guides a genetic counselor’s interaction with patients, then its 
content is found wanting in several areas.  I will use Kessler’s schematic of the teaching 
approach, which is based largely on Hsia’s account, to assess the consequences of this 
model and its concomitant vision.  
1. Goal: educated counselee – One appeal of the teaching models is its 
commitment to a single aim.  The technical vision’s account of communication reinforces 
this limitation on ends because the transmission model reduces the pragmatics of 
communication to the exchange of information.  And yet Hsia’s pursuit of educating a 
counselee faces many challenges of which he is fully aware.  His explanatory strategy is 
to organize genetic counseling as having a core function or essence and a set of essential 
adjuncts.  The former entails the explaining of facts and options; the latter involves 
everything else. 
The strength of Hsia’s conceptualization is that it does articulate the connection 
between addressing essential adjuncts and offering genetic information. Patients are 
sometimes not ready to process information because of personal circumstances related to 
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emotional, family or economic circumstances.  Moreover, many counselees do come with 
misconceptions that need to be addressed.  The problem with acknowledging this 
plurality of issues is that it becomes more difficult to draw lines between content.  Hsia’s 
development of the connection between receiving information and the psychosocial state 
of patient is in tension with his initial claims about the essence of genetic counseling.  If a 
genetic counselor decides that a patient is not ready to receive genetic information 
referring her instead to a social worker, then has any genetic counseling taken place?  In 
Hsia’ strict sense, it has not because no genetic information has been transferred, no 
counselee has been educated.  If such an interaction is not genetic counseling, then how 
should one understand the genetic counselor’s assessment of a counselee’s emotional 
readiness to be educated? Presumably, Hsia would characterize it as a rudimentary 
diagnostic skill that allows a genetic counselor to recognize whether a counselee is “in a 
state” to be receptive.  The single mindedness of this model misses the importance of the 
variety of interactions that occur within a genetic counseling session and also the 
plurality of benefits that are in play.55  
2. Based on perception that clients come for information – The teaching model 
might justify its restrictive view of genetic counseling by referring to its perception that 
patients come to receive genetic information rather than psychotherapy or moral 
consultation.  Kessler’s synopsis of the model is guilty of being too simplistic here 
because Hsia acknowledges that counselees’ attitudes are often motivated by nongenetic 
concerns.  A better description of the model’s stance is that the client should come to 
receive genetic information.  If he or she does not, then the genetic counselor’s task is to 
                                                
55 For a study that identifies the large number of benefits at stake, see, B. A. Bernhardt, B. B. Biesecker, 
and C. L. Mastromarino, "Goals, Benefits, and Outcomes of Genetic Counseling: Client and Genetic 
Counselor Assessment," Am J Med Genet 94, no. 3 (2000): 189-97. 
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address other concerns in order to clear the way for the transfer of genetic information.  
The problem with attributing the reason a counselee should participate in the session is 
that the other reasons may actually be vital to a counselee’s understanding of the genetic 
information in a holistic way.  Hsia’s account presupposes an atomistic semantics where 
meanings can be contained in their separate spheres, whereas the conversational moves in 
an actual session do not function within such circumscribed spheres.  This feature of 
conversation challenges the notion that districts of meaning can be easily defined.  For 
example, in Debbie’s case, the genetic counseling session refers to chromosomes, 
responsibility, and God’s will. These seemingly disparate meanings are all tied to the 
interpretation of genetic information. I will say more on this below.       
3. The model assumes that if informed, clients should be able to make their own 
decisions - Although the issues around decision making are taken up more fully in 
chapter three, several problems can be suggested at this stage.  Hsia has a highly 
restrictive view of the counselor’s role in a counselee’s decision making process.  His 
hands-off approach is motivated in part by his definition of a rational decision. Once the 
information has been transferred then the patient must make a decision with respect to his 
or her beliefs.  A rational decision is one that is made after careful deliberation of the 
genetic information by the patient. The attribution of rationality is not based on outcome. 
The strength of Hsia’s view is that ‘rational’ is not restricted to logical inferences that 
follow from an idealized scientific perspective.  Rational decisions are marked by the 
patient’s reasoning and cannot be made by the genetic counselor even when the patient 
wants or expects a recommendation from the health care professional.  The weakness of 
Hsia’s view is that it advocates the presumption that a counselee is fully transparent to 
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herself and is fully competent in making inferences about genetic information using 
personal information.  Hsia’s model presumes that interiorities can be shared only 
through a thin channel of objectivity and that the subjective contents of decision making 
are better left to their owners.     
4. Assumptions about human behavior and psychology simplified and minimized; 
cognitive and rational processes are emphasized –  Hsia’s account does simplify 
assumptions about human psychology or behavior.  This effort to minimize such 
assumptions is an acknowledgment of the limitations of a genetic counselor’s 
competencies in understanding and responding to the psychological and social problems 
of a patient. At the same time, these concerns, Hsia notes, cannot be avoided. Hsia’s 
account glosses over what competencies are required to be sensitive to these issues in a 
way that serves patient education.  
 The teaching model does emphasize cognitive and rational processes but the 
problem is that this emphasis is simplistic. The presuppositions about the interpretive 
processes and the achievement of understanding rely on the technical vision’s image of 
transfer and receipt with the result of achieving identical mental state in reference to the 
genetic information. The complexities and challenges of linguistic practices are reduced 
to transmission problems that are attributed to generic differences between perspectives.  
That vocabularies, i.e. religious and genetic, themselves are sometimes difficult to 
adjudicate is never considered.         
5. Counseling task is to provide information as impartially and as balanced as 
possible – Most of the teaching model’s commitments hinge on the idea that under the 
right conditions a genetic counselor can transfer objective information to the patient in a 
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way that the patient can receive it.  A criticism of this assertion is that the genetic 
counselor decides what information should be given and that this selection is based on 
perceptions about what information is valuable.  Hsia acknowledges that a completely 
unbiased counselor is a “myth”: 
Whenever a counselor presents information, however 
sincerely he or she may strive for objectivity, the tone of 
voice, choice of words and nonverbal will all add 
subjective color to the objective facts.56  
This admission maintains a distinction between objective facts and their delivery.  What 
Hsia’s model misses is the differences between the circumstances that produced the 
objective fact and the circumstances that entitle a genetic counselor to offer it to the 
counselee. What makes a fact objective is the repeatable circumstances that produced the 
proposition.  The circumstances that entitle genetic information to be offered to patients 
are not the same as the circumstances of its production as a fact.  For example, there has 
been significant debate about when an amniocentesis should be recommended to a 
pregnant woman.  The criterion currently in use is: When the probability of miscarriage 
from amniocentesis equals the probability of having a child with a genetic abnormality, 
then the pregnant woman should offered amniocentesis. These two outcomes can be 
compared because they can be interpreted as harms.  The circumstance in which the 
information is offered is clearly not the same as the circumstance that produced the 
probability nor are the potential harms commensurate.  The teaching model as expressed 
by Hsia underestimates the values needed to use objective facts in circumstances outside 
the ones that produced them.   
                                                
56 Hsia, 184. 
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6. Education is an end in itself - This commitment has similarities to the goal of 
an educated client but is a much stronger claim, one that is highly compatible with the 
technical vision of communication. One consequence is that the criterion for success of 
genetic counseling becomes transferring the genetic information in an accessible way and 
answering all of the patient’s questions.  Confirmed success could be established through 
an objective instrument to measure the counselee’s understanding.57  A second 
consequence is that other concerns can be dealt with as issues subservient to the 
educational task similar to the way classroom teachers sometimes view disciplinary 
issues.  
The problem with this restrictive model of communication can be seen in 
following circumstance: The genetic counselor has succeeded on the above terms but is 
left with an ambivalent patient who is clearly distraught by what they have learned.  To 
define success in purely educational terms raises the question of the genetic counselor’s 
status as a health care professional and the benefits this role should attempt to confer. Is 
the genetic counselor a technician of information or a professional charged with the  
responsibility of caring for a person and their health?  Given that genetic counseling is 
the task of HCPs, the claim that education is an aim in itself is incompatible with the 
other values and responsibilities traditionally attributed to clinicians.   
 7. Relationship with client is based on authority rather than mutuality -  This 
ascription by Kessler is in part true in reference to Hsia’s account.  The claim that genetic 
counseling should be purely educational entails a certain kind of authoritative structure of 
communication. A knowing counselor imparts knowledge to an unknowing counselee.  
                                                
57 One line of research within the genetic counseling tradition is outcome based.  For a review of these 
issues, see A. Clarke, E. Parsons, and A. Williams, "Outcomes and Process in Genetic Counselling," Clin 
Genet 50, no. 6 (1996): 462-9. 
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Here again Hsia’s implicit understanding of semantics support his view that the genetic 
counselor, if nothing else, has control over the meaning of genetic information.  Hsia 
would acknowledge that the counselee has control over decision making; his model 
appears less equipped to acknowledge that the patient’s perspective plays a role in what 
the genetic information means.  I can only assert that this is problematic here and will 
develop this semantic point in the next chapter.                           
Another problematic feature of Hsia’s account is that the dispositions of authority 
and sympathy are deployed exclusively in the service of educational benefits. He states 
that “a total lack of sympathy can antagonize a counselee, preventing effective transfer of 
information.”58  Elsewhere he asserts the need for the counselee to trust the counselor but 
this trust does not entail the belief that the counselor cares about the counselee in terms of 
health. Instead it is a trust in the counselor’s knowledge of the information and 
transparency about the limits of his or her knowledge. He reduces the motivation for 
showing sympathy to the optimization of information transfer. Such a reduction makes 
his model susceptible to charges of being overly cognitive and even more serious of 
being manipulative.  More will be demonstrated about the shortcomings of the teaching 
model in chapters three and four. 
   
A Therapeutic Vision of Communication  
The technical vision of communication addresses the problem of sharing interiors 
by specifying and creating conditions of high probability for accurately transmitting 
information.  It looks to objective information and its accessible referents as the most 
                                                
58 Hsia, 177. 
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likely conceptual content to be transferred effectively.  The suggestion that Weaver’s 
extension of the technical vision was moving toward psychology points to the availability 
of psychological discourses about communication.  In this section, a psychological 
account of communication is offered in terms of Carl Roger’s humanistic psychology.  
After rehearsing its components, the therapeutic vision’s impact on genetic counseling is 
demonstrated.            
The therapeutic vision has roots prior to World War II but came to fruition after 
the war in part through the writings of psychotherapists like Carl Rogers.  Because 
Rogers has had a traceable influence on genetic counseling, I will explicate the 
therapeutic vision in terms of the major commitments that he put forward.  Peters 
reinforces the choice of Rogers as spokesperson for this distinctive view of 
communication:   
Carl R. Rogers, the leader of person centered, humanistic 
psychology in the postwar era is perhaps the best example 
of a therapeutic theorist of communication. As he put it in a 
talk in 1951, “The whole task of psychotherapy is the task 
of dealing with a failure in communication.”  
Communication breakdown for him was the fate of the 
neurotic, whose communication both with himself and with 
others was in some way damaged—blockage of 
communication occurring between the unconscious and the 
ego, for instance.  “The task of psychotherapy is to help the 
person achieve, through a special relationship with a 
therapist good communication within himself.” Good 
communication with other would follow. As Rogers 
summarized, ‘We may say then that psychotherapy is good 
communication, between and within men.  We may also 
turn that statement around and it will still be true. Good 
communication, free communication within or between 
men is always therapeutic.’59 
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This characterization of Rogers captures both the psychological bent to the vision and 
also its universal aspiration.  A key psychological concept in his view of communication 
is congruence.  Through a brief elaboration of this notion, we can begin to trace the 
trajectory of his thought.    
In On Becoming a Person, Rogers defines congruence as an “an accurate 
matching of experiencing and awareness. It may still be extended further to cover a 
matching of awareness, experience, and communication.”60 An infant who is moved by 
an empty stomach to cry is according to Rogers in a unified state of congruence: the 
experience and awareness of hunger and the communicative response are integrated.  His 
counter example involves a man who is exhibiting anger in a conversation and who 
denies this anger when confronted. This man is in a state of incongruence, not aware of 
his anger even though the anger is explicit in his tone of voice.  Congruence is the 
compatibility between operational attitudes about internal and external stimuli and one’s 
attitudes about those attitudes.  The therapeutic vision of communication, in Rogers’ view 
sets congruence as its end and client-centered therapy as its means. 
Client-centered therapy, a name Rogers would later change to person-centered 
therapy, is the set of practical attitudes and implementations61 that helps others achieve 
congruence. The root hypothesis motivating these attitudes is: Every person has the 
capacity to be autonomous.  Autonomy for Rogers is the ability to choose one’s own 
goals, to decide how to reach those goals and to take responsibility for both the goals and 
the decisions.  A major obstacle to this autonomy is the fear of experiencing who one 
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61 Rogers avoids using the terms ‘techniques’ or ‘methods’ because of the concern that when detached from 
the root hypothesis clients quickly recognize and resist them.   
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truly is.  This fear prevents a person from learning her true feelings, desires, and interests 
that ultimately motivate authentic goals.  When this fear subsides, a channel of 
communication is opened up:  
Often I sense that the client is trying to listen to himself, is 
trying to hear the meanings and messages which are being 
communicated by his own physiological reactions.  No 
longer is he fearful of what he may find.  He comes to 
realize that his own inner reactions and experiences, the 
messages of his senses and his viscera are friendly. He 
comes to want to be close to his inner sources of 
information rather than closing them off.62 
Being open to communication with one’s true self is essential to achieving the 
congruence required to authentically undertake one’s autonomy.  Attributing autonomy 
and the possibility for congruence to the client is on Roger’s view the starting point for 
therapeutic communication.   
This attribution takes specific form in the therapeutic process through empathic 
identification.  Rogers characterizes the stance this way: 
The counselor’s function is to assume in so far as he is able 
the internal frame of reference of the client to perceive the 
world as the client sees it, to perceive the client himself as 
he is seen by himself, to lay aside all perceptions from the 
external frame of reference while doing so and to 
communicate something of this empathic understanding to 
the client.63 
The effort to understand the client requires an acceptance of the interior that comes into 
view through the process.  If empathic identification functions like a mirror that helps the 
client see what needs to be rearranged, then evaluations or judgments by the counselor 
distort what the client sees.  Counselors who employ the Rogerian approach in as much 
as possible strive to share the client’s interior in a way that allows not only the therapist 
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Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 29. 
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but also the client to have otherwise unavailable access.  The client gradually discards 
prior filters of experience, moves to an immediacy of experience and then gradually 
replaces old attitudes with provisional ones that are more sensitive to actual experience. 
The result is that “internal communication is clear with feelings and symbols well 
matched and fresh terms for new feelings.” 64 The dream of shared interiors, it seems, has 
partially been obtained through the therapeutic process. The therapeutic vision of 
communication offers access to interiors that can be seen as they truly are without the 
distortion of prior dogma and external biases.  Before explicating the Rogerian program 
in terms of the two questions,  an account about how this vision entered into the field of 
genetic counseling needs to be sketched.   
In 1969, Sarah Lawrence College accepted ten students into the first academic 
institution to offer a program specifically designed to train Masters-level genetic 
counselors.  Melissa Richter, the professor who took the steps to open the program had 
training in biology and psychology and believed that clients receiving genetic 
information needed professionals who could attend to their psychological needs.  In 1976 
Sarah Lawrence offered a course titled ‘Client-Centered Counseling.’  Joan H. Marks, 
who directed the Sarah Lawrence program for 26 years until 1998 and was trained in 
psychiatric social work, described the course as “based on Carl Roger’s concepts of 
nondirective counseling, employing empathic responses against the background of 
unconditional positive regard”65  
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At present, genetic counseling students at Sarah Lawrence take a course titled 
“The Empathic Attitude” taught by Marvin Frankel. The course description is 
representative of the therapeutic vision and reflects a Rogerian influence: 
This course provides a theoretical and practical 
understanding of client-centered counseling. Students 
participate in tape-recorded interviews with role-playing 
subjects, which provide the basis for subsequent classroom 
discussion. Rogerian techniques are applied and integrated 
into clinical genetic counseling cases. Special emphasis is 
placed on understanding the emotional content of language 
in all phases of the genetic counseling process; eliciting a 
client’s psychological needs; and the choice of vocabulary 
in explaining complex genetic phenomena.66 
Combined with a substantial regiment of genetic courses, students at Sarah Lawrence 
learn what it means to communicate empathically with clients about their experience of 
receiving genetic information.  This course description suggests the continuation of the 
trajectory of the therapeutic vision of communication whose entrance into the field of 
genetic counseling is clearly documented in the program at Sarah Lawrence and its 
influence in the field.  Sarah Lawrence’s program continues to influence the field in the 
total number of graduates working as genetic counselors and leading other genetic 
counseling programs.67     
Having established the link between the therapeutic vision of communication and 
genetic counseling, an elaboration of the therapeutic vision of interpersonal 
communication in terms of our two questions provides some standard criteria to 
recognize it within the genetic counseling literature. 
 
                                                
66 Sarah Lawrence College, Human Genetics 2007-2008 Courses [website] (Sarah Lawrence College, 2008, 
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67 For a compelling account of Sarah Lawrence’s influence, see Arno Motulsky, "2003 Ashg Award for 
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Theses of the Therapeutic Vision 
What are we doing when we communicate?  Interpersonal communication is the 
sharing of each person’s individual experience through the matching of appropriate 
symbols. Evaluative and judgmental attitudes distort the process of communication 
because they obstruct our ability to empathically identify with the other person. 
Interpersonal communication presupposes intrapersonal communication that occurs 
between a person’s experience and her awareness of the experience. Experience is an 
“organismic event” and awareness is a construal or symbolization of this event.  The 
therapeutic vision claims that communication between persons is greatly enhanced when 
congruence, or accurate symbolization of experience, is present in each of the persons.  
What is meaning?  Like the technical vision, the therapeutic vision offers a 
representational theory of meaning.  Meanings are built by matching symbols to 
experiences.  Symbols with varying degrees of accuracy are attached to and filter 
experiences of perceived reality.68  Experience is the interaction of subconscious input 
from a phenomenal field and conscious awareness that allows for symbolization.  Each 
person’s symbol set functions like a map that helps them navigate the phenomenal field. 
Unlike the technical vision, the therapeutic vision focuses on the internal referents 
of experience as it gets expressed in feelings and beliefs and the accuracy of the concepts 
attached to them.  Communication guided by therapeutic attitudes permits “faulty and 
generalized symbols” to be ”replaced by more adequate and accurate and differentiated 
symbols.“69  The latter symbols emerge through a process of testing experience.  The 
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accuracy of meaning comes from testing the symbolization of private experience; 
however it does not follow that intensional forms of meaning are preferred.   
When the therapeutic vision explicitly adopts semantic terms, it parallels the 
technical vision’s preference for extensional over intensional forms of meaning. On this 
view, intensional qualities of meaning are marked by the “tendency to see experience in 
absolute and unconditional terms, to over generalize, to be dominated by concept or 
belief, to fail to anchor his reactions in space and time, to confuse fact and evaluation, to 
rely on ideas rather than upon reality-testing.”70  Unobstructed by dogmatic filters that 
block communication between experience and awareness, accurate symbolization has an 
extensional quality that is tested against direct experience of the phenomenal field rather 
than against a highly abstracted map.71 
The link between meaning and interpretation has two important dimensions. First, 
interpretation is a form of matching symbols and experience.  The therapeutic vision 
claims that fear of the true self prevents persons from matching appropriate symbols to 
immediate experience.  The fear is rooted in abandoning dogmatic pictures of the self and 
replacing them with provisional but more responsive conceptions of individuated 
experience.  This leaves open the question of where the new conceptions come from.  
True interpretation of one another starts on Roger’s view at home in the accurate 
matching of symbols with internal experience, what he calls internal communication. 
Thus, an authentic interpretation of others requires 1) that the speaker’s symbolic 
utterance is appropriately matched with his or her experience 2) that the listener’s receipt 
of the utterance entails an empathic openness to content. When the receiver hears or sees 
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the sentence, then he or she attempts to match it with the imagined interior state of the 
speaker or author.  This interpretive scheme culminates in the ideal state of mutual 
understanding where I understand the world from your perspective and you understand it 
from mine. 
Linguistic structures, i.e. syntactically recognizable utterances, can express or 
conceal true meanings.  When symbols are properly matched to an individual’s 
experience of the phenomenal field, then syntactic structures are a valuable tool for 
sharing experiences.  In circumstances where an incongruence can be detected, nonverbal 
communication usually indicates the more reliable experience of the person.  Although 
nonverbal communication can be less determinate than verbal expression,  the  fullness of 
understanding another person is not complete without interpreting their bodily reactions 
in relevant circumstances. 
    
The Therapeutic Vision and Psychotherapeutic Model of Genetic Counseling 
The psychotherapeutic model of genetic counseling explicitly avows features of  
the therapeutic vision of communication as can be seen in the work John Weil and 
Seymour Kessler.  Most advocates of the psychotherapeutic model avow three 
components that are directly borrowed from a Rogerian approach : unconditional positive 
regard, empathy, and genuineness.  John Weil, a leading proponent of this approach to 
genetic counseling, refers to a passage by Bohart to elaborate these “three critical 
elements”: 
Unconditional positive regard involves respecting and 
accepting the counselee as a complete individual including 
his or her strengths, weaknesses and full range of feelings 
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and behaviors.  While it is unconditional with respect to the 
individual, it need not be so with respect to specific 
behaviors or aspects of personality.  Thus, the counselor 
acknowledges to herself that the counselee has some less 
positive aspects and she addresses them in an appropriate 
manner.  This includes setting limits on unacceptable or 
threatening behavior 
Empathy involves an understanding insofar as possible of 
the counselee’s lived reality. This includes his or her past 
and present experiences, emotions and perceptions of the 
world and the role these play in shaping behavior. 
Genuineness involves the counselor’s openness to her own 
emotional experiences in the interaction with the counselee 
and a modulated but honest expression of this in her 
interaction with the counselee.72 
When one of these is missing, according to Weil, the message being sent to the counselee 
is that emotional issues will not be addressed.  Even more serious, is the tacit message 
that emotional issues are “too scary to address or too abnormal to be tractable or that the 
bearer is too needy, pathological or unacceptable to be helped.”73  When these attitudes 
are embodied by the counselor, the circumstances are established for helping the patient 
to address, understand, and adapt to the emotional states that result from receiving 
genetic information. 
Fulfilling these attitudes depends on informed observation of the counselee’s 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors.  These interpretations of the client are in part formed by 
the counselor’s awareness of psychosocial possibilities and through inferences from what 
the client says and does.  Echoing Rogers’ notion that symbolization of the phenomenal 
field is a working hypothesis, Weil describes the process this way: 
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Such observation should be treated as working hypotheses.  
Any particular reaction or communication may have 
alternate personal, social, or cultural explanations.  As the 
session unfolds and as interventions based on the genetic 
counselor’s inferences provide further information relevant 
to the assessment, the hypothesis can be further confirmed, 
revised, or rejected.  Thus, there is an ongoing dynamic 
process of hypothesis generation, testing, and revision 
through which the genetic counselor obtains a better 
understanding of the counselee and refines her responses.74 
 The multiplicity of inputs that a counselor can use include: what, how, when, and why 
utterances are made and a host of nonverbal clues such as body posture and facial 
expression.  The crucial challenge is tracking these inputs and at the same time providing 
appropriate outputs.  Weil and Kessler assert that the ability to coordinate all of these 
activities comes with experience.      
Whereas the teaching model categorizes psychosocial issues as an essential 
adjunct, the psychotherapeutic model places them at the center of its approach.  This is 
especially true of emotional states.  The Rogerian triad above paves the way to develop 
and reduce emotional intensity as necessary.75  If patients express strong emotion in the 
session, then it is critical to acknowledge these emotions in a sustained fashion.  Weil 
gives the example of a patient who began a session in isolation and despair having called 
off his engagement thinking that he had Duchenne muscular dystrophy.  The counselor 
explained to him that he had a much milder muscular disorder, and the patient grew 
angry.  After an “empathic inquiry” into the sources of anger the patient expressed his 
despair and in follow-up sessions was able to accept his new diagnosis and see 
possibilities for renewing the relationship with his fiancé.  By acknowledging the anger 
and asking questions about it, the counselor is recognizing its validity and providing 
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opportunity for the counselee to talk about it.  The crucial aspect of a counselor’s 
recognition on Weil’s view is that it seeks to understand the emotion from the 
counselee’s perspective.  This commitment requires sensitivity to the counselee’s cultural 
background, which may encourage suppression of certain emotions.76 
At other times the counselor must diffuse emotional intensity.  In certain 
situations, the genetic counselor may discern that sustained attention on the emotional 
state of the counselee may overwhelm or produce anxiety in the counselee.  In these 
circumstances, the counselor may in effect switch gears and discuss more cognitive 
content or utilize other coping mechanisms, e.g. humor, that are compatible with the 
defense mechanisms the counselee has already displayed.  Weil acknowledges that this is 
a difficult task.  A counselor must resist temptation to unconsciously adopt the 
counselee’s defense mechanisms that seek to avoid emotions and at the same time use 
them circumspectly to diffuse emotions when necessary. 
Promoting autonomy is at the center of the Rogerian model and is a key aspect in 
the psychotherapeutic approach to genetic counseling.  Both Weil and Kessler assert that 
genetic counselors should aim at building a client’s confidence in his or her ability to 
make good decisions.  By explicitly supporting and praising a counselee’s responses to 
present or past circumstances, the genetic counselor provides resources that can 
overcome feelings of being overwhelmed or inadequate.  Weil states: 
Supportive statements of this sort are often unexpected 
which adds to their emotional impact.  These comments 
help repair previous experiences of feeling judged, 
stigmatized, or treated with insufficient respect for 
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autonomy. As with all reparative interventions, they may 
have a longer-term impact on self esteem and efficacy.77 
This passage implies that counselees are often in need of such support and that 
encouraging words can actually be therapeutic in the sense of restoring the psyche to 
better functioning.  Weil has confidence that the right communication techniques 
combined with the Rogerian triad of attitudes can successfully intervene in the 
psychological problems of the counselee.    
Much of what has been said thus far about the psychotherapeutic model depends 
on Weil’s work and implicitly involves Kessler because he is cited throughout Weil’s 
book.  For the most part, Weil’s telling of the story is endorsed in much of what Kessler 
has written.  To rehearse Kessler’s view on these same topics would be redundant.  
Instead, I turn to some of Kessler’s early contributions that demonstrate how the 
psychotherapeutic model is informed by more global claims about communication.     
Seymour Kessler has been articulating and updating the psychotherapeutic model 
of genetic counseling for over 30 years. In an early contribution he uses insights from 
theories of communication to inform the genetic counseling process. He offers several 
distinctions related to communication levels and context.  Drawing primarily on theorists 
in psychotherapeutic process, he proposes that communication works at many levels and 
two are of particular significance:  denotative and metacommunicative.  The denotative 
points to the literal content of a communication that takes the form of a syntactically 
correct sentence. The meta-communicative picks out those aspects of communication 
below the level of consciousness that express needs, desires, and feelings usually in the 
form of nonverbal behaviors.  One consequence of using this distinction is that 
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incongruencies between what is said and the way it is said can be observed and 
responded to appropriately.  The genetic counselor, who observes verbal compliance and 
nonverbal defiance, might circle back and address the issue in a way that allows the 
conflict to be resolved.  Kessler shows how these levels of communication are affected 
by their contexts.    
Kessler attends to the influence of context on communication by dividing it into 
three components: physical, social, and syntactic.78  In terms of physical influences, a 
client comes to the counselor’s “home ground” where the rooms, equipment, 
professionals and even smells have “stimuli value” for the client and implicitly encourage 
compliance.79  Sensitivity to physical context clearly has implications for how a counselor 
might proceed to mitigate these factors in interactions.  In terms of social features, 
Kessler wants us to see that a client’s experience is influenced by whether the interaction 
is face-to-face, on the telephone, or between people of the same sex. Whether and to what 
degree a counselor is aware of this social dimension affects the education and counseling 
of a client.  Syntactic context is the communicative circumstance in which a message 
occurs and the impact these circumstances have on meaning.  Giving the example of a 
client repeating the question, “What are our chances of having a normal child?”  Kessler 
points out that the question has a different meaning each time it is asked during the 
session.  Recognizing syntactic context allows a genetic counselor to be sensitive to the 
movement of a conversation and the different roles an utterance can play at different 
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times.  When recognized, these contextual factors can inform how a genetic counselor 
cares for the counselee throughout the conversation.   
Kessler endorses the notion that “all messages contain requests” and that 
sympathy or caring is what is usually requested. Following Satir, he proposes that all 
messages seek validation on some level.80  This commitment reinforces Peters’ ascription 
that the therapeutic vision is a view of communication that extends beyond its 
disciplinary home toward a universal standing.  If all acts of communication are requests 
for validation, then all communicators have the potential to validate or invalidate the 
other person.  The psychotherapeutic model of genetic counseling seeks to validate the 
person through the aforementioned attitudes and techniques. 
 
Evaluation 
1. Goals a) to understand the other person b) to bolster their inner sense of 
competence c) to promote a greater sense of control over their lives d) relieve 
psychological distress if possible e) to support and possibly raise their self-esteem f) to 
help them find solutions to specific problems -  The ambitious agenda of the 
psychotherapeutic model is both a strength and a weakness.  In contrast to the teaching 
model, it has a more holistic view of caring for the counselee and offers many 
communicative techniques of which only a few have been mentioned.  The main criticism 
offered here is:  If the teaching model seeks to do to little for the patient, then the 
psychotherapeutic model aspires to do too much.  Intended for situations where the 
counselor-counselee’s relationship has time to develop over many sessions, the Rogerian 
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approach is not appropriate for the institutional circumstances that define genetic 
counseling.  Genetic counseling relationships are usually developed over one or two 
sessions that lasts anywhere from 30 minutes to 2 hours.  Kessler has acknowledged that 
the Rogerian approach must be modified in significant ways to fit the circumstances of 
genetic counseling.81  Kessler’s solution has been to emphasize the need for counseling 
skills that are customized for short-term interactions:  “This might require the acquisition 
and development of rapid means of assessing others and understanding their needs, the 
skills seasoned professionals tend to develop in any case.”82  In light of this revision, 
attaining the goals above becomes more dependent on effective techniques that allow 
quick evaluations than on the relational benefits conferred by the Rogerian triad of 
attitudes.  Rogers himself would question whether this technique-driven approach can 
obtain the substantive goals above. 
The question becomes whether the psychotherapeutic model in these institutional 
circumstances can hold up under the weight of its goals and tasks given its 
acknowledgment of the complexity of human psychology.  Rapid evaluations of complex 
phenomena is a difficult trick to pull off especially in the psychosocial realm.  As Kessler 
asserted at the beginning, it takes an exceptional individual to combine the teaching and 
counseling models.  For example, the first goal of understanding the client is questionable 
in terms of not only the temporal constraints but also epistemic ones. A comprehensive 
one-way understanding of another person - not to mention mutual understanding -  is 
difficult to achieve even with ample time and access. Awareness of this difficulty is seen 
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in the repeated disclaimers of those who endorse this goal.83  Advocates of empathic 
inquiry admit how difficult it is to bracket all evaluative background commitments and to 
bridge actual differences in perspectives particularly when cultural backgrounds are 
significantly far apart.  The constraints of genetic counseling thwart an already difficult 
epistemic aim.  If all the other goals flow through this first one, as Kessler claims, then 
they are all put into question by these obstacles.  
2. Based on perception that clients come for counseling for complex reasons -  On 
the one hand, this commitment is a responsible stance given that patients 1) some times 
do not know that they have come for genetic counseling  2) have different perspectives 
that generate different needs 3) sort through genetic information over time as their needs  
change within and between sessions. On the other hand, this thesis fails to articulate the 
assumptions about patient motivations that are necessary to justify saying anything at all.  
In the next chapter, I will propose that assumptions have to be made about patient 
motivations to justify the expectation that genetic counseling might help the patient.    
3. The model has complex assumptions about human behavior and psychology  
which are brought to bear in counseling  - The expectation that genetic counselors should 
have a complex grasp of human behavior and psychology raises several questions.  First, 
how much knowledge of psychology is sufficient to perform genetic counseling?  
Second, since there are competing accounts of human behavior and psychology, which 
one should genetic counselors endorse? The third and possibly most important question 
is: How should a complex theory be used in a session?     
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The Rogerian vision of psychotherapy attempts to bracket substantive 
psychological assumptions to avoid imitating the diagnose-and-treat model of traditional 
medicine.  This method is committed to the therapeutic value of communication 
accompanied by the appropriate attitudes.  The difficulty in undertaking this kind of 
communication is that empathic identification requires a bracketing of psychological 
assumptions to understand the person from her perspective, a perspective that presumably 
lacks a sophisticated psychological theory.  The genetic counselor taking such a stance 
must make inferences from what he hears and sees.  From what set of commitments are 
these inferences made?  Propositions from a psychological theory would be likely 
candidates as premises to understand and respond to observations and yet the use of such 
commitments can conflict with the original empathic stance.   
An example helps illustrate this point. A counselor observes that a 25-year-old 
client whose child has been diagnosed with Down syndrome is feeling guilty about 
giving birth to a child with cognitive limitations.  What should the genetic counselor infer 
from this observation? A fully empathic stance would try to understand the patient’s 
experiences and beliefs that produce the guilt and grasp the consequences of this guilt for 
the patient.  A responsibility of achieving this level of understanding within a Rogerian 
model is to mirror the patient’s perspective back to her without evaluation.  The goal of 
this process is that the patient will recognize incongruencies between the mirrored 
perspective and her true self. The true self is the final arbiter.  
Leaving aside questions about what ‘true self’ means, this empathic stance is 
highly improbable given that the psychotherapeutic model is generally skeptical that a 
patient’s guilt is warranted in circumstances similar to the one described above.  A more 
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likely response to a patient’s guilt in the psychotherapeutic model is to infer that this guilt 
is unjustified and should be alleviated.84 The genetic counselor states authoritatively, as a 
representative of the scientific community, that the chromosomal abnormality is a 
random occurrence and not the fault of any individual agent.  Has any harm been done? 
The statement might make the client feel less guilty, but it could make her question 
whether God is in control. This doubt could undermine her hope that the Lord will 
provide the strength to deal with this new circumstance.  This outcome is not inevitable.  
The counselor could help the counselee reconfigure an understanding of God’s 
sovereignty that allows for randomness and hopefulness.  This result does not avoid the 
collision between an empathic identification and a substantive stance on guilt and 
causality. In this case, a psychological assumption about guilt and a biomedical 
conclusion about randomness influence the revision of a patient’s religious beliefs.  This 
case does not challenge the claim that genetic counselors should have complex views 
about patient behavior and psychology.  It only highlights the complexities of 
adjudicating psychological assumptions about the efficacy of empathy with other 
substantive commitments about appropriate psychological states.        
4. Counseling task complex: a) requires assessment of client’s strengths and 
limitations, needs, values and decision trends b) requires a range of counseling skills to 
achieve goals and c) requires individualized counseling style to fit client’s needs and 
agendas; flexibility d) requires counselor to attend to and take care of his own inner life -  
If the goals of the psychotherapeutic model underestimate discursive challenges, then the 
tasks developed to meet those goals are vulnerable to the same charge.  The tasks in (a) 
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require the genetic counselor to make a number of complex attributions in a very short 
period of time. Should a genetic counselor be expected to reach such conclusions - even 
provisional ones -  about a counselee?85  The tasks in (b) should be endorsed because 
most items on the list should also be on a list for effective communication.  Informed 
observation, developing and diffusing emotional states, reframing situations to name a 
few are skills that can help a client grasp the meaning of the genetic information.  
Employing these skills effectively does not require a complex set of psychological 
assumptions; nor must they serve the psychological goals.  I will demonstrate how they 
can function within an explicitly normative framework in chapter two.  The value of (c) is 
that it guides counselors away from treating all counselees the same, e.g. as idealized 
rational persons.  The (c) tasks can be interpreted in a strong sense where the genetic 
counselor has a comprehensive grasp of the client’s perspective and can confidently 
counsel him or her with this knowledge. A weaker stance, the one I think more 
defensible, is that the HCP must be responsive to what the individual says and does in the 
session as they coordinate the meaning of the information together.  The important 
difference between the strong and weak stance is that the clinician acknowledges the 
provisional status of his or her understanding of the client.  The final task is a worthwhile 
undertaking that is reminiscent of living Socrates’ examined life.  The importance of this 
task for this project is that it requires attention to the robust perspective that a genetic 
counselor brings into the session. The wording “inner life” utilizes the spiritualist 
tradition’s picture of inner/ outer and attenuates the scope of commitments that actually 
need attention.  The genetic counselor should not only be aware of his or her emotional 
                                                
85 What I hope to show in the next chapter is that these kinds of assessments can be facilitated by the HCP 
without taking on the responsibility of actually making judgments about clients. 
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habits, personal beliefs and history of actions but also the web of institutional norms that 
are formed by the historical tradition of biomedical practice.  Whether these are part of 
her “inner life” does not matter as much as the awareness that these institutional and 
other external norms are operational when he or she inhabits the role of genetic 
counselor.86     
5. Education is used as a means to achieve above goals.  All of the goals of the 
psychotherapeutic model are psychological according to Kessler.87  Education should 
facilitate understanding between persons, promote inner competence, provide control,  
relieve distress, raise self-esteem and enhance problem solving.  The details of the 
relation between education and these goals is not fully worked out by Kessler.  Two 
critical question need to be answered.  How does education actually serve the above 
goals? Should education be understood as a means to these ends?  
Thinking about Debbie’s case will help us answer the first question.  When the 
genetic counselor explains to Debbie her risk status, the above goals should be served in 
some way.  If Debbie grasps the information, then she could experience the 
empowerment of understanding her risks.  This empowerment comes from knowing her 
pregnancy status and having choices to do something about her risk.  Instead of going 
through her pregnancy anxious and ignorant of important facts, she now knows about her 
option to find out for sure whether her baby has certain abnormalities. With this 
information she can plan for the future and feel as though she has taken full responsibility 
for her pregnancy.  Education can have this effect on Debbie’s psychological state and 
                                                
86 E. W. Clayton, "The Web of Relations: Thinking About Physicians and Patients," Yale J Health Policy 
Law Ethics 6, no. 2 (2006): 472-75.  Clayton provides a helpful synopsis of the competing interests and  
professional shortcomings that affect even the most thoughtful of physicians.  
87 Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Ix. Teaching and Counseling," 290. 
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the genetic counselor can contribute to this effect.  The difficulty with this picture of 
educational consequences is that a very different set of consequence are also likely to 
occur.  Debbie could also have a very different experience of learning about her risk 
status.  The information could shake her faith and produce an intense anxiety about the 
pregnancy that she had never experienced until learning about the information.  The 
experience of a dilemma, which is described in the case, is in part caused by the 
educational process.  The emotion and ambivalence that Debbie experiences can last a 
long time after the genetic counseling session is over.  Kessler and Weil would 
acknowledge these possibilities and rejoin that with the appropriate counseling skills the 
genetic counselor could mitigate the negative effects on Debbie’s psychological state.   
This response is plausible but remains distant from the characterization that education is a 
means to achieving ambitious psychological goals.   
 How education affects the patient depends on the circumstances of the patient 
and the skills of the counselor.   Because of these contingencies, education should not be 
seen as a means to the above psychological goals.  Instead, it should be characterized as 
having significant influence on the feasibility of the goals above.  A crucial skill that a 
genetic counselor must have is recognizing what impact education does have on a patient. 
This primarily comes from listening to what the patient says and observing nonverbal 
communication.  Education may actually thwart the above goals in an enduring way and 
it is vital that the genetic counselor recognize this change in the patient’s status.    
6. Relationship aims for mutuality  -  Kessler’s model instructs a genetic 
counselor to de-emphasize the authoritative structure of the relationship without 
 59 
relinquishing it.88   Efforts to downplay the authoritative structure entail letting the 
counselee steer the conversation when appropriate, championing the autonomy of the 
patient and demonstrating a level of empathy that expresses, “I’ll be there with you in 
case you stumble.”89  These measures all aim towards mutuality.  Or do they?  Kessler 
never defines what he means by mutuality, and Weil does not use the term to define the 
contours of his project.  For this thesis to become plausible, some definition of mutuality 
needs to be given.  If it refers to the aim of mutual understanding, then this thesis 
becomes tenuous because of the difficulty of achieving anything close to a reciprocated 
grasp of the situation. Kessler’s description of genetic counseling cited in the introduction 
implies that this might be a worthy goal: “Their assumptions about things seem vastly 
different and there are other impediments to communication and mutual understanding.”90    
Such an aim fails to take the differences in perspectives seriously.   
If mutuality refers to the mutual recognition of persons as distinct sites of 
authority, then the thesis becomes more plausible. Kessler recognizes the imbalance of 
authority in the professional-client relationship and the failure of clients to recognize their 
own authority in the situation.  If the psychotherapeutic model adopted the second 
definition of mutuality, then it could become the unifying concept of the model whose 
central thrust is to promote client autonomy.  This unification puts into question the need 
for an ambitious set of psychological goals and assumptions that currently define the 
psychotherapeutic approach.  For example, the first goal of the model is to understand the 
other person through empathic identification.  The need for rigorous bracketing of the 
professional perspective is not necessary to encourage the client to acknowledge his or 
                                                
88 Ibid., 291. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling: Xii. More on Counseling Skills," 263. 
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her own authority in the interaction.  The call for emptying one’s perspective to absorb 
another’s is a clear remnant of the spiritualist desire to share interiors and an application 
of Roger’s therapeutic vision of communication.  What is needed is a competency in 
eliciting client participation in a dialogical process with the HCP.  This alternative will be 
developed in chapter two. 
    
Summary 
Peters tells an expansive story about communication that has as its central conflict 
the frustrated ideal of sharing human interiors. We should be unified but we are divided.  
He identifies the technical and therapeutic visions as initiatives to make the dream of 
shared interiors a reality.  Through precise, discursive transmissions or genuine, empathic 
identifications, the reality of possessing the identical information or the possibility of 
mutual understanding seems to appear on the horizon. The central claim of this chapter is 
that the teaching and psychotherapeutic models of genetic counseling are inheritors of the 
spiritualist tradition and respectively employ the theses of technical and therapeutic 
visions of communication.  Peters is right to reject the spiritualist tradition’s 
interpretation of our discursive condition and to criticize the communication visions that 
it has generated.  An alternative tradition is offered in the next chapter as well as a 
theoretical foil to the two visions rehearsed above.  These expressive resources will locate 
and underwrite the responsibilist model of genetic counseling.
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CHAPTER II 
 
A RESPONSIBILIST MODEL OF GENETIC COUNSELING 
 
If I believe that Zoroaster is the sun and that its shining is his beatitude, 
then an utterance of ‘The sun is shining’ means something different in 
my mouth than it does in your ears.”  
   Robert Brandom,  Making It Explicit  
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced and elaborated the teaching and 
psychotherapeutic models of genetic counseling. The models were located within larger 
narratives from which they inherited distinct views of communication.  I claim that the 
teaching model of genetic counseling is underwritten by the technical vision of 
communication; the psychotherapeutic model by the therapeutic vision of 
communication.  Both are broadly situated in what John Durham Peters’ calls the 
spiritualist tradition.  In this chapter I develop an alternative view that has been offered in 
the genetic counseling literature that places responsibility at the center of its approach.  
After introducing the responsibilist model, I elaborate it in reference to a different 
philosophical story about communication whose details are worked out in Robert 
Brandom’s pragmatic model of conversational scorekeeping.  These additional expressive 
resources are then used to flesh out the theses of the responsibilist model. 
       
Responsibilist Model 
If the primary goal of the teaching model is help the counselee understand and the 
central goal of psychotherapeutic model is to help the counselee adapt, then the goal of 
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the responsibilist model is to help the counselee take responsibility for receiving genetic 
information.  The genetic counselor as teacher aims to impartially transfer genetic 
information to the client who will then possess balanced information to make a “rational” 
decision.  The genetic counselor as psychotherapist intends to empathically understand 
the counselee and intervene as appropriate to promote the autonomy of the individual.  
As a responsible communicator, the genetic counselor attempts to coordinate meaning 
across different perspectives with the goal of helping the counselee grasp and make 
decisions with the genetic information.  This alternate frame for understanding genetic 
counseling is by no means unprecedented.          
Mary White criticizes nondirective models of genetic counseling1 and proposes an 
alternative model called “dialogical counseling” that seeks to promote responsible 
decision making.2  Nondirective counseling, in White’s terms, is defined by a negative 
right that entitles counselees’ decision-making processes to be protected from 
interference or coercion.  Upholding this right restricts what interventions the counselor 
can undertake. Once the genetic information has been carefully explained and all 
pertinent questions answered, the genetic counselor must remove possible constraints on 
the autonomous decision making process of clients.  White challenges the understanding 
of autonomy that is presupposed in nondirective counseling. If autonomous decision 
making means deliberation that is free from constraints, then nondirective counseling 
only takes into account external constraints and fails to acknowledge internal constraints 
to autonomy such as misconceptions or stress.  With these critical insights in mind, White 
                                                
1 M. T. White, ""Respect for Autonomy" In Genetic Counseling: An Analysis and a Proposal," J Genet 
Couns 6, no. 3 (1997): 298-99. White acknowledges that nondirectiveness has many meanings.  Her 
criticisms are most consistently applied to a version of nondirective counseling that resembles the teaching 
model presented in chapter one.  
2 Ibid., 304. 
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suggests an approach to autonomy and counseling that is informed by notions of sociality 
and responsibility.    
In constructing a counseling model around social responsibility, White utilizes the 
work of protestant theologian, H. Richard Niebuhr.  Drawing primarily from Niebuhr’s 
The Responsible Self, White promotes an understanding of autonomy that takes into 
account the sociality and interdependence of human beings.  Niebuhr claims that selves 
are social, practical phenomena who come into existence through recognitive relations 
with other selves. If this account of humanity is true, then autonomy cannot be an 
atomistic capacity of self-determination. Autonomy and more specifically deliberation 
and decision making must be seen as social phenomena that involve interactions such as 
dialogue. White points out that dialogue with people we trust is a common form of 
deliberation; and if decisions are made individually, then they often involve an internal 
dialogue.  In the interest of noninterference, the nondirective counseling model limits the 
counselor’s role in deliberation leaving the counselee to her own devices to make a 
decision in unfamiliar discursive territory.  White claims that this is a breach of social 
responsibility, a failure to recognize the counselor’s responsibilities in an important 
dialogue.   
Niebuhr’s notion of social responsibility is specified in reference to the goals and 
strategies of genetic counseling.  In the dialogical model, responsible decision making is 
the goal of genetic counseling and dialogue is the strategy that genetic counselors 
undertake to achieve it.  Following Niebuhr, responsible decisions bear the marks of a 
dialogical process where: 1) every action is a response to a prior action 2) all actions – in 
contrast to behaviors - involve interpretation of what is happening 3) an agent anticipates 
 64 
consequences of possible actions 4) fitting actions are acknowledgments of ongoing 
individual and collective narratives.  In short every responsible decision asks: “To whom 
or what am I responsible and in what community of interaction am I myself?”3  The 
offering of genetic information is an action undertaken by the genetic counselor and 
becomes the prior action to which a counselee must respond.  In terms of normative 
trajectories, they share responsibility for the genetic information like travelers on 
different paths share a crossroad.  
Genetic counselors have responsibilities to their institutional and larger social 
contexts as well as to the context of the client whose background commitments represent 
a more or less different repertoire of responsibilities.  A genetic counselor who enacts 
social responsibility must try to acknowledge all of these contexts in the offering of the 
genetic information.  White illustrates these responsibilities in the area of prenatal 
diagnosis. She notes that the practice of medicine has values, albeit contested ones, that 
constrain the circumstances under which it is appropriate to use prenatal diagnosis.4  
These professional standards serve as constraints in any genetic counseling session. 
Responsibilities to social solidarity, White admits, are much more difficult to discern: 
Thus in contemporary secular society social solidarity may 
best be conceived as embracing a plurality of evolving 
social and cultural values in which decisions may be 
considered ethically responsible each corresponding to 
different moral priorities.5 
Genetic counseling in prenatal circumstances has for example prompted diverse 
responses to the status of terminating pregnancy after a diagnosis of Down syndrome. By 
                                                
3 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self; an Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy, [1st ] ed. (New 
York,: Harper & Row, 1963), 68.  
4 As White acknowledges, this is an area of heated debate.  For an extended discussion of these issues see 
Parens and Asch. 
5 M. T. White, "Making Responsible Decisions. An Interpretive Ethic for Genetic Decisionmaking," 
Hastings Cent Rep 29, no. 1 (1999): 18. 
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defining social solidarity in reference to pluralism, the genetic counselor is in a better 
position to help individuals take responsibility for the information in reference to his or 
her perspective and cultural values that shape it.  In Debbie’s case, the genetic counselor 
shares responsibility for helping her respond to emotional, moral and religious issues. At 
the same time, the contract for sharing such responsibilities has to be negotiated with the 
client.  In other words, an HCP cannot assume that patients want the same level or kinds 
of help.   
Many of the contents of White’s proposal are either taken over or modified in the 
responsibilist model presented here.  In the interest of comparing like models, I use 
Kessler’s schematic form to introduce the responsibilist model: 
1. Goal: a) To help coordinate the meanings of genetic 
information across diverse perspectives b) To facilitate 
responsible decision making  
2. Based on assumption that clients come to share 
responsibility for understanding the genetic information 
and for decision making 
3. The model assumes that the patient can participate in a 
dialogical process of grasping the genetic information and 
making responsible decisions. 
4. Counseling task is to facilitate 1) navigation and 
negotiation of the appropriate perspectives for 
understanding the genetic information and 2) practical 
reasoning about what action to take in reference to the 
relevant sources of responsibility 
5. Relationship aims towards the mutual recognition of 
shared responsibilities  
By designating responsibility as the conceptual hub, the responsibilist model transposes 
most aspects of genetic counseling into a normative key.  For example, taking a pedigree 
involves giving a person a genetic identity, an identity that has to be negotiated with other 
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ways of sorting the self such as a child of God, successful professional, or dutiful citizen.6   
Uttering genetic information to a patient has a two-fold normative significance: 1) The 
patient receives a true claim about her genetic situation that she should add to her 
repertoire of commitments.  2) The patient should use this knowledge in a way that will 
determine a course of action.  In the responsibilist model, the perspectives of both 
counselor and patient come into focus as sites of normativity that must interface in the 
process of interpretation and decision making. 
As it is used here, the concept of normativity extends beyond norms that guide 
practical intentions to include interpretive norms that inform the formation of beliefs.  
The sphere of the normative refers to a social practical space where moves, both 
linguistic and nonlinguistic can come under appraisal. In other words, normative moves 
are ones that can be attributed as wrong, inappropriate, or unfitting. One lesson Kant 
taught is that a judgment, e.g., ”That banana is yellow” or “Your risk is such and such,” is 
the most basic unit of responsibility.7 According to Hegel the resources for appraising a 
judgment are fundamentally social and historical. Being responsible to shared rules of 
inference is one way to think about this kind of responsibility.   
If discursive resources vary within a pluralistic society, then the meanings within 
the clinic will be made from several standpoints. For example, risk assessments of 
pregnancies can be appraised in relation to several different contexts.  In the context of 
the rules for probable reasoning, which correlate blood levels with probabilities of Down 
                                                
6 D. Armstrong, S. Michie, and T. Marteau, "Revealed Identity: A Study of the Process of Genetic 
Counselling," Soc Sci Med 47, no. 11 (1998): 1653-8. Arrmstrong and others report how genetic counseling 
constructs a genetic identity.  
7 Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question:What Is Enlightenment?," in Kant : Political Writings, ed. 
Hans Siegbert Reiss (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Robert Brandom asserts 
that one of Kant’s most important insights is the relationship between judgment and normativity.  Brandom 
draws a sharp contrast between Kant’s and Descartes’ accounts of judgment.   
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syndrome, a risk assessment can be judged incorrect.  Without specialized training, 
patients are not in position to appraise the correctness of the probability but they are 
competent to make other kinds of appraisals.  If they are associated with a religious 
community that prohibits abortion under any circumstance, then the patient might 
conclude that the risk assessment and amniocentesis are inappropriate because they 
endanger the fetus for no justifiable benefit.8  These judgments are normative because 
they are responsible to sets of shared commitments from which correct and incorrect 
inferences can be made.  It is within this understanding of the normative realm that 
White’s commitment to social responsibility should be understood. 
 If genetic counseling’s goals, assumptions, tasks and overarching aims are to be 
understood in explicitly normative terms, then a development of normativity and 
responsibility is required and will be pursued in the next two sections of this chapter.9   
The normative elements as well as the other components of the model are related to an 
alternative tradition of spirit and a pragmatic theory of communication. The theses of the 
responsibilist model of genetic counseling are understood in reference to a “more robust 
tradition of spirit”10 and underwritten with an account of communication set out by 
Robert Brandom.  The first move situates the responsibilist model within a largely 
Hegelian picture that develops the problems of spirit in a way that motivates the second 
move. Brandom’s project, which explicitly acknowledges its Hegelian roots, works at a 
                                                
8 Whether knowing a fetus has a condition confers benefit to a pregnant woman that is not considering 
termination is a real question. I observed two OB/GYNS who had different stances on the issue.  One stated 
that if a woman would not consider termination then, she should not undergo amniocentesis. The other said 
to patients that knowing whether a baby has Down syndrome can help parents and health care provider 
prepare for the delivery.    
9 The debate about the status of norms as regularities or proprieties cannot be sorted through in the confines 
of the project.  The position that norms are proprieties is the one undertaken here and depends largely on 
Robert Brandom’s work. 
10 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 109. 
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finer level of detail to see how normativity, authority and responsibility are at work in the 
interpretation and understanding of utterances.  Through these efforts, I aim to locate and 
underwrite the responsibilist model of genetic counseling within a larger philosophical 
picture. 
  
Embodiment Tradition of Communication 
Peters claims that the spiritualist tradition and its concomitant visions of 
communication fail to develop the  “pragmatic middle ground of making due.”11  The 
terrain that needs cultivating is a complex attitude toward communication that resists 
aspirations for complete identity with each other and at the same time avoids resignation 
to the fate of discursive distance.  Undertaking the former potentially overrides 
differences and results in the replication of selves or groups; endorsing the latter leads to 
rash claims of incommensurability and isolation. Two conclusions from the last chapter 
are significant here. The psychotherapeutic model of genetic counseling aspires for too 
much identification in its goal of empathically understanding the client. The teaching 
model, to overcome or avoid imperfect media of subjectivity, places its confidence in too 
narrow a set of transmissible messages that involve primarily objective information.  The 
pragmatic middle ground developed in this chapter articulates communication, more 
specifically linguistic practice, as a normative and social achievement that mitigates 
differences without aspiring to erase them and that allows individuals to coordinate a 
world through an expanding range of meanings.  
                                                
11 Ibid., 65. 
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The spiritualist tradition, introduced in chapter one, claims that spirit resides in 
our individual interiors and that exteriors, i.e. speech - producing bodies, obstruct the 
sharing of individual spirits. Its assertion of an autonomous mental sphere gives ideas and 
intention primary roles in a metaphysics of intentionality and has supported a variety of 
accounts of communication from Plato’s recollection, to Augustine and Aquinas’ 
angelology and to Locke’s notion that ideas excite identical mental states.  In this 
dualistic picture, exteriors, i.e. language and bodies, are different kinds of things than 
interiors, i.e. ideas. Exteriors produce sounds and scripts that are imperfect mediums 
seeking to bridge separated and isolated interiors.  Two key problems get articulated by 
this picture: 1) Individual interiors once united are now separated. 2) Available mediums 
that link interiors fall short of the task of uniting them.  The problems that define this 
tradition as Peters tells the story are revised or rejected by another tradition of thought 
whose origin is marked in the writings and legacy of Hegel.  
Peters’ narrative highlights the development of a social and practical account of 
the relation between spirit and communication. If the spiritualist tradition asks how 
interiors can be reunited, then this alternative tradition asks how human bodies interact to 
give rise to concepts, concept mongers and coordinated worlds. Hegel’s enduring answer 
to this question is that this is a social-historical process, which he calls Spirit or Geist, 
that begins with reciprocal recognition: 
For Hegel communication is not a psychological task of 
putting two minds en rapport but a political and historical 
problem of establishing conditions under which the mutual 
recognition of self-conscious individuals is possible.  The 
issue is to reconcile subjects with their embodied relation to 
the world, with themselves and with each other.12     
                                                
12 Ibid., 112. 
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The problems of communication on this view can be understood in reference to several 
factors.  One of the key insights of Hegel is that we are not transparent to ourselves. 
Selves do not begin as private spirits or interiors encased within a frustrating material 
home; instead selves are wrought through social practices, e.g. linguistic practice, where 
public meanings and other skills are generated by specific kinds of interactions between 
individual bodies. Hegel uses the example of a master and slave to illustrate this point.13 
The uptake is that we need others to be self-conscious and this dependency creates the 
possibility of constructing others in our own image or being constructed in the image 
others.   
 If the account of selves as socially constituted is endorsed, then it has the 
practical implication of making dialogue a condition for the existence of self-conscious 
selves.  Dialogue is the reciprocal practice of coordinating meanings across perspectives 
that allows us to take explicit responsibility for and be responsible to our selves, each 
other and our world. White’s notion of dialogical counseling draws its theoretical 
momentum not only from Niebuhr’s conception of responsibility but also implicitly from 
Hegel’s notion of reciprocal recognition.   But all communication is not dialogical as 
Peters is quick to point. 
Dialogue must be tempered by placing some value on dissemination.  On Peters’ 
view, dissemination is an act of communication that cannot or does not concern itself 
with reciprocation. Mass communication is one example and Jesus’ parables are 
another.14 In the former, dialogue is logistically improbable; in the latter, it is 
eschatalogically unworkable.  Peters’ attention to this dimension of communication is 
                                                
13 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Arnold Vincent Miller, and J. N. Findlay, Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 111-19. 
14 Peters, Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication, 51, 206. 
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important for this project for several reasons.  On the one hand, it demonstrates the kind 
of communication genetic counseling should not be under most circumstances. A genetic 
counselor who casts seeds of genetic information to patients with the attitude of Jesus’ 
sower should be criticized for a lack of care. On the other hand, dissemination can be an 
appropriate stance in an important set of circumstances that occur in genetic counseling: 
the moments when patients do not want to talk.  HCPs can prompt but cannot ultimately 
make the patient participate in a dialogue.  It does not take much imagination to see the 
harms of trying to force reciprocal communication in these situations.  Peters calls 
advocate of dialogue who do not appropriately recognize these limitations, “dialogians.”15  
 This alternative understanding of communication suggests a different story about 
what is happening in the ‘Patient Education’ room as Debbie and the genetic counselor 
try to understand one another. The picture of two interiorities separated by imperfect 
media is replaced by two embodied and distinct perspectives trying to navigate a shared 
world with available communicative resources.  The possibility of communication 
requires that Debbie and the genetic counselor share many common beliefs and concepts.  
Both assume, for example, that the other has some very basic knowledge about what 
‘pregnancy,’ ‘risk,’ ‘needle’, and ‘termination’ mean.  Such concepts are common 
references in their shared world. At the same time the need to communicate arises from 
what they do not share. It is assumed by both of them that the genetic counselor possesses 
medical information about Debbie that she does not yet have.  This mutual assumption 
implicitly reflects a recognition of differences in their individual perspectives. It also 
suggests a tacit awareness of the cultural phenomena of specialization that systematically 
                                                
15 Ibid., 34.d 
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develops different perspectives in the training of individuals to undertake specific roles 
such as that of a genetic counselor.  Communication can be understood as the capacity to 
navigate meanings between perspectives against this backdrop of assumed commonalities 
and differences.  Will this information be helpful to Debbie?  Does Debbie understand 
probabilities or Down syndrome? Is pregnancy termination permissible to her? Why is 
the genetic counselor giving Debbie this information? Does the genetic counselor think 
that fetuses with Down syndrome should be terminated? As these two perspectives enter 
the conversation, they must try to coordinate their distinct standpoints within a shared but 
specialized world that can produce specific facts about the embodiment of Debbie and 
her fetus.  
Peters’ Hegelian story, which he develops further with Kierkegaard and Marx, 
offers a trajectory of thought about communication that poses a different set of problems 
than the spiritualist tradition.  This alternative view asks: How do we as bodily creatures 
coordinate ourselves in a way that allows us to build worlds together from individuated 
standpoints? Language is clearly one of the most important resources in this development 
and Hegel’s robust vision of spirit continues to press 21st century thinkers for a more 
detailed understanding of language and communication.  In the next section, a pragmatic 
theory of communication is offered that reflects the insights of this tradition as it has 
taken shape in the work of Robert Brandom.  My aim in introducing his work is to 
provide expressive resources for underwriting the responsibilist model of genetic 
counseling. 
 
A Pragmatic Theory of Communication 
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 One of central questions of this project is: What understandings of 
communication are and should be operational in genetic counseling models?  In chapter 
one, I tried to show the visions of communication that are implicit and at times explicit in 
two dominant models in genetic counseling.  Brief critiques of these models and their 
respective visions have been offered.  Having introduced the responsibilist model and a 
framework of core concepts that fund it, a more detailed theory of communication is 
needed to show how normativity, authority and responsibility are operational in a 
fundamental feature of genetic counseling, the exchange of utterances.   
The methodological strategy underway assumes that a grasp of genetic counseling 
should begin with a general account of the possibilities and constraints that constitute the 
practice of communication.  The overarching features of communication must be 
understood before giving an account of how competencies specific to health care 
professionals and genetic concepts further constrain or specify genetic counseling.  One 
could characterize this methodological sequence as Aristotelian in its movement from a 
less qualified description of an activity or object, e.g. Aristotle’s treatment of friendship, 
to more qualified accounts, e.g. Aristotle’s account of pleasure-based, utility-based, and 
virtue-based friendships. In providing a theoretical account of the basic features of 
communication such as attributing, acknowledging, inferring and understanding, a new 
set of expressive resource is offered for reflection on the challenges in genetic 
counseling.  A brief hypothetical example of a theoretical benefit might prove helpful.   
If a genetic counselor implicitly holds, as the therapeutic vision proposes, that 
empathic understanding is the ideal of all communication, then she would experience 
consistent frustration in the outcomes of genetic counseling.  This frustration might 
 74 
compel her to ask more and more psychosocial questions and to provide more elaborate 
psychosocial interpretations of the situation. Pressing towards empathic understanding, 
the genetic counselor ignores signs that the patient is uncomfortable with talking about 
these personal matters.  As a result the genetic counselor institutes what Peters’ has called 
the “tyranny of dialogue”16 an overriding concern for comprehensive and equal exchange 
that ignores the needs of in this case the patient.  If the same counselor took 
communication to be a coordination of meanings across different perspectives, then her 
responsiveness to the respective backgrounds should be keener and her expectations for 
outcomes should be recalibrated in reference to the intractability of some differences 
between perspectives.  Although this hypothetical is extreme, it shows that attitudes, 
implicit or explicit, towards communication can affect how genetic counseling is 
undertaken.   
Robert Brandom’s17 model of deontic scorekeeping articulates the structures of 
rudimentary conversational exchange and offers this project a vocabulary and system to 
think about the responsibilist model. The next two chapters elaborate the consequences of 
the responsibilist model and this pragmatic theory of communication in relation to 
concerns about nondirectiveness in genetic counseling and the complex issues 
surrounding religion.  In an effort to stay close to the practical question, a likely utterance 
                                                
16 Ibid., 159. 
17 In philosophical circles, the choice of Brandom over Jurgen Habermas might be scrutinized.  Two 
reasons justify this decision.  First, Habermas’s work focuses more on communicative norms within 
procedural contexts of ‘ideal speech’, whereas Brandom’s applies to a broader range of communicative 
contexts. Second and more important, Brandom’s account supplies the details to Habermas’s pragmatic 
stance.  Habermas recounts a letter he received from Richard Rorty that recommended Brandom’s work as 
working out the pragmatics of communication that Habermas intends. For reference to letter, see Jürgen 
Habermas, Ciaran Cronin, and Max Pensky, Time of Transitions (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 
2006). and for a helpful comparison of Brandom and Habermas, see Kevin Scharp, "Communication and 
Content: Circumstances and Consequences of the Habermas-Brandom Debate," International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 11, no. 1 (2003): 43-61.     
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from Debbie’s case is used to help explicate the model.  Thus, an ancillary goal will be to 
understand what it might mean for the following sentence to travel from the genetic 
counselor’s mouth to Debbie’s ear: You have a 1/106 risk of giving birth to a child with 
Down syndrome.  
 
What is communication? 
Brandom’s Making It Explicit  develops and works out a theory of language use 
that he terms deontic scorekeeping.18  Communication is the joint practice of deontic 
scorekeeping between two or more scorekeepers.  The core of this practice is giving and 
asking for reasons.19  This section does not entail an exhaustive elaboration of Brandom’s 
model, which he works out in a 740-page book, but presents his theory in enough detail 
to underwrite the responsibilist model.  Deontic scorekeeping has two wheels on which it 
rolls: normative pragmatics and inferential semantics.  Brandom encapsulates the basic 
structure of the model in this passage: 
Competent linguistic practitioners keep track of their own 
and each other’s commitments and entitlements.  They are 
(we are) deontic scorekeepers.  Speech acts, 
paradigmatically assertions, alter the deontic score; they 
change what commitments and entitlements it is 
appropriate to attribute not only to the one producing the 
                                                
18 Every theory has limits and this one is no exception.  As Brandom indicates, his theory is an “artificial 
idealization” that oversimplifies and schematizes what we do but at the same time we should be able to 
recognize our own linguistic practices in this account.  Brandom correlates his term ‘commitment’ with 
‘obligation’ and ‘entitlement’ with ‘permission’ and explains his resistance to these correlates as disrupting 
the picture that authority necessarily depends on hierarchy.  Commitments and entitlements are normative 
statuses for Brandom and one of his central contributions is the development of these normative statuses in 
reference to assertional responsibility.  One possible consequence of his development is that ethical theories 
must begin at the level of the norms of discursive practice.                  
19 Brandom acknowledges that placing the practice of giving and asking for reasons at the core of linguistic 
practice is an intellectualist move away from Wittgenstein’s notion that language has no downtown.  
Wittgenstein insight is that we use language for all kinds of purposes and thus there is no core or 
‘downtown’ use for language. Brandom’s insight is that linguistic practice cannot be understood at all 
without the practice of giving and asking for reasons. 
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speech act but also to those to who it is addressed.  The job 
of pragmatic theory is to explain the significance of various 
sorts of speech acts in terms of practical proprieties 
governing the keeping of deontic score –what moves are 
appropriate given a certain score and what difference those 
moves make to that score.  The job of semantic theory is to 
develop a notion of the contents of discursive commitments 
(and the performances that express them) that combines 
with the account of the significance of different kinds of 
speech act to determine a scorekeeping kinematics.20   
To develop a pragmatics without yet dipping into semantics, Brandom asks us to imagine 
observing social practices where performers make nonlinguistic moves that have the 
significance of changing their normative (and social) status.  The two basic statuses in 
play are commitments and entitlements.    
Brandom makes a fundamental distinction between entitlements and 
commitments.21  Entitlements involve attributions of authority to do something that 
cannot be done without such authorization.  Brandom gives the example of the ticket 
taker at a movie theatre who authorizes those with tickets to enter.  This practice does not 
commit the ticket holder to enter but does allow non-ticket holders to be ejected, the 
removal being understood as a type of sanction.  Brandom construes this example of 
ticket taking as attributing authority without yet attributing responsibility.  A person is 
permitted without yet being committed.  Medical referrals can function as tickets or 
entitlements to other kinds of medical services and in the same way only authorize but do 
not commit a patient to those services.        
The structure of commitment involves responsibility and authority.  Brandom uses 
the example of “taking the queen’s shilling,” an 18th century British practice where taking 
                                                
20 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit : Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 142. 
21 Ibid., 159-62. 
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a shilling from an official recruiting officer meant that the taker was expected to serve in 
the military.22   The actual taking of the coin changes the taker’s score, his normative 
status, by making it appropriate for others to attribute to him a commitment to serve the 
military.  The consequence of being attributed this commitment consisted of undergoing 
sanctions levied in circumstances where there was failure to serve.  Two features of 
commitment can be understood from this practice.  First, to undertake a commitment 
involves a performance that signifies to others that they can attribute a commitment or 
responsibility to the performer. Second, attributing commitments consists in whatever 
taking someone as committed entails either defined externally by an observer or 
internally by the practice.  In the case of the queen’s shilling, failure to fulfill the 
commitment involves the attributors being disposed to sanction, i.e. a beating or court 
martial.  Beating is normatively less complex than the processes of court martialing.23     
Brandom wants us to see the possibility of more sophisticated rendering of this 
practice by extending its specification in terms of entitlement. By taking the shilling, the 
                                                
22 Ibid., 162. Brandom elaborates that this practice was justified as a way to confer commitment to illiterate 
citizens but in actuality it was a highly abused practice that involved disguised recruitment officers circling 
taverns where drunken citizens with empty pockets would take the queen’s shilling.     
23 Ibid., 34-46. The relationship of sanctioning to deontic scorekeeping deserves brief attention because it is 
a crucial feature for understanding how normative practices work. Positive and negative sanctions provide 
one explanation of what it means to assess performances as correct or incorrect. Sanctions can consist in 
withholding rewards or distributing punishment for incorrect performances and the provision of rewards or 
withholding of punishment for correct performances. Brandom divides sanctions into two kinds: 
nonnormative or normative.  The first kind involves responses to performances that ultimately depend on 
the disposition of the sanctioner.  Imagine a household where the behavior of lying has been designated as 
wrong but no specific punishment has been specified.  Thus, when a child lies the parent might be disposed 
to spank the child one day and yell at the child the next day.  This kind of sanction seeks to negatively 
reinforce the disposition that produced the performance without yet normatively defining what sanction is 
appropriate.  What makes this sanction nonnormative for Brandom is that it can be explained in purely 
naturalistic terms by an observer without reference to a normative specification.  Normative sanctions 
consist of responses to assessments that are defined by further changes in normative status, i.e. withholding 
of subsequent entitlements or removing preexisting obligations, and thus must be defined in reference to 
the internal workings of the normative practice.  When the child lies, he loses his or her entitlement to give 
reports that will be taken as true by his parents.  Normative sanctions do not have as direct a relationship to 
the reinforcement of a disposition in the ways that nonnormative sanctions do: “In such cases one is 
rewarded or punished for what one does “in another world” –by a change in normative status rather than 
natural state. 
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citizen not only entitles the attribution of the commitment but also entitles designated 
officers to sanction him in the case of failing to serve.  One consequence of mediating the 
practice of sanctioning with entitlement is that it brings the appropriateness of sanctions 
in question as a normative status, i.e. whether someone is entitled to sanction another.  It 
is a further specification of the practice in terms of normative status.24  A commitment is 
then not only a responsibility that is appropriately attributed by others but it is also an 
undertaking that authorizes others to hold the undertaker responsible in an appropriate 
way.   
In accounting for the source of deontic statuses, Brandom proposes that they are 
instituted by practical attitudes of taking and treating each other as committed or entitled.  
These attitudes are not arbitrary in a normative practice and yet their normativity is not 
explicit in the form of rules. Following the Wittgensteinian, pragmatist line of tracing 
rules back to practice, Brandom calls norms that are implicit in practices proprieties and 
these are what govern deontic attitudes.  The two basic deontic attitudes are attributing 
and undertaking (the latter is sometimes referred to as acknowledging) commitments and 
entitlements.  Brandom understands attributing as more fundamental than undertaking 
because our ability to track ourselves begins with the ability to track others.  What 
undertaking makes possible are authorized attributions of entitlements and commitments 
and also entitlements to sanction under certain circumstances.  This pragmatic emphasis 
on attitudes, sometimes called methodological pragmatism, is one of the features of 
Brandom’s work that I think can be especially helpful for reflections on genetic 
counseling. Its focus on practical attitudes governed by implicit norms provides a detailed 
                                                
24 For Brandom, a practice becomes more sophisticated as it become further defined by normative statuses.  
One only has to think about how policies evolve within an organization to specify additional commitments 
and entitlements related to it.      
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vocabulary to analyze and evaluate the implicit norms that govern scorekeeping attitudes 
of those who participate in genetic counseling.                    
Deontic statuses and attitudes are the raw materials for explicating the practice of 
giving and asking for reasons.  When an assertion or claim is made, a commitment is 
undertaken.  Brandom calls this an assertional commitment.  Assertional commitments 
entitle others to attribute that commitment as well as hold the asserter responsible for 
what the commitment entails.  Unlike other kinds of commitments, assertional 
commitments can be inherited by their attributers.  This special feature will be addressed 
below.  The broad context that allows the significance of assertional commitment to be 
worked out is the “game of giving and asking for reasons,” a central concept that 
Brandom borrows from Wilfrid Sellars.25  An assertion is made within this practice and 
plays the dual role of 1) being a reason 2) or standing in need of a reason.  Claims or 
assertions are paradigmatically formatted as declarative sentences such as: You have a 
1/106 risk of giving birth to a child with Down syndrome.  Henceforth P, this sentence 
when uttered in a genetic counseling session presupposes and prompts the need for 
deontic, or mores specifically, conversational scorekeeping.      
Conversational scorekeeping involves tracking the significance that utterances 
and non-linguistic behaviors have on the perspectives of those involved in a conversation.  
Individuals inevitably have different commitment sets, otherwise there would be no 
reason to communicate.  Keeping score in a conversation involves “keeping two sets of 
books.”26  When the genetic counselor utters P to Debbie, the genetic counselor has 
undertaken a commitment to P by asserting it.  This entitles Debbie not only to attribute 
                                                
25 Wilfrid Sellars, "Some Reflections on Langauge Games," Philosophy of Science 21, no. 3 (1954): 204-
28. 
26 Brandom, 590. 
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P to the genetic counselor but also to acknowledge P as a commitment she should 
undertake unless there is a reason to challenge P.  Since the genetic counselor is a 
professional and Debbie a layperson, then Debbie will likely take the genetic counselor to 
be entitled to P by default although sometimes the accuracy of test results are questioned 
by patients.  The question of what the consequences of P are for the HCP and the patient 
leads to the question of the content of P, its meanings.  
 
What is meaning? 
Brandom’s answer to the question of meaning is inferential semantics.  In the 
example of conversational scorekeeping above, the significance of P is understood 
semantically in terms of its inferential significance.  As a potential reason27 for further 
claims or as a reason in need of justification, P’s meaning depends on the practice of 
inferring or, as Brandom puts it, “assertions are fundamentally fodder for inferences.”28  
The pragmatic significance of a sentence, its meaning, is its inferential articulation in the 
practice of giving and asking for reasons.  Inferences can refer to logically explicit 
inferences that are staples of introductory logics classes, especially in the form of 
conditionals, but more importantly for this project, inference refers to material inferences 
that can be observed in everyday exchanges and requires no logical vocabulary.  Material 
inferences involve proprieties that govern the practical attitudes involved in linguistic 
practice.  When the genetic counselor utters P, Debbie could have responded, “I’m in 
danger of having a sick baby” and this response is an inference from P.  Whether it is a 
                                                
27 Brandom is not claiming that every sentence is uttered to provide a reason or every sentence ascribed 
should be challenged but only that they have the potential to be a reason for some further claim or action 
and the potential to be challenged. 
28 Brandom, 168. 
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valid inference or one that should be challenged is an important question but it does not 
change its status as a kind of inferential doing.  One of the responsibilities a genetic 
counselor has in offering P is to be fluent in the kinds of inferences that should and 
should not be made from P.  If P is involved in a set of inferential relations, then these 
deserve further specification in terms of structure.   
Brandom understands every sentence to be governed by an inferential network 
consisting of three kinds of relations: commitments, entitlements and incompatibilities.  
If I assert a sentence, then I am committed to, entitled to and prohibited from endorsing 
other claims whether I am aware of it or not.  Let’s take the proposition P.  To 
exhaustively survey these relations, one would have to identify all the premises that could 
commit, entitle and preclude entitlement to concluding P; and identify all the conclusions 
that must, can and cannot follow from P.  No one within a given discursive community 
would have a complete grasp of all these relations, but professionals who offer sentences 
like P are certainly expected to have a significantly better grasp of them than lay persons.  
What limits the set of premises and conclusions to and from P are the contextual factors 
related to its actual claiming.  Borrowing from Michael Dummett,  Brandom broadly 
characterizes the meaning of a claim as the inferential articulation of the circumstances 
and consequences of its assertion. For example, P is easily recognized as a sentence 
appropriate to health care circumstances and more specifically to circumstances that 
involve pregnant women.  What commits or entitles a health care professional to utter 
these words is an important question as is the question of the consequences of uttering P 
from the HCP’s view.  Also of great importance are the circumstances and consequences 
of the patient that might serve as premises and conclusions to and from P once she is 
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entitled to the claim. To say that a sentence stands in these relations is not yet to explain 
how one person inherits meanings from another person.  
Brandom characterizes acquisition of inferential relations in which a sentence 
stands as the inheritance of deontic statuses.  This process has an intrapersonal and 
interpersonal dimension. Let us first look at intrapersonal inheritance. If I wanted to 
justify P, I could work through the algorithms to arrive at P or attempt to grasp the full 
consequence of P for my preexisting commitments. In this dimension of inheritance, I 
possess these deontic statuses as a result of undertaking the commitment and actually 
doing the inferential work.  The second dimension is interpersonal.  When the genetic 
counselor offers P to Debbie, it introduces the interpersonal dimension of inheritance.  
The linguistic performance of asserting P has both pragmatic and inferential significance.  
First, it licenses the patient to attribute P to the counselor. Most often this licensing is 
implicit but it could be made explicit in the form of an ascription: ‘The genetic counselor 
believes of me that I have a 1/106 risk of having a child with Down syndrome.  Since the 
claim is offered as true, the hearer of the claim is also being licensed to endorse it and 
incorporate the claim into her commitment set. How is the patient entitled to this claim? 
She inherits possession of its entitlement from the counselor who can presumably justify 
the claim.  Most often, the patient infers that P has a default status of being true because 
the genetic counselor is assumed to be a reliable reporter. But the issue of whether P is 
true, whether the genetic counselor is entitled to it can and does arise.  Some patients 
question the accuracy of genetic screens and tests.    
The possibility of challenging P points to what Brandom calls the default-
challenge structure within linguistic practice.  The default component acknowledges that 
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many statements we produce and consume have a default status of being true. Without 
the possibility of a default dimension, we would live in the world of the radical skeptic 
searching for and doubting the existence of truth foundations.  The challenge aspect 
refers to the possibility of questioning someone’s entitlement to a commitment. Without 
the possibility of challenging an assertion, there is no normative appraisal, no 
responsibility, no linguistic practice, no discursive communication.   
The details of any given default-challenge structure depends on the context in 
which a discursive exchange occurs.  What is said at a dinner party is not usually held to 
the same level of scrutiny as what is said at a public hearing.  The default-challenge 
structure of genetic counseling has many features typical of a professional-client 
relationship.  Given that professionals are expected to have expertise rooted in esoteric 
knowledge, clients often attribute a default status to a professional’s statements.  The 
difficulty in professional-client exchanges is knowing when to rely on what Brandom 
calls “person-based authority” and when to rely on “content-based authority.”  The 
former requires an act of deference and the latter requires an act of inference.  The power 
imbalance in professional-client relationships is well established in the scholarship but 
less attention has been given to how this works in communication practices. How should 
we understand the movement between deferential activity and inferential activity? What 
will be shown below is that for the patient to understand and adapt to P in terms of the 
model presented here requires deferring and inferring.  Before explicating how these 
alternating activities work, the relation between default-challenge structures and 
sanctioning must be acknowledged.        
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A contiguous aspect of the default-challenge is the possibility of normative 
sanction. If the genetic counselor elicits incompatible claims from a patient, then the 
counselor might be less likely to attribute a default status to the patient’s subsequent 
responses. For example, the patient may characterize her parents as healthy but in 
response to follow-up questions may reveal that her mother had breast cancer and her 
father has high-blood pressure.  If more and more incompatible claims are detected, then 
the counselor may withdraw the presumed entitlement to make any claims that have a 
default-status. This across-the-board withdrawal of entitlement correlates with the finding 
of a patient incompetent to give consent.  Patients also undertake the authority to 
challenge and sanction the HCP who undertakes genetic counseling.  In a genetic 
counseling session that I observed, the physician recommended that the patient not 
undergo amniocentesis unless she would terminate the pregnancy. The patient challenged 
this recommendation claiming that the results from the test would reduce anxiety and 
allow her to sleep.  In terms of the deontic model, the patient withdrew the physician’s 
entitlement to the recommendation in respect to her circumstances.  This withdrawal is a 
kind normative sanction that implicitly says: Whatever prior experiences entitled you to 
this recommendation, they do not entitle you to it in my case.   In this discussion of 
default-challenge structures and sanctioning, the perspectival nature of meaning is 
suggested and deserves further explanation.       
In interpersonal conversation, the inferential significance of a claim is relative to 
the background commitments of the producers and consumers of the claim. If claim P is 
undertaken by a genetic counselor, then it has inferential significance from the standpoint 
of both the genetic counselor and the patient.  Let’s take the perspective of the genetic 
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counselor first.  The genetic counselor’s possession of entitlement to the claim’s 
accuracy can be traced back to algorithmic calculations.  By undertaking P the health 
care provider is automatically committed to other commitments such as: 1) Your risk is 
lower than 50-50 but higher than the general populations risk of 1/733 of giving birth to a 
child with Down syndrome 2) You have a just under a 1% risk of giving birth to a child 
with a chromosomal abnormality.  In terms of entitlement-relations, the question is what 
does P entitle – instead of commit – the HCP to infer, an inference that is susceptible to 
challenge by countervailing evidence.29  The reference to Down syndrome brings a host 
of inductive inferences about the clinical and social characteristics of a child with this 
condition.  Although cognitive disabilities and low muscle tone in newborns with Down 
Syndrome occurs in close to 100% of cases, they must still be classified as entitlements 
because rare circumstances do occur where these are not present.30 A likely inference that 
a genetic counselor would offer is:  “You have a 1/106 risk of having a child with mild to 
severe cognitive disabilities.”  Other entitlements would involve substituting in the 
underlined section clinical findings such as:  90% of children with Down syndrome have 
significant hearing loss31; 30-40% of children with Down syndrome have a congenital 
malformation in the heart or gastrointestinal track.  The social characteristics of children 
with Down syndrome, e.g. prospects for independence32, effects on families33, are also 
                                                
29 Brandom gives the example of a well made match and the entitlement to the inference that when struck 
against the appropriate surface it will light.  He notes extremely cold circumstances in which such an 
inference could be challenged. 
30 J. R. Korenberg and others, "Down Syndrome Phenotypes: The Consequences of Chromosomal 
Imbalance," Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 91, no. 11 (1994): 4998. 
31 D. S. Mazzoni, R. S. Ackley, and D. J. Nash, "Abnormal Pinna Type and Hearing Loss Correlations in 
Down's Syndrome," J Intellect Disabil Res 38 ( Pt 6) (1994). 
32 For a longitudinal study comparing persons with Down syndrome to perform ‘activities of daily living, 
seeM. A. Maaskant and others, "Care Dependence and Activities of Daily Living in Relation to Ageing: 
Results of a Longitudinal Study," J Intellect Disabil Res 40 ( Pt 6) (1996). 
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entitlement-relations.  Selecting  and offering these consequences of P has come under 
increasing scrutiny by groups advocating for the disabled.34  A major concern is that the 
primary criteria for interpreting Down Syndrome is to establish it as a medical condition 
that is justifiably the object of risk assessments.   Finally, the incompatibilities of P 
include that set of sentences that one is not entitled to undertake as a result of its being 
uttered.  For example, the client is not entitled to the inference: “I will give birth to a 
child with Down syndrome.” Because Debbie might infer from P that the fetus has been 
diagnosed with Down syndrome, genetic counselors often make this incompatibility 
relation explicit.  One goal of the genetic counselor is to help the patient inherit a set of 
inferences from P that are valid from the standpoint of the role of a genetic counselor 
whose commitments are for the most part supplied by the biomedical tradition.           
P’s meaning extends beyond the counselor’s commitment set to the perspective of 
the patient.  This set of meanings is often referred to as subjective or personal as a way of 
distinguishing it from the objective meanings of P.   Often the objective set of meanings 
is privileged when discussing what P really means but this leaves the status of Debbie’s 
perspective in question. Indebted to the Gadamerian insight of meaning pluralism, 
Brandom’s theory would classify Debbie’s repertoire of commitments as a legitimate 
context in which P can be interpreted or specified. His position does not mean that all 
contexts are created equally.  Some are more relevant than others.  The key normative 
                                                                                                                                            
33 The effect a child with Down syndrome has on a family is complex.  For a population study that 
compares divorce rates between Down syndrome families, families with other birth defects and families 
with no known disabilities, see R. C. Urbano and R. M. Hodapp, "Divorce in Families of Children with 
Down Syndrome: A Population-Based Study," Am J Ment Retard 112, no. 4 (2007): 261-74.  
34 For a recent article discussing the conflict of interests between Down syndrome advocates and 
OB/GYNs, see Amy Harmon, "Prenatal Test Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus," New York Times, 9 
May 2007, 1. Adrienne Asch has been a consistent and forceful critic of the prenatal testing. See A. Asch, 
"Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?," Fla State Univ Law Rev 30, no. 2 
(2003): 315-42.  
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question is whether the HCP and Debbie think her perspective is important for 
understanding P.  Whether and to what degree the genetic counselor should try to 
understand the genetic information from the patient’s perspective are crucial questions 
that are answered differently by each of the genetic counseling models under 
consideration.  I will address these differences below.  
The deontic scorekeeping model is an idealized representation of the practice of 
undertaking a rudimentary conversation.  The account proposes that both scorekeepers 
keep two sets of books or more explicitly track the conceptual content from both 
perspectives in effort to try to understand the content in view.35 The reason for this 
demonstrates the depth of Brandom’s pragmatism.  In his view, grasping conceptual 
content requires that a scorekeeper be able to coordinate or negotiate inferences from 
different contexts of interpretation. This will be developed below in the discussion about 
the dialogical structure of grasping a concept.  
Does Brandom’s model mean that the genetic counselor does not understand P if 
she does not grasp it from the perspective of each patient to whom it is offered?  It does 
follow that the counselor does not understand P if she exclusively interprets it from her 
own perspective, but such a unilateral relation to the content is highly unlikely. More 
likely is that the HCP habitually navigates between a biomedical perspective and an 
idealized patient perspective or a conglomerate of actual patient perspectives that she has 
encountered or gleaned from studies. If this latter case is operational, then the experience 
of uttering P to patient after patient may still seem to fit more along the lines of the 
technical vision’s model of communication as transmission.  The meaning of P is 
                                                
35 The model does not claim that both do it equally well. 
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standardizable in an assembly line of perspectives because the idealized patient 
perspective is substituted for the actual perspectives of individual patients.  The technical 
vision’s understanding of meaning suppresses the role of the recipient’s perspective 
because it privileges the sender’s perspective and fails to see the perspectival structure of 
semantic phenomena. Brandom rejects the notion that any perspective should have a 
permanent privileged status in the interpretation.36  The circumstances of the utterance 
inform the selection of contexts that are important for interpretation.  For a genetic 
counselor to claim that she understands P in this circumstance requires that she be able to 
make inferences from Debbie’s perspective.  
The patient has at least two interpretive tasks. One is to try to understand P from 
the counselor’s perspective; the second is to try to understand it from her own 
perspective.  For Debbie, the meaning of P is obtained by presuming that P is true, i.e. 
attributing a default status and sort the consequences of P as the genetic counselor 
explains them.  She must first track P’s inferential significance for the genetic counselor. 
Why is the HCP saying this to me? What does the HCP think the significance of this 
information is?  If Debbie accepts P as true, then the question of entitlement is answered.  
What remains is the task of identifying the inferential significance of P from Debbie’s 
perspective. Her religious commitments provide an interesting case. Debbie believes that 
God’s will would be present in several kinds of outcomes presumably because she 
                                                
36 Brandom endorse an I-Thou social model of linguistic practice rather than an I-we account.  In the latter, 
the communities position on a matter  is the truth of the matter ; in the former, the truth of the matter is a 
negotiated status between individuals who constitute a linguistic community (p.590): “Mutual 
understanding a communication depend on interlocutors’ being able to keep two sets of books, to move 
back and forth between the point of view of the speaker and the audience, while keeping straight on which 
doxastic substitutional and expressive commitments are undertaken and which are attributed by the various 
parties.  Conceptual contents, paradigmatically propositional contents can genuinely be shared, but their 
perspectival nature means that doing so is mastering the coordinated system of scorekeeping perspectives, 
not passing something nonperspectival from hand to hand (mouth to mouth).       
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believes God is active in all circumstances.  Because P indicates a risk of possible 
outcomes, it necessarily involves from Debbie’s perspective the issue of God’s 
sovereignty and protection.  From Debbie’s perspective, she should interpret P in relation 
to God’s will.  To finally understand P is clearly relative to both Debbie’s deferential and 
inferential activities. Thus, understanding is a kind of practical grasp that suggest 
dialogical structures.37   
Having rehearsed several important components of Brandom’s model, it is now 
possible to make the links between Brandom’s understanding of dialogue and White’s 
notion of dialogical counseling.  Brandom sets out a distinction between dialogical 
relations and dialogical processes.38  A dialogical relation holds between premises from 
two different sources or voices that share in the arrival at a common set of conclusions. 
As Brandom puts it,  “In this sense each of them has its ‘say.’ For the collaboration of the 
commitments of the two as it were interlocutors consists in their relation to their joint 
inferential consequences.”39  To show in what sense premises share conclusions, 
Brandom gives the analogy of sharing in the way Fred and Ginger share a dance and not 
in the way that marching soldiers share a gait.40   The presence of dialogical relations 
should be more pronounced in professional/client encounters like genetic counseling 
because there are pronounced perspectival differences that exist because of specialized 
training. The technical knowledge of the professional should combine with personal 
knowledge of client to arrive at a conclusion.  For example, Debbie’s statement about 
                                                
37 The possibility that P  could affect every commitment is evidence of Brandom’s endorsement of 
semantic holism, the position that meanings cannot be easily divided into analytic and synthetic 
distinctions. 
38 Robert Brandom, "Hermeneutic Practice and Theories of Meaning," SATS - Nordic Journal of 
Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2004): 23.   
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 24. 
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God’s will and potential outcomes is a clear example that a dialogical relation has been 
established: 
Genetic Counselor:  Here are four possible outcomes … 
+ 
Debbie: God’s will is involved in this pregnancy and any 
outcome related to it. 
= 
God’s will would be involved in a miscarriage from 
amniocentesis or the birth of child with Down Syndrome 
Not all dialogical relations are this surprising and some can remain implicit in the simple 
substitution of words such as ‘baby’ for ‘fetus’.41 A genetic counselor refers to a fetus as 
having a risk and the patient refers to the baby as having a risk.  This substitution is made 
explicitly dialogical in the following two ascriptions: 1)‘You said that the fetus is at such 
and such a risk.’ 2) ‘You said about my baby that he or she is at such and such risk.’  The 
second ascription contains an implicit dialogical relation that reflects input from both 
patient and counselor.  For White, an optimal outcome of dialogical counseling would be 
a set of conclusions that reflects the appropriate dialogical relations.  What makes such 
relations possible is, at least in part, the dialogical process of reaching them.           
Brandom proposes a continuum of perspectival gaps that can be more or less 
bridged by dialogical processes. On one end are wide gaps – the kinds of gaps that 
hermeneutic theory usually addresses -  that involve significant historical and cultural 
barriers to interpretation; on the other end are the everyday gaps that exist between 
individuals who are close in many ways but still travel this world along distinct 
spatiotemporal paths.42 One could theoretically extend this continuum further by placing 
                                                
41 For a more thorough discussion of this specific example, see L. de Crespigny, "Words Matter: 
Nomenclature and Communication in Perinatal Medicine," Clin Perinatol 30, no. 1 (2003): 17-25. 
42 Brandom, "Hermeneutic Practice and Theories of Meaning," 26. 
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completely identical perspectives at one end and completely incommensurable 
perspective at the other.  At both extremes, no dialogical relations or processes are 
possible.  
The perspectives of HCPs and patients are neither incommensurable or identical 
and thus are amenable to dialogical processes. Dialogical processes include interpreting 
texts/utterances and more fundamentally grasping conceptual contents. In the case of 
texts or utterances, the interpreter plays a role in specifying the meaning of what some 
one else says or wrote.  Two sources can be identified in the process of establishing the 
meaning of X. In the case of conceptual contents, a stronger and more global claim is 
being made:    
The most important notion of hermeneutic dialogue 
underwritten by inferentialist semantics is a different one, 
however. For according to the development of that view in 
Making It Explicit, [is that] practical grasp or understanding 
of conceptual content is the ability to navigate and 
negotiate between the different perspectives from which 
such a content can be interpreted (implicitly) or specified 
(explicitly)… When one can say both “S believes that a 
bunch of bloodthirsty fanatics occupied the village,” and “S 
believes of a bunch of gallant freedom fighters that they 
occupied the village,” one is calibrating claims (and 
concepts applied therein) according to the different 
doxastic perspectives of the author and the target of the 
ascriptions in a way that makes clear what inferential 
significance as premises they would have for each. 
Mapping different inferential significances, relative to 
distinct contexts, onto each other in this way is what taking 
them to be expressions of the same conceptual content 
consists in. For once again, it is the same conceptual 
content that is being attributed by the two ascriptions.   
Grasp of conceptual content in this sense is essentially 
dialogical, even in cases where one or more of the contexts 
in question is not associated with an interlocutor authorized 
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to engage on its behalf in processes of expounding, 
expatiating, and answering for it.43  
Dialogue on this view is constitutive of understanding and essential in the account of 
deontic scorekeeping.  In Brandom’s idiom, a practical grasp of genetic information in an 
actual genetic counseling session can only come from calibrating the claims of the HCP, 
the patient and others in the room.  The characterization of calibrating seems 
hypercognitive if one imagines a formal debate or biblical scholar presenting a definitive 
reading but Brandom asks us to think in terms of material inferences and the perspectival 
structures built into the most basic exchanges.  Thus, the example cited above of a patient 
substituting ‘baby’ for ‘fetus’ in reference to the same phenomena is a subtle but 
significant sign that a dialogical process is underway.  
White’s call for dialogical counseling appears more modest and not intended as 
global claim about what understanding entails but her social-perspectival account of 
autonomy prompts her call for dialogue and comports well with Brandom’s position.  
Both view understanding and decision making as a social achievement.  What Brandom 
provides for White and for the responsibilist model is the elaboration of linguistic 
practice as an essentially normative, social, and dialogical phenomena. 
       
Underwriting the Responsibilist Model 
Mary White’s call for dialogical counseling promotes shared understanding and 
responsible decision making.  She appropriates the work of H. Richard Niebuhr to show 
how a general account of selves as socially constituted can motivate a particular model of 
genetic counseling.  What I have done above is to extend the theoretical elaboration 
                                                
43 Ibid., 24-25. 
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begun by White to both a larger story about communication and embodiment and to a 
more specific pragmatic and normative account of the structure of communication.  
Brandom’s model depicts all acts of communication as interpretive events that have 
dialogical structures.  The insights from these theoretical resources are sketched below in 
relation to the theses of the responsibilist model. The model will be developed more in 
chapters three and four.              
1. Goals: a) To help coordinate the meanings of genetic information with the 
patient  b) To promote responsible decision making – Genetic counselors should aim for 
a coordinated set of meanings about genetic information that reflect the appropriate 
perspectives.  Below I will explicate the coordination of meanings in terms of the two 
tasks of navigating and negotiating perspectives. Achieving this first goal is similar to 
achieving the goal of an educated counselee as espoused in the teaching model but a few 
significant differences are worth mentioning. First, achieving a coordinated set of 
meanings requires a self-conscious awareness that that there are at least two legitimate 
perspectives trying to understand the genetic information.  The genetic counselor should 
make inferences with P that cannot be made by the patient; the patient should make 
inferences with P that cannot be made by the HCP. Since the HCP is the professional 
with a technical grasp of the information, it might seem that only the patient needs to gain 
an understanding.  The claim of the responsibilist model is that the HCP does not 
adequately understand the genetic information in this context until some grasp of the 
patient’s perspective is achieved.  Although previous patient experiences contribute to the 
HCP’s understanding, these have a provisional quality that can be revised by each new 
perspective. This view challenges the teaching model’s picture of a genetic counselor 
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transmitting objective information to the patient who then can ask questions or have 
misunderstandings corrected.  Second, to obtain the outcome of coordinated meanings 
requires not only that dialogical relations are formed but also that an explicitly dialogical 
process is undertaken.  The teaching model promotes dialogical relations in one sense.  
The patient receives the genetic information and then is free to commingle this input with 
his or her practical commitments to make rational decisions.  This view aims to replicate 
the genetic information and the biomedical context in the patient who then can apply this 
information to their situation.  The responsibilist view aims to coordinate the meanings of 
the genetic information through explicit dialogical processes. An example will help 
illustrate the point. 
When offering information like P to patients, a genetic counselor who I observed  
informed the patient that she was being given this information because her risk of having 
a child with abnormalities was greater than the risk of miscarriage from amniocentesis.  
The genetic counselor then asked the patient how she interpreted this risk.  By making the 
biomedical perspective explicit and eliciting the perspective of the patient, this 
counseling maneuver provides the patient an opportunity to negotiate between 
perspectives.  A negotiation between perspectives involves a consideration of meaning 
from two sources and determining which interpretation is worthy of semantic purchase.  
This example illustrates how dialogical processes can generate coordinated meanings.   
Note that this example and this goal of the responsibilist model do not aim to 
“understand the person” as Kessler proposes or to have an empathic understanding as 
comprehensive as Weil advocates.  The genetic counselor attempts to understand the 
perspective of the patient in relation to the conceptual content and the constraints of the 
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circumstances.  Kessler and Weil could rejoin that they do not expect to achieve complete 
empathic understanding of the person and that this failure does not undermine the validity 
of the goal - one that has a family resemblance to the desire for shared interiors 
developed in chapter one.  On the view endorsed here, a model should have achievable 
goals. Allowing for those exceptional cases where patients refuse to talk, the coordination 
of meanings is for the most part practically feasible.     
Advocates of the psychotherapeutic model might also accuse the responsibilist 
model of overemphasizing rational processes and neglecting emotional processes. 
Accepting the limitations of understanding does not mean that the emotional responses of 
the patient are ignored.  If P causes a physiological reaction in Debbie, then that bodily 
response is potentially part of the meaning of P.  Under Brandom’s model, one can 
articulate the meaning of P and its relation to the physiological response of Debbie’s 
body upon hearing P.  It is not just the sounds of the words that caused the physiological 
response but the meaning of the words.  What is the relation of the meaning of P to the 
physiological response?  In this circumstance, P caused the physiological response.  If 
this bodily response is called ‘anxiety’ or ‘fear,’ Debbie  undertakes a noninferential44 
commitment that expresses (or reports) a bodily state caused by P. Henceforth, part of the 
meaning of P is related to the anxiety Debbie feels.  Both Debbie and the HCP are 
responsible for coordinating what this anxiety means from their distinct standpoints.  This 
                                                
44 Perception is a term used by Brandom to refer to noninferential commitments expressed in observation 
reports.  Noninferential commitments are triggered by what Brandom calls reliable differential responsive 
dispositions.  On Brandom’s view, we share these dispositions with land mines and thermostats but the 
latter do not undertake noninferential commitments.  To explicate the important relation between 
noninferential commitments and inferential ones,  Brandom compares a parrot that can be taught to say 
‘red’ and the use of red by a competent language user.  The parrot may be able to differentiate when to say, 
‘That is red’ but has no understanding of the inferential significance of this move.  When a competent 
language user claima, ‘That is red’, he or she knows the significance of the utterance, i.e. it is not a patch of 
green. If Debbie is implicitly or explicitly aware that she is anxious, then this attitude can be attributed as a 
noninferential commitment that has clear inferential significance for understanding P.    
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description implies that an HCP who does not address the emotional states of a patient 
fails to take responsibility for an important consequence of offering P.  
The second goal of the responsibilist model is to facilitate responsible decision 
making.  Two questions must be answered to understand this goal. Under what 
circumstances can it be said that a responsible decision has been made? To whom or what 
is the decision maker responsible?  At the beginning of this chapter, Niebuhr’s view of 
responsible action is used by White as a guide to promote responsible decision making in 
genetic counseling. These marks of responsible actions bear repeating: 1) every action is 
a response to a prior action 2) all actions –in contrast to behaviors - involve interpretation 
of what is happening, 3) an agent anticipates consequences of possible actions 4) fitting 
actions are acknowledgments of ongoing individual and collective narratives.  The first 
mark requires that the genetic counselor be aware that he or she constitutes the prior 
action to which the patient must respond. The HCP is not a conduit through which 
objective information flows but rather the one who is endorsing the genetic information 
as true and useful and thus initiates the need for a response.  Prior actions such as the 
referral also play a role but the genetic counselor is the most proximate agent to the 
patient’s decision making. The second mark makes explicit the link between the two 
goals.  Achieving responsible decision making depends on the ability to achieve an 
adequate coordination of meanings. The third mark requires that the genetic counselor 
help the patient think prospectively about the outcomes of her decision. In Debbie’s case, 
the genetic counselor identified four possible outcomes for her to consider: 
1) She can refuse the amniocentesis, avoid increased risk of 
miscarriage, and have a healthy baby. 
2) She can refuse the amniocentesis, avoid increased risk of 
miscarriage, and have a special needs child.  
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3) She can undergo amniocentesis and miscarry a healthy 
baby. 
4) She can undergo amniocentesis, an abnormality is found 
and then she must decide whether to continue the 
pregnancy. 
Implicit in the presentation of these is the question of what it would be like to live with 
this particular outcome.  Responsible decisions reflect accountability to future contexts.  
If the anticipated consequences are not compatible with the preferences and/or 
obligations that are anticipated to be operational in the future, then the action does not fit 
the context.  And this brings us to the fourth and final mark.  Responsible decisions are 
fitting or compatible with particular contexts.  In the case of genetic counseling, two 
contexts are collaborating to make a decision, the biomedical context and the patient 
context.  These contexts are suppliers of reasons for acting. Given the variation with 
patient contexts, are some decisions more responsible than others? What is not a 
responsible decision? A patient who flips a coin to decide whether to undergo 
amniocentesis is not on this account making a responsible decision even though one 
could make the argument that the outcome of the coin flip is a context.  Whether the 
patient is entitled to his or her reasons for acting and whether the patient’s perspective is 
sufficiently informed are important concerns when determining whether a decision is 
responsible.  Who gets to decide whether a patient’s decision is responsible?    
This question is understood against the backdrop of the default-challenge 
structure that Brandom identifies above.  In all three genetic counseling models, the 
patient’s pro-attitudes and the beliefs they pair with them have a default status.  A pro-
attitude refers to those evaluative attitudes expressed as desires, preferences or 
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obligations that constitute part of what forms an intention to act.45 Giving a patient’s pro-
attitudes and commingled beliefs a default status is worked out differently by each of the 
models. The teaching model does this by educating or informing the client and then 
letting the patient make a decision without interference even if the decision may cause the 
patient harm.  The psychotherapeutic model actively promotes the client’s autonomy 
through empathic understanding and unconditional positive regard.  Few circumstances 
warrant direct challenge.  The responsibilist model acknowledges the authority of the 
patient perspective by making it an integral part of the meaning of genetic information. 
At the same time its commitment to dialogue implies that other perspectives are needed 
to grasp the situation and to make a responsible decision.  The responsibilist model 
allows the genetic counselor more discretion to challenge the patient’s decision making 
either implicitly or explicitly.  Mary White elaborates this more interventionist stance in 
terms of dialogical counseling:     
In dialogical counseling the counselor is not a nondirective 
purveyor of genetic information; instead she acts as the 
interlocutor in dialogue, as the expert authority and 
sounding board for the individual faced with a genetic 
decision. Her role is not to minimize her involvement in 
decision making, but to promote a thorough and 
responsible deliberative process. As a partner in dialogue, 
the counselor provides the most current thinking on the 
medical, psychosocial, and moral aspects of reproductive 
decision making; helps her clients identify and clarify their 
priorities; dispels any misperceptions; and supports them as 
they make their decisions. If a client appears to be 
neglecting important factors or making a decision based on 
an unduly narrow perception of her alternatives, the 
counselor may introduce additional information and 
perspectives and the arguments for and against these views. 
                                                
45 See Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," The Journal of Philosophy 60, no. 23 (1963). 
Donald Davidson claims that action can only be understood in relation to a ‘primary reason’ defined as the 
pairing of a belief and a pro-attitude.  When giving explanations for our actions (Why did you open the 
umbrella? …because it is raining), we often leave out the pro-attitude (I want to stay dry.).   
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If the counselor is concerned that a decision will be less 
than fully informed, is poorly reasoned, or may be regretted 
at a later date, she may encourage further reflection and 
discussion. If a decision is so at odds with prevailing social 
values that it could be considered ethically unacceptable, 
she may question her clients' reasoning and encourage them 
to think about the social consequences of the decision.  
Throughout the dialogue, the counselor does not debate, 
heckle, manipulate, or attempt to coerce a client's choice. 
Rather, her approach resembles that of a good teacher, 
therapist or friend, whose aim is to promote the flourishing 
of the individual in accordance with his or her unique 
personality and circumstances.46 
The controversial features of White’s description will be made more apparent in the next 
chapter when the value of nondirectiveness is directly addressed.  Most of what White 
says above expresses what it means for the genetic counselor to facilitate responsible 
decision making. Her reference to teachers and therapists makes it clear that the 
responsibilist model is not incompatible with those roles but the way these particular 
roles have been modeled in genetic counseling.         
Two objections need to be addressed in regards to decision making in general. 
First, some patient responses are more like recognitions than decisions. Second, by 
focusing on the ‘decision’ the HCP may miss the most important concerns that need to be 
addressed.  Churchill and Schenk refer to end-of-life circumstances where patients and 
their surrogate decision makers recognize without any observable inferences what must 
be done and their concerns tend not to be about medical decisions.47   For example, 
family members sometimes spend no observable effort deliberating about when to 
remove life-sustaining treatment but give considerable attention to reconciling familial 
relations.  One can imagine similar situations arising in prenatal genetic counseling where 
                                                
46 White, "Making Responsible Decisions. An Interpretive Ethic for Genetic Decisionmaking," 20. 
47 L. R. Churchill and D. Schenck, "One Cheer for Bioethics: Engaging the Moral Experiences of Patients 
and Practitioners Beyond the Big Decisions," Camb Q Healthc Ethics 14, no. 4 (2005): 393-98. 
 100 
a pregnant woman sees or hears that she is carrying a severely deformed fetus.  Whether 
and how the pregnancy will be terminated can become an issue at this juncture. For some 
women, the response to terminate does not come from an inferential process of decision 
making but rather as a recognition of their baby’s condition.  In such cases, issues of 
maternal grief are likely to be of more importance than a decision about termination. 
Avowing the responsibilist model in this case would mean coordinating the meanings of 
this difficult finding leaving open whether or when a decision needed to be addressed.  
One strength of the responsibilist model is its adherence to a holistic structure of 
meaning.  This stance requires the genetic counselor to be responsive to what genetic 
information and genetic anomalies mean for the patients in the broadest sense.  It also 
requires an openness to interpretations that are different than one’s own.  For example, 
some women, for religious reasons, carry fetuses with severe and ultimately lethal 
anomalies to term despite the risk to their own health.  Such cases demonstrate the ability 
of meanings to reach far beyond the ultrasound room where the anomalies are detected.   
Having provided a sketch of the two basic goals of the responsibilist model, which will 
be developed in relation to Debbie’s case in chapters three and four, I turn to the 
assumptions necessary to justify these as obtainable goals.   
 2. Based on assumption that clients come to share responsibility for 
understanding the genetic information and for decision making – Although the 
psychotherapeutic model’s perception that patients come for complex reasons is 
empirically accurate, it leaves implicit the kinds of commitments that must be attributed 
to the patient in order to begin the conversation. By leaving these assumptions implicit, 
the psychotherapeutic model prevents them from being explicated or scrutinized.  One of 
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the strengths of Hsia’s account is that it acknowledges that people come for a variety of 
reasons and at the same time assumes that they should come to receive information.  
Likewise the responsibilist thesis acknowledges that genetic counselors have to make 
certain provisional assumptions about what motivates a patient to come for genetic 
counseling.  Without such assumptions, the HCP would lack entitlement to engage the 
patient with the information.    
Several challenges follow from assuming that a patient wants to share the 
responsibility of understanding and decision making.  First, the counselor in trying to 
coordinate meanings may find that the patient is resistant to sharing her perspective.  In 
these circumstances, the HCP should try to engage the counselee in different ways and 
allow for silence to play a role in the interaction.  Sometimes patients have important 
reasons to be quiet.  The need to be silent may indicate a need to focus energy on 
grieving or managing emotions.48  If it becomes evident that the client does not want to 
communicate, then the counselor must disseminate the information and hope that the 
patient can take responsibility for it in non-observable ways. Peters’ insight that dialogue 
can become tyrannical identifies the limits of dialogical processes and the need for an 
alternative stance.  Second, the genetic counselor may experience patients who do not 
want help in decision making.  Some may request privacy to make the decision.  The 
genetic counselor must defer to the preferences of the patient if this occurs.  Because the 
patient ultimately must live with the consequences of the decision, she has the authority 
to trade in explicit dialogical process for implicit or internal dialogical processes. The 
third challenge moves in the opposite direction.  Some patients will want or expect the 
                                                
48 Patricia T. Kelly, Dealing with Dilemma : A Manual for Genetic Counselors, Heidelberg Science Library 
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977). 
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HCP to take all of the responsibility.  This attitude is sometimes expressed in the ‘what 
would you do’ question or in the genuine surprise of being expected think about and 
respond to the information.49 . The genetic counselor should express in an affirming 
manner her expectation that the patient take responsibility for the situation.  The HCP 
should make explicit her willingness to share in the process of decision making if the 
client will provide a place to start.   
3. The model assumes that the patient can participate in a dialogical process of 
grasping the genetic information and making responsible decisions. – Whereas Kessler 
proposes that genetic counselors should have a complex set of psychological 
assumptions, the responsibilist model makes assumptions about capacities to engage in 
communicative practices.  Two key observational skills are needed to undertake this 
assumption. The first involves recognizing whether a patient is minimally capable of 
understanding and decision making in the context of the session.  Although no clear cut 
litmus test is available, the session should start with highly accessible content, i.e. small 
talk about parking or the waiting room, to assess basic conversational skills.  To be able 
to have a conversation at all goes a long way in determining whether a patient can 
participate in a more complicated, dialogical processes.  On Brandom’s view, to be able 
to converse requires the appropriate application of concepts.  These applications 
demonstrate a base level ability to make judgments.  After initial competency has been 
assessed, then ongoing judgments about the level of competence has to be made. Gauging 
levels of competence facilitates the appropriate navigation of perspectives. One of the 
impressive qualities of the genetic counselors I observed was their ability to calibrate 
                                                
49 This question does not necessarily mean that the patient wants to abdicate responsibility for decision 
making. 
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their conversations to their patients’ abilities.  Some patients come to the session having 
acquired a beginner’s fluency in the medical discourse usually through internet research; 
whereas other patients do not know why they have been referred or what a gene or 
chromosome is.  This variation in levels does not challenge the basic assumption that a 
patient who can participate in dialogical process can understand and make decisions 
about the information.  
Kessler objects to the teaching model’s overemphasis on cognitive or rational 
processes.  The same objection could be levied against these assumptions about practical 
capacities.  The concern behind this objection is that the emotional or psychosocial 
dimension of the interaction will be neglected.  Having responded to this criticism under 
the first thesis, it should be added that this objection reinforces the binary thinking that it 
seeks to challenge.  It reinforces the bright line between objective and subjective 
meanings. Although subjective meanings are acknowledged in the aforementioned 
models – especially in the psychotherapeutic approach, they are often characterized as 
private meanings rather than alternative scripts that have been appropriated by the patient 
to report her experience of the conceptual content.  For example, the feeling of guilt in 
response to the news that one’s child has a genetic condition is consistently interpreted as 
psychological, but it can also be characterized normatively as an inference from any 
number of communal narratives about parents being responsible for what happens to their 
children.  Patients, just like HCPs, stand in relation to social contexts that provide 
institutional narratives, values, and rules that influence thought and action.  Dialogical 
counseling is a way of coordinating this conglomeration of meanings. 
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 4. Counseling task is to facilitate 1) navigation and negotiation of the 
appropriate perspectives for understanding the genetic information and 2) practical 
reasoning about what action to take in reference to the relevant sources of responsibility 
- If coordinating meaning is the goal, then the tasks necessary to achieve such an outcome 
involves navigating and negotiating perspectives that are trying to understand the same 
conceptual content.  Although much has already been said about this dialogical process, 
the example of pronoun use allows us to further demonstrate the distinction between 
navigating and negotiating perspectives.  
Anaphora is an esoteric term best understood by the familiar example of 
pronouns.  Pronouns have an anaphoric structure in that what they pick out depends on an 
antecedent that varies in terms of specificity of reference.50  Brandom calls this 
asymmetric recurrence. Any lexical grouping, i.e. sentences, quantifiers, demonstratives, 
can perform this function and as a group are called proforms.  Anaphora contributes to 
the present model by expressing “one of the central mechanisms by which 
communication is secured across the interpersonal gap created by difference in doxastic 
commitments.”51  As Brandom points out, this is generally significant for all 
communicators because it allows person A in a dialogue to refer to something that person 
B mentioned earlier even though person A is not familiar with or does not know what 
exactly is being referenced.  One can see in genetic counseling that a patient may use 
various proforms to refer to opaque concepts that the genetic counselor introduces.    
HCPs should track whether patient responses contain proforms that allow for fluent 
                                                
50 Brandom, Making It Explicit : Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. 
51 Ibid., 486. 
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conversation but conceal a lack of understanding.  The usefulness of anaphora can be 
demonstrated by working through the way ‘you’ is used in  P.   
An anaphoric analysis of P raises an interesting question about the use of ‘you’ in 
terms of its antecedent especially in languages that do not distinguish between formal and 
informal use of second-person pronouns.  If in the initial interaction between the genetic 
counselor’s and patient’s names were exchanged, then the ‘you’ is most likely assumed to 
refer to the patient. However, an alternative specification could be that ‘you’ refers to 
persons whose markers when inputted into the algorithm produced the 1/106 probability. 
‘you’ refers to one member of an aggregate that entitle the genetic counselor to assert P,  
and it could also reflect the attitude of a professional who sees many patients in one day.  
Such a usage would be susceptible to the criticism of treating patients as numbers but 
could only be interpreted as such in hindsight after much else had been said.  The reading 
of ‘you’ as referring to the actual patient becomes more plausible if the health care 
professional actually tries to learn about the ‘you’ to which the probability is correlated.  
The normative uptake here is that the use of ‘you’ makes possible this equivocation of 
antecedents that allows the patient to think the counselor is referring to her specifically 
whereas the counselor could be referring to ‘you’ as a tokening of an algorithmic output.   
Patients can also use pronouns to both navigate perspectives and at the same time 
conceal their ignorance. Take for example, “Does my baby have it?” would be an 
appropriate response to P, and the use of ‘it’ allows the patient to refer to Down 
syndrome without having to make any substantive substitutions.  Compare this to the 
response, “I am in danger of having a sick baby” that substitutes ‘sick’ for Down 
syndrome.  At minimum this substitution expresses that the vocal sound ‘Down 
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syndrome’ means ‘sick’ to the patient whereas ‘it’ reveals nothing.  The anaphoric 
dimension of linguistic practice has received little attention in reflections on genetic 
counseling and admittedly is difficult to track in real time. It may prove more useful 
when doing transcript analysis for training purposes.   
One reason for introducing anaphora is that it highlights a linguistic resource that 
allows genetic counselors and patients to navigate perspectives without yet negotiating 
them.  One skill that a genetic counselor must have in identifying whether negotiations 
are occurring is to track whether the patient is making substantive substitutions for terms 
initially introduced by the HCP. Substitutional inferences are the proprieties that govern 
the substitution of singular terms and predicates.  When sentences like P are uttered to the 
patient, he or she interprets it in part by substituting available terms that they consider to 
be equivalent.  These substitutions allow the claim to then be interpreted in terms of their 
own background commitments. “I am (You have) in danger  (a 1/106 risk) of having a 
sick baby (of having a child with DS)” is an inference from P that reflects substitutional 
commitments on the part of the patient.  Restatements of this sort should signal to the 
health care provider the difference in perspectives and provide clues for follow-up 
statements.  The relation between substitution and meaning is significant for interview 
techniques that call for restating patient comments or sharing vocabularies.52  Restating 
patient utterances should be understood normatively as part of the process of negotiating 
perspectives.             
The notion that the HCP and patient perspectives can negotiate meanings may 
seem to threaten the objective status of the genetic information. This threat is often 
                                                
52 For examples of arguments for the importance of restating, see Baker and others, 55-74. and de 
Crespigny: 17-25.  
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avoided by drawing a bright line between objective meaning and personal meaning, 
biomedical content and psychosocial content.  The problem with drawing such a line is 
that it underestimates the need to negotiate or adjudicate the meanings of the biomedical 
and patient perspectives as they form dialogical relations in a specific context.  For 
example, one consistent finding in patient responses to probabilities is that they interpret 
these numbers in unpredictable ways.53  This conclusion does not threaten the objective 
status of the proposition, i.e., its algorithmic derivation, but it might bring other 
biomedical hypotheses into question such as whether this form of information is helpful 
in patient decision making. It is this commingling of objectively derived and practically 
applied commitments that makes the need for coordinating meaning especially important 
in genetic counseling.  If the patient is presented with options, this meaning making takes 
on the form of practical reasoning that ends with a decision. 
    Practical reasoning is a crucial part of responsible decision making.  From the 
HCP’s perspective, the primary reason that P is offered to someone like Debbie is for her 
to use it in her practical reasoning about whether to undergo amniocentesis. P will play a 
part, large or small, in the process of practical reasoning as it is related to desires for 
healthy children, responsibilities to children already born or to divine commands about 
the treatment of miraculous gifts. A dialogical relation will form between P and the 
desires, responsibilities, or obligations of the patient whether a dialogical process is 
actually undertaken.  If the HCP is responsible for facilitating decision making, then a 
                                                
53 See Kessler and Levine, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Iv. The Subjective Assessment 
of Probability."; A. Lippman-Hand and Fraser, "Genetic Counseling--the Postcounseling Period: I. Parents' 
Perceptions of Uncertainty.", A. Lippman-Hand and F. C. Fraser, "Genetic Counseling: Parents' Responses 
to Uncertainty," Birth Defects Orig Artic Ser 15, no. 5C (1979).  
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basic understanding of some styles of practical reasoning will allow for a more informed 
dialogical process.   
Brandom elucidates three distinctive patterns of practical reasoning rooted in what 
he calls material inferences. Jeffrey Stout gives the following examples to illustrate 
Brandom’s patterns:  
(a) Going to the store is my only way to get milk for my 
cereal, so I shall go to the store. 
(b) I am a lifeguard on the job, so I shall keep close watch 
over the swimmers under my protection. 
(c) Ridiculing a child for his limp would humiliate him 
needlessly so I shall refrain from doing so.54 
Inference (a) is representative of that type of practical reasoning that uses desire or 
preferences as a premise; (b) exemplifies practical reasoning founded on role-specific 
responsibilities; (c) involves an inference from an unconditional ought what Brandom 
calls an “agent- and status-blind pattern of endorsement of practical inferences as 
entitlement-preserving.”55 All three of these inferences are materially sound without 
being logically sound in a formal sense.  Logic plays an expressive role that helps make 
explicit the premises of material inferences.  Stout demonstrates:  
Suppose I added to (a) a statement expressing my desire to 
have milk for my cereal; to (b) the conditional that if I am a 
lifeguard, it is my responsibility to keep a close watch over 
the swimmers under my protection; or to (c) the principle 
that one ought not to humiliate people needlessly56  
                                                
54 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, New Forum Books (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 188.  Stout’s examples are based on Brandom, Making It Explicit : Reasoning, Representing, and 
Discursive Commitment, 245.   
55 Brandom, Making It Explicit : Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, 252.  Brandom 
acknowledges that moral philosophers tend to reduce moral reasoning down to one type of pattern.   For 
example, Hume reduces moral reasoning to desire whereas Kant prefers to reduce moral reasoning to 
unconditional obligations.   
56 Stout, 188. 
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Most patients as do most people in general express themselves without formal logic using 
material inferences.  One way an HCP can facilitate decision making is to make a 
patient’s practical premises explicit especially when conflicts arises.  When ethical 
problems arise, the source can be traced to a conflict within a particular pattern, i.e., 
conflicting desires, or between patterns, i.e., a conflict between a desire and an 
unconditional obligation.  One tendency that should be avoided is to try to reduce 
practical reasoning to one style.  If a patient is expressing her dilemma as a conflict 
between parental responsibilities, then the HCP should not ask ‘What do you really want 
to do?’ This question ignores the style of reasoning used by the patient.  An example 
from Debbie’s case illustrates the usefulness of Brandom’s styles of practical reasoning. 
Debbie indicates that she does not want to leave her present children with the 
responsibilities of care giving for a disabled child. She also claims that she does not want 
to place the baby at risk by undergoing amniocentesis.  After the various outcomes have 
been identified, she introduces the concepts of miraculous gift and God’s will.  These 
concepts implicitly suggest responsibilities to a divine agent although these are not 
specified.  The genetic counselor should observe that Debbie’s role as a parent plays a 
large part in her practical reasoning.  The HCP could point out to Debbie that she clearly 
takes her responsibilities as a parent seriously.  A subsequent statement might inquire 
whether she feels equally strong about her responsibilities to her present children and to 
the fetus.  Debbie’s introduction of religious terms also warrants follow-up from the 
counselor.  She is introducing another source of values that she finds important in 
reasoning about the decision.  One question that might be helpful is: ‘Do you feel as 
though God will bless whatever decision you make?’  This prompt might help Debbie 
 110 
clarify her statements about God’s will and it also introduces the concept of blessing 
which may be implicit in Debbie’s comments about God’s will.  Much more will be said 
in chapter four about the peculiarities of addressing religion in genetic counseling.  In this 
context, it is important to note religious belief as an important influence on styles of 
practical reasoning, one that is not exempt from the dialogical process in the facilitation 
of decision making.     
5. Relationship aims towards the mutual recognition of shared responsibilities – 
In the commentary on the psychotherapeutic model, I suggested that mutuality might be 
defined as the mutual recognition of persons as distinct sites of authority.  The concept of 
mutuality is further qualified here in terms of the mutual recognition of shared 
responsibilities.  Both the genetic counselor and the patient should recognize their shared 
responsibility for understanding the genetic information and for decision making.  If the 
genetic counseling relationship is mutual in the sharing of responsibilities, then the 
specification of these responsibilities shows differences and inequalities in perspectives.  
The patient will never understand the genetic information in the same way the genetic 
counselor does.  This difference produces an epistemic inequality that gives the HCP a 
greater but limited authority over what it means to properly understand the genetic 
information.  The genetic counselor will never have as much at stake in the decision 
making as the patient. This difference creates practical inequalities that give the patient a 
greater but limited authority in deciding what a responsible decision entails.  These 
shared responsibilities and perspectival differences both define the relationship and 
generate the need for dialogical processes and relations or dialogical counseling. 
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Summary 
The arguments of this chapter seek to develop an alternative model of genetic 
counseling that is an heir of the embodiment tradition of communication and receives 
further theoretical support from Brandom’s theory of communication.  Unlike the 
spiritualist tradition, the embodiment tradition does not aim for shared interiority.  It 
accepts that we must navigate perspectival differences in order to coordinate a shared 
world.  Brandom’s model of deontic scorekeeping marks off the pragmatic middle 
ground between stances towards communication that embrace mutual understanding57 or 
flee into radical otherness.58  Here we are, different and in need, but with the resources to 
talk to one another. This attitude towards communication demarcates a space into which 
the responsibilist model fits.  Professional/client communication brings special challenges 
and responsibilities because of the marked differences in perspective.  This feature is 
clearly present in genetic counseling.  In the previous chapter, we reviewed the teaching 
and psychotherapeutic models that sought to overcome these differences through 
technical transmissions and empathic identification respectively.  The responsibilist 
model seeks to overcome them by coordinating meaning across different perspectives.   
Having offered a new model and underwritten it with a theory of communication, 
the next two chapters will compare how all three models address two important issues in 
                                                
57 For an exchange that makes explicit Habermas’s emphasis on mutual understanding and Brandom’s 
critique of Habermas’s stance, see Jürgen Habermas, "From Kant to Hegel: On Robert Brandom's 
Pragmatic Philosophy of Language," European Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2000): 322-55. and Robert 
Brandom, "Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts: Reply to Habermas," European Journal of Philosophy 8, 
no. 3 (2000): 356-74.  
58 The relationship between Levinas’s and Brandom’s positions is not well understood and more research 
needs to be done in this area.  Levinas’s emphasis on inscrutable otherness and the role of embodiment, i.e. 
‘faces,’ in founding the ethical relationship stands as a critique against an emphasis on social practices, i.e. 
linguistic practices, that bind us and allow us to identify with one another through language.  I think 
Brandom and Peters partially avoid this critique in their resistance to cheap claims of mutual 
understanding.            
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genetic counseling: nondirectiveness and spiritual assessment.   Despite the lack of clear 
specification over the years and the growing discontent with it as a defining principle of 
genetic counseling, nondirective counseling continues to pervades the ethos of genetic 
counseling.  By contrast spiritual assessment has emerged recently but often provides the 
HCP with vexing issues.   
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CHAPTER III 
  
GENETIC COUNSELING AND NONDIRECTIVENESS 
 
We're supposed to ooze empathy, but stay aloof from 
decisions. Oh, I know I'm supposed to be value-free. But 
when you see a woman on welfare having a third baby with 
one more man who's not gonna support her, and the fetus 
has sickle cell anemia, it's hard not to steer her toward an 
abortion. What does she need this added problem for, I'm 
thinking'? 
So I try to put it in neutral, to go where she goes, to support 
her whatever her decision. But I know she knows I've got 
an opinion, and it's hard not to answer when she asks me 
what I'd do in her shoes. "I'm not pregnant," I say, 
"remember that.’  
A social worker who trained me at Sloan-Kettering taught 
me something important: to clear my own agenda before I 
walk into the room, to let the patient set the agenda. It's the 
hardest lesson, and the most important one.  
- Rayna Rapp from interview with genetic counselor1  
 
Nondirectiveness has been a core value in genetic counseling models for over 
thirty years2 and yet there is no consensus about what it means.  Nondirectiveness is a 
contested set of attitudes about the role a genetic counselor should play in helping a 
patient understand and make decisions about genetic information.  Of its early advocates, 
Sheldon Reed - coiner of the term ‘genetic counseling’ - is the most influential.  Although 
he never used the term ‘nondirective,’ he advocated the attitudes to which the term 
                                                
1 R. Rapp, "Chromosomes and Communication: The Discourse of Genetic Counseling," Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1988): 154. 
2 D. C. Wertz and J. C. Fletcher, "Attitudes of Genetic Counselors: A Multinational Survey," Am J Hum 
Genet 42, no. 4 (1988). For a historical overview related to eugenics, see R. G. Resta, "Eugenics and 
Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling," J Genet Couns 6, no. 2 (1997): 255-8. 
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refers.3  Fine cites this passage as an articulation of his early view that comports with 
nondirectiveness: 
They want to know what the chances are of another 
abnormality. We give them the figure if we have reliable 
one; otherwise we tell them we do not know the value. The 
parents often ask us directly whether they should have 
more children. This question is one we do not answer 
because we cannot.  The counselor has not experienced the 
emotional impact of their problem, nor is he intimately 
acquainted with their environment. We try to explain 
thoroughly what the genetic situation is but the decision 
must be personal one between the husband and wife, and 
theirs alone.4 
Reed’s view equates nondirective counseling to withholding advice about decision 
making.  In an ongoing discussion, this articulation represents the dominant camp, one 
that is compatible with the teaching model of genetic counseling.  Motivated by the 
psychotherapeutic model, Kessler along with others in the field articulate an alternative 
view of nondirectiveness.  Seeking to define it in positive terms of what should be done, 
he elaborates the approach as a set of counseling skills that seek to promote the autonomy 
of the client. For example, genetic counselors should evaluate and point out the decision 
making strengths of clients.  As these two understandings compete to articulate this 
constitutive value of the practice, recent challenges have proposed that nondirectiveness 
should no longer play such an important role.    
John Weil’s call for the post-nondirective era and the omission of 
nondirectiveness in the 2006 NSGC definition of genetic counseling represent individual 
and institutional efforts to reconceptualize the relation between nondirectiveness and 
                                                
3 Beth Fine, "The Evolution of Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling and Implications of the Human 
Genome Project," in Prescribing Our Future : Ethical Challenges in Genetic Counseling, ed. D. M. 
Bartels, Bonnie LeRoy, and Arthur L. Caplan (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), 102-3. 
4 Ibid., 103. 
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genetic counseling. Weil acknowledges that competing definitions exist and that robust 
definitions along the lines of Kessler’s view are new wine in old skins.  He suggests that 
nondirectiveness as a defining term of genetic counseling is a “historic relic” that has 
outlived its usefulness and that its replacement should be to bring the psychosocial 
dimension into every phase of the counseling process.5  The NSGC committee decided 
that nondirectiveness should be omitted in its 2006 definition for several reasons.  An 
NSGC workshop in 2003 was held to discuss the relation between nondirectiveness and 
genetic counseling.  Conclusions from the workshop included that its role must be 
clarified; that genetic counseling is a “psycho-educational interaction” incompatible with 
tenets of nondirectiveness; and finally that nondirectiveness must be sensitive to the 
growing numbers of clinical circumstances such as cancer genetics that warrant 
recommendations from the provider.6  Omitting nondirectiveness in the 2006 definition is 
an acknowledgment of all of these factors but raises the question about the long-term 
consequences of moving away from this core value.     
Many factors have contributed to the rise and possible fall of nondirectiveness as 
a defining principle of genetic counseling.  At stake are issues that extend beyond narrow 
professional interests.  As the U.S. history of nondirectiveness shows, the first genetic 
counselors adopted this stance to create separation from the mandated eugenic policies of 
the early 20th century.  In this chapter, I offer a brief history of nondirective genetic 
counseling to establish the normative trajectory of the conversation. I then elaborate and 
evaluate how the teaching, psychotherapeutic and responsibilist models specify and 
                                                
5 J. Weil, "Psychosocial Genetic Counseling in the Post-Nondirective Era: A Point of View," J Genet 
Couns 12, no. 3 (2003). 
6 J. Weil and others, "The Relationship of Nondirectiveness to Genetic Counseling: Report of a Workshop 
at the 2003 Nsgc Annual Education Conference," J Genet Couns 15, no. 2 (2006). 
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justify nondirectiveness.  I conclude that the responsibilist model offers the most 
adequate view of the feasibility and normative importance of nondirectiveness.  
      
A Brief History of Nondirectiveness 
In the first forty years of the twentieth century, a policy of preventing the 
‘feebleminded’ from breeding was promoted by many U.S. scientists and politicians and 
by many of their European counterparts.7  This stance was justified by the concern that 
the “normal-minded” and elite were producing far fewer offspring than the “moron or 
high grade feeble-minded class.”8  These eugenic concerns and goals directed early 
conversations between those who had genetic knowledge and those who “needed” 
genetic knowledge.  They also led to mandated policies of sterilization.  The U.S. on 
many accounts was a leader in a eugenics movement whose international culmination can 
be found in the Nazi political initiatives towards Jews in the 1930s and 40s.9 As Kevles 
points out, “In Germany, where sterilization measures were partly inspired by the 
California (sterilization) law, the eugenics movement prompted the sterilization of 
several hundred thousand people and helped lead of course to the death camps.”10 
Eugenic initiatives were based less on rigorous science and more on insufficient evidence 
that justified prejudicial policies against certain groups.  
Against this trend, some in the scientific community, e.g. Lionel Penrose (British) 
and James V. Neel (American), established the medical value of genetics with rigorous 
                                                
7 Diane B. Paul, Controlling Human Heredity, 1865 to the Present, The Control of Nature (Atlantic 
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995), 70. 
8 Ibid., 62. 
9 Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy E. Hood, The Code of Codes : Scientific and Social Issues in the Human 
Genome Project (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 11.  Kevles’ book is one of 
numerous accounts that depict the U.S. as an early implementer of eugenic ideas.  
10 Ibid., 10-11. 
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scientific methods.  These initiatives would eventually materialize as heredity clinics in 
the name of “preventive medicine” rather than eugenics.  Some have pointed out that 
these clinics were still vulnerable to the charge of being eugenic in terms of having the 
negative eugenic goal of reducing the number of children with birth defects; at the same 
time, preventive medicine promoted voluntary screening and sterilization as well as 
“sympathetic counseling.”11  The move from state mandated to medically voluntary 
practices reflected the gradual learning of an international lesson about eugenics: under 
the guise of objective scientific knowledge, genetic discourse can be used to justify 
unthinkable atrocities in the political realm.  The various political manifestations of 
eugenics in the first half of the twentieth century remain a ghostly presence in all 
subsequent conversations and initiatives involving genetics.   
In the 1950s, academic geneticists sought to sever ties with mandated eugenics in 
institutions such as the Dight Institute. They implemented voluntary screening and 
sterilization.  In a 1952 article that presented several physicians discussing genetic 
counseling cases, Sheldon Reed weighed in on the issue of giving advice: 
If the genetic counselor is to advise the couple as to 
whether they should have more children or not, he must 
consider all the psychological, social, and economic factors 
he can find out about. It is an extremely rare case, which, in 
the experience of the Dight Institute, can be advised 
outright, as to whether or not reproduction is indicated. The 
counselor has never suffered the particular circumstances 
which the parents of the affected child suffered and 
therefore cannot completely understand their feelings.12 
Earlier in the article Reed acknowledges the possibility of psychoanalysis by challenging 
its feasibility: “It is not practical to expect that extensive psychoanalysis will be possible 
                                                
11 Fine, 102. 
12 Lee Dice, "Genetic Counseling," Am J Hum Genet 4, no. 4 (1952): 339.  
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in genetic counseling cases, but the general reactions of both parents to the situation can 
be obtained.”13  What this indicates is that Reed and other genetic counselors who 
pioneered the ethos of nondirectiveness were aware of the psychological needs of patients 
and the possibility and improbability of using rigorous psychotherapeutic approaches to 
genetic counseling.  This new sensitivity to the client’s perspective is an indication of the 
movement away from politically mandated eugenics even as these same counselors still 
endorsed the eugenic goal of preventing birth defects.14  What had shifted was the locus 
of authority.  More deference was being given to patient perspectives in the pursuit of 
“dysgenic goals.”15  Sorenson claims that most research geneticists and physicians during 
this period trusted that their patients, many of whom had experienced the challenges of 
having an affected child, would make rational decisions consistent with goals of 
preventive medicine.16 
In 1969, the training of masters-level genetic counselors began at Sarah Lawrence 
College.  As discussed in chapter one, in the formative years of this institution’s 
curriculum a Rogerian approach to counseling was introduced that included nondirective 
counseling.  In this context, genetic counseling appropriated a version of 
nondirectiveness that was informed by a substantive psychotherapeutic system.  The 
masters-level genetic counseling modeled by Sarah Lawrence spread as did the influence 
of the Rogerian approach during a period where the need for prenatal genetic counseling 
was rapidly increasing. 17   
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Resta, "Eugenics and Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling," 256. Resta presents compelling 
quotations from several geneticists who promote nondirective counseling and eugenics aims. 
15 Fine, 103. 
16 Sorenson, "Genetic Counseling: Values That Have Mattered," 9. 
17 Marks, 18-22. 
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Two key factors precipitated the increase in numbers who received prenatal 
genetic counseling in the 1970s. First, diagnostic (amniocentesis) and screening 
techniques (alpha feto-protein) improved during the 1960s.  Second, the 1973 decision in 
Roe v. Wade that legalized abortion gave prospective parents new reproductive options. 
Genetic counseling guided by competing views of nondirectiveness - either from a 
teaching or psychotherapeutic perspective - was now being offered to families many of 
whom had no family history of genetic problems. During this period the foci of genetic 
counseling were primarily offering information about reproductive risks, fetal diagnoses 
and pregnancy options.  The counseling demand would soon extend beyond the 
reproductive sphere as genetic tests were developed in other areas of medicine.         
The proliferation of genetic information and testing in areas outside prenatal care 
has challenged the centrality of nondirectiveness in genetic counseling.  As Wylie Burke 
and others have demonstrated, nondirectiveness is traditionally considered appropriate in 
circumstances where the genetic test has high clinical validity but no effective treatment 
exists, e.g. Huntington’s Disease (HD).  In circumstances where the test has high clinical 
validity but effective treatment exists, e.g. PKU,18 nondirectiveness has not been 
considered necessary.  A third set of tests with low clinical validity and no effective 
treatment is generally not recommended by HCPs.  A final set of genetic tests has 
uncertainty associated with the test’s clinical validity and the effectiveness of treatment.  
It is this final set, which will continue to grow, that has raised important questions about 
the role of nondirectiveness in clinical encounters.   
                                                
18 PKU stands for phenylketonuria and is a metabolic disorder where the body is unable to metabolize the 
amino acid, phenylalanine.  The result is that this amino acid builds up in the body causing damage to the 
central nervous system. This build up and the severe cognitive disabilities that accompany it can be avoided 
by putting the infant on a life-long diet that is free of phenylalanine.          
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In the mid 1990’s genetic tests became available to detect mutations in BRCA1/2 
genes associated with familial forms of breast cancer.  Unlike genetic tests for HD and 
karyotyping for chromosomal abnormalities, the BRCA1/2 tests did not predict with 
certainty that a woman would get breast cancer.  Instead it provided a risk assessment or 
idenitfied a predisposition to develop disease.  Unlike genetic testing of HD and 
karyotyping for chromosomal abnormalities, BRCA1 testing results come with treatment 
options that vary in terms of effectiveness.   Consider, for example, the role of 
prophylactic mastectomy as a preventive measure.19  When a woman is found to be a 
carrier of BRCA1, she has several options including increased surveillance and 
prophylactic mastectomy. Some have questioned the latter maintaining that the benefits 
of prophylactic mastectomy are overestimated and the potential harms underestimated. 20  
Nonetheless, evidence is growing that some benefits are conferred by the procedure.21  
What status does nondirectiveness have in these circumstances? Is its primary role in the 
pretest conversations?  Or should it be applied in eliciting preferences between  potential 
treatments?  At this juncture, it is important to see that genetic counseling models have 
had to adapt to the changing circumstances of genetic testing.      
The rise of evidence-based medicine in the early 1990s has spawned 
investigations into genetic counseling asking whether nondirectiveness is a value that is 
actually being upheld in practice. Benkendorf has asked whether genetic counselors use 
indirect communication as a tactic to achieve nominally “nondirective” communication. 
Indirect communication involves substituting a direct expression e.g. the preference ‘I 
                                                
19 A prophylactic mastectomy involves the removal of one or two breasts in order to prevent the occurrence 
of breast cancer. 
20 F. Eisinger, "Prophylactic Mastectomy: Ethical Issues," Br Med Bull 81-82 (2007): 7-19.   
21 T. R. Rebbeck and others, "Bilateral Prophylactic Mastectomy Reduces Breast Cancer Risk in Brca1 and 
Brca2 Mutation Carriers: The Prose Study Group," J Clin Oncol 22, no. 6 (2004): 1055-62. 
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prefer the window down’ for an indirect one, e.g. ‘It sure is cold in here’ that requires the 
recipient of the communication to make the inference, ‘You want the window down.’  
The second person does actually make this inference but the first person is clearly 
directing them there. The study found that genetic counselors do use indirect 
communication as a technique that permits the client to make her own inference despite 
the use of indirect statements as inferential vectors.22 Probably the most important 
empirical study of nondirective counseling, published in 1997, was undertaken by Michie 
et al.23 Acknowledging that no accepted definition of nondirectiveness exists, they 
identified directiveness in statements where the counselor gave directions or advice to a 
counselee and sessions where selective information giving or endorsement by the 
counselor was clear. Using this criteria they asked both counselors and counselees to rate 
the genetic counseling session. The researchers concluded that nondirectiveness was not 
being uniformly undertaken and that lower socioeconomic clients as well as highly 
concerned clients were more likely to be directed in their decision making.  Kessler 
responded to this study by stating that Michie’s criteria for directiveness cast too large a 
net. For example, advice giving in genetic counseling was not always directive.  The 
results of these studies in the 1990s and early twenty-first century have intensified the 
discussion about what nondirective counseling entails and its feasibility. 
Whether nondirectiveness is achievable or definable remains an important 
question to which the aforementioned proposals by Weil and the NSGC’s definition offer 
answers.  The normative and empirical questions about this concept suggest either that it 
is losing or never fully had a grip on the profession or that it no longer needs to have 
                                                
22 Benkendorf and others: 199-207. 
23 S. Michie and others, "Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling: An Empirical Study," Am J Hum Genet 
60, no. 1 (1997): 40-47.  
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primary role in defining this professional task.  Will these proposals and the changing 
contexts marginalize the role of nondirective counseling or does it have a default status 
that will allow it to persist?    
In the next section I elaborate how the three models under investigation specify 
nondirectiveness and address whether they justify or jettison its role in the changing 
context of genetic counseling.  Part of this elaboration involves showing how these 
approaches would evaluate the genetic counselor’s performance in Debbie’s case.  I 
begin with the teaching model. 
  
Nondirectiveness and the Teaching Model 
In chapter one, I noted Sorenson’s claim that the attitudes of the early academic 
geneticists influenced the principle of nondirectiveness in ways that remain operational in 
genetic counseling.  As academics, they valued what Sorenson calls ‘technical neutrality’ 
a stance that incorporates the concern for standardization in scientific method and factual 
presentation in the pedagogy of the sciences. Sheldon Reed developed the initial 
connection between nondirectiveness and the teaching model, characterizing the genetic 
counselor primarily as an educator with limited knowledge to make recommendations. A 
genetic educator presumably with some expertise has a grasp and should carefully 
explain objective information such as risk assessments but cannot grasp or explain the 
perspective of the patient in the same way.  What is implicit in Reed’s view and is 
representative of the teaching view is:  HCPs who undertake genetic counseling are 
entitled to offer and explain genetic information to patients because of its objectivity but 
they are not authorized to offer judgments about the patient’s circumstances because it 
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involves subjective information to which they have little or no access. Genetic 
information is a set of objective messages that any geneticist would offer to any 
individual with the same genetic circumstances. It is in this respect ‘neutral’ towards the 
actual person receiving it.  In the teaching model, the authority of the professional is 
inherited from the authority of the true and neutral information they offer.  Sorenson 
suggests that this understanding of authority and neutrality was consistent with the 
academic dispositions of geneticists who pioneered the task of genetic counseling.  
Sorenson also suggests that physicians in contrast to scholars/research physicians value 
neutrality less and intervention more.24   
One of the criticisms of the teaching model’s interpretation of the nondirective 
value is that it only attends to what genetic counselors should not do.  Before looking at 
these criticisms, it needs to be made explicit what exactly the HCP providing genetic 
counseling should not do and why these prohibitions are warranted by an educational 
emphasis.  In chapter one, I introduced Hsia’s account of information provision as a 
substantive paradigm for the teaching model.25  
Hsia’s account of nondirectiveness illustrates a negative elaboration of 
nondirectiveness. His work is helpful not only because it is a substantive presentation of 
the teaching model but also because it reflects the perspective of an academic geneticist 
and pediatrician who does genetic counseling.  This combination of training generates a 
stance that takes seriously the temptation to intervene in patient decisions and at the same 
                                                
24 Sorenson, "Genetic Counseling: Values That Have Mattered," 10. 
25 Hsia’s article represents the most articulate account of the teaching model of genetic counseling but he 
does not have much competition.  Sorenson is another influential supporter of the “genetic education” 
model rather than “genetic counseling” model.   I hypothesize that the lack of theoretical resources to 
elaborate the teaching model indicates its dominance.       
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time articulates practical reasons to keep a certain distance.26  He issues a litany of ‘nons’ 
that nicely encapsulates his position: “I advocate the responsibility of genetic counselors 
to be nondirective, nonpsychoanalytic and nonjudgmental.”27      
In a subsection titled “What to Avoid,” Hsia presents several sets of reasons for 
resisting the temptation to direct families in their decisions.  The first set of reasons are 
motivated by the concern to maintain the respect or trust of the patient. Such concerns are 
related to issues of demarcating professional authority. If the genetic counselor gives a 
recommendation, then she is vulnerable to loss of respect in two ways.  First, if the 
counselee does not take the counselor’s advice and finds the other course of action 
acceptable, then she will lose some respect for the counselor’s judgment.  In the second 
and more consequential scenario, the patient takes the advice, e.g. forgoes amniocentesis, 
and finds living with the consequences unacceptable, i.e. caring for a child with Down 
syndrome.  In this case, not only has respect for the counselor been lost but also the 
counselee must live with the long-term responsibilities and challenges of a decision that 
the professional authority recommended.  These reasons for not offering advice to a 
family are based on the negative consequences of taking such directive action, but Hsia 
also acknowledges that the complexity of the circumstances raises the question of who 
should be authorized to make the decision regardless of outcome: “who does know the 
best course for a family to take?”28  
                                                
26 Hsia’s account predates cancer genetics and thus is organized primarily around a set of counseling 
circumstances that involve reproductive decisions. 
27 Hsia, 169. 
28 Ibid., 181. 
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A core premise in the teaching model’s conception of nondirectiveness is that the 
genetic counselor is not in a position to know the best interests of the client.29  Without 
explicit mention of the respect for autonomy, Hsia argues that counselees need to come to 
their own conclusions about the best course of action.  He asserts that a genetic counselor 
cannot make a judgment about whether a counselee’s decision is rational especially in 
decisions involving reproduction:  
The procreative drive of counselees, however, its intensity, 
constancy and durability are beyond the professional ken of 
the geneticist.  Other aspects of the personal vagaries of 
counselees are equally imponderable such as the 
willingness or ability of a person to accept and adapt to a 
compromise solution and the strength of character needed 
for a person to cope with stressful life events.” (181) 
No matter how determined a genetic counselor is she will never bridge this perspectival 
distance and thus lacks essential premises to make practical decisions on the patient’s 
behalf.  Hsia’s skepticism about a counselor’s ability to understand patients’ emotions, 
drives and character is consistent with his cautious attitude toward psychotherapy in 
genetic counseling.30    
The short term nature of genetic counseling sessions and the complexity of 
undertaking psychological assessments have led advocates of the teaching model to 
challenge the use of counseling techniques in the genetic counseling. In “valuing 
nondirectiveness over advice giving and education over counseling,” Sorenson makes 
explicit the connection between teaching and nondirectiveness and its tension with the 
psychotherapeutic model.31  Hsia justifies these preferences by pointing to the potential 
harm a counselor could inflict without the proper training and experience in using 
                                                
29 Sorenson, "Genetic Counseling: Values That Have Mattered," 11-12. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 12. 
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counseling skills. Genetic counselors should have enough psychological knowledge to 
make a referral to a trained professional.  
The third ‘non’ in Hsia’s triad is being nonjudgmental.  If a counselor should 
avoid delving into a counselee’s decision making or psychological states, then it follows 
that they do not possess entitlement to morally judge the final decision. Subtle or overt 
challenges to a counselee’s decision are rarely an appropriate move for a genetic 
counselor to make.  In cases where the best interest of the counselee seems to be in 
jeopardy, e.g. seeking “quasi-fraudulent care,” the counselor should still refrain from 
challenge.32 
Hsia’s distinctions between being nondirective, nonjudgmental, and 
nonpsychoanalytic are often conflated in references to nondirectiveness.33  One of the 
contributions of his account is that it raises the question of how to demarcate the complex 
attitudes of the counselor.  For example, these distinctions suggest the possibility of being 
nondirective and doing psychotherapy if the training and time were sufficient.  In other 
words, even as psychoanalysis is dismissed in this model, the distinctions themselves 
raise the possibility that they are not incompatible as will be apparent below.  Despite 
these benefits, most who refer to nondirectiveness from a non-psychotherapeutic 
standpoint, continue to lump these together.  In terms of the teaching model, 
nondirectiveness is a term for many in the profession that licenses an avoidance of 
patients’ emotions, ambivalence and decision making in relation to genetic information. 
In the rest of this section, I want argue that Hsia’s and Sorenson’s positions 
implicitly rely on specific interpretations of pedagogy, autonomy, and meaning. 
                                                
32 Hsia, 184. 
33 Bosk, 28-29. Bosk like Hsia thinks the distinction between nondirectiveness and value neutrality should 
be distinguished because physicians are rarely the former but certainly aim to adopt the latter stance. 
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Pedagogical neutrality, a traditional and highly criticized34 stance within education 
circles, is an assumption of the teaching model of genetic counseling.35  As I tried to 
develop in chapter one, the teaching model appropriates a technical vision of 
communication where objective messages are sent through a noiseless channel in order to 
justify a certain pedagogical stance. One premise of this account is that schools and by 
extension educational events are neutral sites where universal facts about states of affairs 
are distributed.  If this is true, then the best circumstances for learning require that the 
teacher bracket all his or her values and provide only neutral descriptions of what is the 
case.  These efforts at perspectival constraint allow students to make inferences with 
defined concepts and stable facts in new situations.  The idea of pedagogical neutrality 
addresses a central concern about teaching’s relationship to autonomy. 
Autonomy according to the teaching model is an individual’s capacity to make 
rational decisions using objective genetic information in relation to her own 
commitments.  Providing the circumstances for a person to exercise her autonomy is the 
explicit36 motivation for pedagogical neutrality and the teaching model of genetic 
counseling.  Autonomy on this account requires an individual to have available to him or 
her the terms, definitions, and facts to choose and use to make new inferences.  The 
teacher can provide these resources but not the inferential activity that allows an 
                                                
34 Henry Giroux, an influential scholar in critical pedagogy, claims in his article “Schooling and the Culture 
of Positivism: Notes on the History” that modern pedagogy has been dominated by positivism of which 
neutrality is a component.  For a compilation of his works including the aforementioned article, see Henry 
A. Giroux, Pedagogy and the Politics of Hope : Theory, Culture, and Schooling : A Critical Reader, The 
Edge, Critical Studies in Educational Theory (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1997).  For an equally 
important figure in the area, see Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed ([New York]: Herder and Herder, 
1970).       
35 Sorenson, "Genetic Counseling: Values That Have Mattered."; Hsia.  Both Sorenson and Hsia assume 
that pedagogical neutrality is not only possible but the an important aim in genetic counseling. 
36 One of the main critiques of the relation between pedagogical neutrality and autonomy is its implicit 
motivation to maintain social control by offering the fiction of disinterested cites of authority, i.e. objective 
states of affairs.  
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autonomous person to actually use them. The teacher should provide all the resources for 
making new inferences, but she should not make the inferences for the student.  The 
genetic counselor as teacher undertakes nondirective counseling when she presents the 
facts, figure and options in a way that does not advocate for a certain outcome.  In short, 
she has bracketed her values when presenting the information and maintains a neutral 
stance as the student-client makes her own decision. 
This notion of autonomy emphasizes not only an atomistic conception of the 
individual legislating his or her own conclusions but also an atomistic conception of 
meaning that funds the genetic educator’s status of objective information giver.  First, the 
set of meanings that is genetic information is easily demarcated or self-evident.  This 
picture of meanings suggests an image of handing the client an easily identifiable bag of 
marble-like meanings, each marble is self-contained, and the set is an accumulation of 
individual meanings. This premise suppresses the normative notion developed in the 
previous chapter that offering genetic information involves undertaking a commitment to 
offer P to the counselee and that the issue of the doxastic or practical entitlement to the 
assertion can be raised. These get articulated in patient questions such as: “How accurate 
is the test/screen?” or “Why are you telling me this?”  The second premise at work here is 
that the patient can add these new marbles to his or her own bag of marbles - a subjective 
bag that cannot be understood by the HCP -  and then make a rational decision.  This 
semantic view fails to take account both the holistic effect sentences can have on persons’ 
commitment sets and the addition of a new commitments like, “I feel a pit in my stomach 
after hearing P.”  To avoid the responsibilities for these semantic and emotional effects 
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on a client, the teaching model offers an account of nondirectiveness that depends on 
pedagogical neutrality and atomistic notions of autonomy and meaning.      
The teaching model and nondirective counseling have an authoritative status that 
comes from playing a formative part in the development of genetic counseling; whereas 
the psychotherapeutic model and its understanding of nondirective counseling, which 
appeared slightly later in the history of genetic counseling, have played the role of 
challenger to the tradition.  As a result, the psychotherapeutic model has needed to define 
itself over against the teaching model. 
   
Nondirectiveness and the Psychotherapeutic Model 
The irony of nondirectiveness is that its conceptual home is in psychotherapy, but 
its professional address is primarily located in the teaching model.  This leads to the 
unexpected result that most of the criticism of nondirective counseling - as defined by the 
teaching model - comes from practitioners who endorse a psychotherapeutic or 
psychosocial model.  Although Weil characterizes nondirectiveness as a historic relic, he 
also acknowledges that its meaning is indeterminate. He cites two dominant perspectives 
and aligns his position with the second camp. He characterizes the first set of meanings as 
centered around withholding advice and the second as promoting autonomy. He notes 
that both have conceptual debts to Carl Roger’s development of the concept.  In this 
section, I elaborate the way that nondirective counseling has been articulated by those 
who advocate it as promoting autonomy within a psychotherapeutic framework.  
Carl Rogers introduces nondirective counseling into psychotherapy as an 
alternative to existing psychotherapeutic models that assessed, diagnosed and treated 
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patients in a way that imitated biomedical models. The medical process he avoids 
proceeds like this: The patient is asked a series of questions by the physician. The 
patient’s answers to these questions are used to make technical inferences that result in a 
diagnosis and recommendation for treatment.  Rogers concludes that the 
psychotherapist’s aim is to help a person become autonomous and to achieve congruence 
through healthy internal and external communication, a set of concepts discussed in 
chapter one.  The biomedical model is not appropriate to achieve this goal, and in its 
stead he develops a more fitting approach called client-centered therapy.  At its core is 
the counseling relationship.  Nondirectiveness is a general strategy within this Rogerian  
framework. 
This conception of nondirectiveness prescribes that the counselor does not direct 
the conversation in the counseling session.  The counselee instead sets the agenda for the  
session and takes a lead role in the conversation.  The counselor’s role is to embody 
certain attitudes as he engages in conversation: unconditional positive regard, empathy 
and genuineness. If a counselor can genuinely achieve empathic identification with the 
counselee, bracketing all evaluations, then the counselee has an opportunity to observe 
and respond to his own perspective as it is empathically understood by the therapist.  
Through this method, a person is provided an opportunity to find her true self 
unencumbered by dogmatic and ideological conceptions of the self.       
Similar to Rogers’ assessment of the psychotherapeutic context, genetic 
counselors who advocate a psychotherapeutic model of nondirectiveness observe that 
genetic counseling does not fit neatly into the traditional biomedical model of diagnose 
and treat.  Specifically, the offering of genetic information is often not followed by a 
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recommendation.  There are other similarities that make nondirectiveness appropriate. 
Receiving genetic information can cause deeply felt emotional responses and can disrupt 
attitudes about where one stands in the world.  Often it requires a decision for a course of 
action e.g., termination of pregnancy or prophylactic mastectomy, decisions that involve 
intensely intimate spheres of human concern.  
  At the same time, genetic counseling has features that necessarily replicate the 
biomedical model and resist the Rogerian view of nondirectiveness.  A genetic counselor 
often does ask questions and make inferences or report test results that indicate risk 
assessments or diagnoses.  In this way, the agenda is significantly defined by the HCP, 
and the patient needs this direction.  Whether this likeness makes genetic counseling 
incompatible with the Rogerian vision is a central question that the psychotherapeutic 
model must answer. Another key obstacle that must be overcome is that genetic 
counseling relationships are often one or two sessions whereas psychotherapeutic 
relationships in the client-centered model are assumed to have developed over longer 
durations. The question raised by this difference is whether counseling skills such as 
empathic identification can actually be undertaken in such a short period.     
Kessler has given nondirectiveness in genetic counseling the most careful 
reconsideration from the standpoint of the psychotherapeutic model and unlike Weil 
argues that it is the inevitable core of the profession.  Its central focus is the promotion of 
the counselee’s autonomy.  Kessler acknowledges the debt that must be paid to Rogers 
and at the same time is willing to revise nondirectiveness to the degree that Rogers might 
not recognize it.   I think it is accurate to describe Kessler’s stance as a gradual movement 
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away from the Rogerian vision toward a psychologically informed, technique-driven 
approach.37       
Kessler addresses criticisms of nondirectiveness by providing a narrower 
definition of directiveness and a broader definition of nondirectiveness.  His specification 
of directiveness is in part a reaction to Michie’s study that concludes that a gap exists 
between the normative and empirical undertaking of nondirectiveness.  Kessler suggest 
that directiveness is a special case of persuasive communication called “persuasive 
coercion.” Persuasive communication entails the kind of influences we experience 
everyday that we do not consider as a threat to our autonomy; persuasive coercion -  
otherwise known as brainwashing or mind control -  involves one or more components 
“1) deception 2) threat 3) coercion.”38  For example, if a genetic counselor intentionally 
withheld information about the risks of amniocentesis in order to encourage the uptake of 
the procedure, then the HCP would be deceiving the patient who might infer that 
amniocentesis has no risks.  Kessler proposes that these elements of persuasive coercion 
should be the criteria for identifying directive actions in genetic counseling. 39 An 
important consequence of this restriction is that advice giving in certain circumstances 
should not be considered directive. Michie’s findings that genetic counselors did not 
uniformly adhere to the value of nondirectiveness are less compelling if one accepts this 
restrictive view of directiveness because she used advice giving as a key code in 
identifying directive action.  Another consequence of Kessler’s stance is that more 
circumstances fall between directive and nondirective action.  He acknowledges that 
                                                
37 In his early writings in the mid-to later 1970s, Kessler is trying to put psychology on the radar screen of 
genetic counselors; in the 1990’s, he is trying to nuance his position to make it more practical in relation to 
the contextual constraints of a genetic counseling session. 
38 {Kessler, 1997 #28}165 
39 Kessler, "Psychological Aspects of Genetic Counseling. Xi. Nondirectiveness Revisited," 165. 
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much of what happens in genetic counseling does not neatly fit into these opposing 
categories.40  Having narrowed the application of directiveness, Kessler seeks to restore 
the meaning of nondirectiveness.  
Kessler offers this definition: “ND describes procedures aimed at promoting the 
autonomy and self-directedness of the client.”41  Kessler elucidates the tangled history 
that this term has with the Rogerian vision. In genetic counseling’s appropriation of 
Rogers’ term, Kessler admits much is lost.  Counselees do not and should not direct the 
agenda in genetic counseling.  This dimension of the Rogerian vision is lost, but the 
ultimate goal of promoting autonomy is retained.  Kessler uses scenarios to highlight 
more specific goals and counseling skills required of nondirective counseling.  
Nondirectiveness is an active form of genetic counseling that seeks to “raise their 
(the patients’) self-esteem and leave them with greater control over lives.”42  What 
Kessler sees as his contribution to the conversation about nondirectiveness is that he 
reintroduces the competencies that counselors need to attain nondirective goals.  He 
suggests several tactics for employing the strategy.  The HCP must pay attention to 
competencies and accomplishments of patients and acknowledge these strengths verbally.  
The genetic counselor should encourage the client to talk more and reward clients for 
efforts toward autonomy. Passive notions that being a ‘good listener’ or being supportive 
are nondirective behaviors is wrong on Kessler’s view because they do not actively 
promote autonomy.  A counselor must help the counselee think through decisions. During 
this whole process, the HCP must keep his or her own feelings in check and must keep 
the focus of the session on the patient.   
                                                
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 166. 
42 Ibid., 169. 
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In the rest of this section I want to show how Kessler’s view of nondirectiveness 
retains vestiges of Rogers’ program even as it jettisons much of the psychotherapeutic 
framework. Despite Kessler’s disavowal of much of Roger’s program, his most recent 
accounts of nondirectiveness still assume key commitments such as unconditional 
positive regard and empathic listening.  Kessler proposes that nondirectiveness entails 
counseling skills such as 1) focusing on and understanding the client’s perspective 2) 
assessing and articulating clients’ strengths in decision making. One can imagine a 
reasonably large set of counseling skills from which Kessler is making his selection.  His 
choices serve not only the goal of promoting autonomy but also reflect the premises that 
a client’s autonomy needs validation and that his or her perspective can be assessed 
relatively quickly.  The train of logic can be located within the stream of Rogerian 
thought that clients need the acceptance or approval of the counselor and that 
nonjudgmental understanding of the client’s perspective can be gained empathically.  The 
evolution of Kessler’s thought moves in a direction of making these psychological 
stances implicit and making the counseling skills they serve explicit.   
This move raises the question of whether counseling skills have to be drawn from 
a psychological framework.  Without explicit psychological underpinnings, Kessler’s 
counseling skills function in a similar way to the responsible communication skills I am 
suggesting. The difference is that I locate the responsibilist model within an explicit 
normative theory of communication whereas it is not clear whether Kessler continues to 
avow the psychological accounts of communication of Rogers and others. 
    
Nondirectiveness and the Responsibilist Model 
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In chapter two, I offered the responsibilist model as an elaboration and extension 
of Mary White’s articulation of responsible decision making in genetic counseling.  She 
gives several criticisms of what can now be seen as the teaching model’s version of 
nondirectiveness.  The thrust of her critique is that current understandings of 
nondirectiveness focus exclusively on protecting the client from the external constraints 
such as counselor coercion or interference from other agents. Genetic counselors 
understand themselves as upholding clients’ negative right to an unfettered decision.  The 
shortcoming of this model of nondirectiveness is that it neglects internal influences on the 
client’s autonomous decision making such as emotional instability and implicit 
misconceptions. The corrective she offers is to make nondirectiveness a positive right 
that entitles a client and obligates a counselor to achieve the most informed and 
responsible decision possible.  Her recommendation leads to a third specification of the 
nondirectiveness in terms of social responsibility that requires dialogue.  
Although the responsibilist model does entail a third understanding of 
nondirectiveness, it shares some of the same concerns as the psychotherapeutic model.43 
Both acknowledge that the counselee’s emotional and practical responses cannot be 
avoided by the genetic counselor.  In this way, both are critical of the teaching model’s 
hands-off approach.   The HCP undertaking genetic counseling in both models should 
take an active role in the decision making process.  At the same time, both models reject 
persuasive coercion.  Finally, the psychotherapeutic and responsibilist models converge 
on the goal of promoting autonomy in complicated circumstances that call for an act of 
self-determination.        
                                                
43 White’s and Kessler’s views are for instance cited by Weil as advocating nondirectiveness as the 
promotion of autonomy. See Weil, Psychosocial Genetic Counseling, 123. 
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To begin to understand the distinctiveness of the responsibilist model’s account of 
nondirectiveness, one must look to the fundamental vocabularies that express the 
respective models.  The teaching model depends on pedagogical idioms premised on a 
notion of technical neutrality; the psychotherapeutic model uses a psychological idiom 
based on a diluted Rogerian notion of psychotherapeutic communication; the 
responsibilist model looks to a normative vocabulary rooted in a pragmatic account of 
communication.  Nondirectiveness on this last view gets its grip by looking at the 
proprieties of conversational scorekeeping understood within a dialogical model.   
As Brandom puts it, scorekeepers keep two sets of books.  Scorekeeper A not 
only acknowledges how a conversation changes A’s perspective but also attributes 
changes to the perspective of scorekeeper B.  Discursive moves constrained by inferential 
proprieties is one cause for these changes.44  If genetic counseling is understood in light 
of this model, then the concepts of directiveness and nondirectiveness need to be mapped 
on to this description. Let us make A the genetic counselor and B the patient.45  Some 
conversational moves by A can change the belief set or doxastic commitments of B; other 
moves by A can change the intentions or practical commitments of B. And vice versa.  
The goal of the genetic counselor should be to take directive and nondirective stances 
during the conversation that are appropriate to the goals of coordinating meanings and 
facilitating responsible decision making.  Directiveness according to the responsibilist 
model involves making discursive moves that appropriately or inappropriately direct the 
scorekeeping activities of the conversation partner(s).  A nondirective stance entails 
discursive restraint that allows someone else in the conversation, in this case the patient, 
                                                
44 Other causes that can change scorekeeping perspective are nondiscursive, i.e. nonverbal behaviors.  
45 To help track the perspectives,  I will refer to A as male and B as female.  
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to direct the conversation.   Inappropriate directiveness comes in many forms.  Kessler’s 
notion of persuasive coercion is one example and can be characterized as intentional 
misdirection. Scorekeeper A can also be overly directive by giving too much information 
and not allowing sufficient opportunity for B to direct the conversation.  The most 
common form of inappropriate nondirectiveness is the refusal to direct the scorekeeping 
despite the patient’s request for some help.  The rest of the section attempts to 
demonstrate how these distinctions work.     
   When A undertakes an assertion such as P, he directs B’s scorekeeping to a 
conceptual content about B’s risk status.  A then proceeds to tell B what P means from 
A’s perspective as a genetic counselor.  A is directing B to keep score on the inferential 
significance of P from A’s perspective as a genetic counselor.  At this juncture,  A’s 
conversational moves entail a kind of directiveness that is defined much more broadly 
than Kessler’s definition. A is authorized to take this initial directive stance because he is 
fulfilling the role of genetic counselor, which is assumed to have specialized knowledge 
about P.  A proceeds to ask B questions about her understanding of P.  From A’s 
standpoint, this move is an attempt to shift to a nondirective stance by inviting B to make 
moves in the conversation. If B requests that A clarify or answer questions, then this 
prompts A to return to directing B in her understanding but with the important difference 
that B has explicitly authorized A to continue being directive.   In other words, a minimal 
dialogical process is underway. If B responds to A’s invitation by expressing her 
understanding of P, then B is directing A’s scorekeeping –as well as her own - to the 
inferential significance of P from her perspective.  When P’s meanings have been 
coordinated between A and B, A directs B’s attention to additional conceptual contents 
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that need to be coordinated.  Here again A’s role as genetic counselor authorizes him to 
lead the conversation.   For the sake of a clear distinction, we will say that the 
interactions thus far have focused on the doxastic commitments of A and B and have not 
yet addressed practical commitments regarding decision making.  At the appropriate 
juncture, the conversation shifts to the difference P makes on B’s practical commitments 
to take or avoid certain actions.  Will P prompt B to undergo amniocentesis?  When the 
conversation turns to practical questions, the scorekeeping turns to practical 
commitments. A directs B’s attention to her decision making options and asks B what her 
preferences are.   
This phase of scorekeeping is generally where issues around patient autonomy are 
focused.  Some notions of autonomy confer authority to B because she has individualized 
and specialized knowledge about her own practical commitments.  This reasoning 
commits A to a nondirective stance because only B knows what she wants.  The teaching 
model subscribes to this view.  This reason for nondirectiveness is confounded if B in 
fact does not have immediate or clear commitments about what she should do.  Genetic 
counselors experience patients like this on a regular basis as Kessler’s quotation in the 
introduction indicated. The responsibilist model confers decision making authority to the 
patient for different reasons.  These are related to the assumption developed in chapter 
two.  It is assumed that the patient wants to and has the capacity to share responsibility 
for understanding the information and deciding what to do with the information.  This 
way of distributing decision making authority reveals the social dimensions of 
autonomy.46  B’s practical commitments are not privileged because she has special access 
                                                
46 Hegel is sometimes accused of collapsing autonomy into heteronomy because he claims that autonomy 
requires that others adopt certain attitudes towards me.  Brandom exonerates Hegel with this clarification: 
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to them; instead they are privileged because of her relationship to the consequences of the 
decision making.  If amniocentesis were undertaken,  B’s body would have the needle 
stuck in it; B would have the miscarriage if complications arose from the amniocentesis.  
If amniocentesis were declined, B would have to manage the anxiety of not knowing; B is 
responsible for the care of the child to whom she eventually gives birth.               
The two primary goals of the responsibilist model are to coordinate meaning 
across diverse perspectives and to facilitate responsible decision making.  The first goal 
should be responsive to the directive structure of the entire genetic counseling enterprise.  
The offering of genetic information directs a patient to make inferences in response to 
sentences with biomedical vocabulary with which a patient is generally unfamiliar.  This 
kind of directiveness is designated here as doxastic directiveness and should not be 
unconditionally prohibited.  Doxastic directiveness entails leading a client towards a 
certain belief outcome.  For example, when a genetic counselor offers a risk assessment it 
is important to lead some clients to the conclusion that a risk assessment does not mean 
that they - or the fetus - have the condition. This guidance is the kind of inferential 
directiveness that clients expect when information is offered to them. To understand a 
sentence like P requires that the client inherit additional premises and conclusions to 
understand the information from a biomedical perspective.  This entitlement to be 
directive is also a condition for the abuse of inferential power and requires the HCP to be 
vigilant about biases that might lead to inappropriate doxastic directiveness. Advocates 
for those with disabilities have criticized genetic counselors for offering high-risk 
pregnant women only the health concerns related to having a child with Down 
                                                                                                                                            
autonomy means I get to choose my commitments but you, whoever I am responsible to, holds me to them. 
See Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead : Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).   
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syndrome.47  These critics suggest that clients should have access to information about 
the challenges and benefits of raising a child with Down syndrome.  Many HCPs omit 
these benefits without the intent of steering a client towards termination of pregnancy.  
They are not intentionally misdirecting the patient but rather focusing on what they 
consider to be the medically relevant features of the condition. According to critics, the 
HCPs are being insufficiently directive by offering too little information about what it 
means to raise a child with Down syndrome.         
The HCP’s perspective is privileged in this allowance for doxastic directiveness. 
Limited authority must be attributed to the HCP’s perspective because it possesses 
specialized knowledge, but this attribution of authority is not absolute. If meaning is to be 
coordinated across diverse perspectives, not all doxastic activity should be directed by the 
HCP.  The patient’s background commitments should also play a role in grasping what 
the information means without yet thinking about decision making.  The genetic 
counselor should be nondirective in terms of allowing the patient to make his or her own 
inferences. Nondirectiveness here is a kind of inferential restraint on the HCP’s part. This 
movement between directiveness and nondirectiveness has the dialogical structure 
proposed by White’s model.       
In the second goal, the HCP is charged with facilitating responsible decision 
making primarily from the perspective of the patient.  Practical directiveness and 
nondirectiveness reside in this sphere of conversational scorekeeping.  Practical 
directiveness can also be appropriate and inappropriate.  It is inappropriate when the 
                                                
47 Harmon.  For more philosophical critiques, see A. Asch, "Distracted by Disability. The "Difference" Of 
Disability in the Medical Setting," Camb Q Healthc Ethics 7, no. 1 (1998), Asch, "Disability Equality and 
Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?.", E. Parens and A. Asch, "Disability Rights Critique of 
Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations," Ment Retard Dev Disabil Res Rev 9, no. 1 
(2003), Parens and Asch, Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights.  
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genetic counselor attempts to change the patient score on specific issues. Telling a patient 
at the outset what their personal preferences should be, or proposing to a counselee what 
their responsibilities as a parent, patient or human being are is prima facie an 
unacceptable form of practical directiveness.  This kind of directiveness can appear in 
subtle forms.  
Let’s take an example from a recent study. In a study of 30,564 pregnancies 
receiving first-trimester risk assessments,48  Nicolaides et. al. found a high correlation 
between increase in risk for Down Syndrome (DS) and increase in consent to undergo 
invasive testing for diagnostic confirmation. Close to 77% of the women who had a risk 
greater than 1/300 chose to have an invasive test and only 4.6% of pregnant women with 
a risk less than 1/300 had invasive testing.  The researchers concluded that the study 
“demonstrated that pregnant women are indeed capable of making informed decisions on 
the basis of the best available evidence.” 49 Genetic counselors who associate high quality 
genetic counseling with a practical nondirective stance might object to telling the women 
in the study “that although a risk of 1 in 300 or more was generally considered to be high, 
                                                
48 In October 2003, The New England Journal of Medicine reported the results of a large-scale study of 
first-trimester screening techniques. This report, along with the subsequent endorsement of American 
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology’s in June 2004, ADD January 2007 gives justification for 
practitioners to incorporate these new techniques into prenatal care.  The first-trimester screen combines 
maternal age, nuchal-translucency thickness, and levels of maternal serum analytes to identify about 78.7 % 
of fetuses with Down syndrome with a false positive rate of 5%.  The first component involves the 
measurement of nuchal translucency using ultrasound in the period between 10 and 14 weeks of gestation.  
If the nuchal fold measures above a certain number of millimeters, then it is considered to be abnormal and 
possibly associated with Down syndrome as well as other aneuploidies. Access to this screening method 
may be restricted by the availability of properly trained ultrasound technicians.  It is not considered 
accurate without the second component of the first trimester screen involving the measurement of two 
biochemical markers:  free beta subunit of human chorionic gonadotropin (ß-hCG), and pregnancy-
associated plasma protein-A (PAPP-A).  At specified levels, these markers are associated with an increased 
risk of trisomy 21 and trisomy 18.  Unlike second trimester noninvasive techniques, first trimester methods 
do not calculate risk for spina bifida, the most common neural tube defect.  Screening for neural tube 
defects must be done in the second trimester. 
49 K. H. Nicolaides and others, "Evidence-Based Obstetric Ethics and Informed Decision-Making by 
Pregnant Women About Invasive Diagnosis after First-Trimester Assessment of Risk for Trisomy 21," Am 
J Obstet Gynecol 193, no. 2 (2005): 324. 
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it was up to them to decide in favor or against invasive testing.”50 The italicized content 
indirectly applies practical pressure by making explicit how most people evaluate the 
probability. What is implicit is that most people do something about high risks.  The 
researcher could be accused of smuggling in a commitment to be used in practical reasoning 
that leads to undergoing an invasive test.  Practical nondirectiveness is the stance by the 
genetic counselor that allows the patient to ultimately decide what evaluations,  
preferences, or obligations are relevant in this circumstance.     
There are appropriate forms of practical directiveness as well.  When a patient has 
stated emotional reactions, personal preferences or moral obligations in response to their 
options, a genetic counselor can help direct provisional inferences using the 
commitments from the patient’s perspective.  For example, if a pregnant woman stated 
that she believed abortion was wrong in most circumstances, then a genetic counselor 
could help her think about the how this belief might function as a reason not to undergo 
amniocentesis in certain circumstances. In other words, the HCP can try to assist the 
patient in making the right decision from the patient’s perspective. One should notice that 
practical nondirectiveness privileges the patient’s perspective but similar to the HCP 
perspective in a doxastic dimension, the patient’s perspective does not have absolute 
authority.   
White discusses this possibility for directiveness in terms of the genetic 
counselor’s role as gatekeeper.51  A genetic counselor can challenge a preference or 
obligation of a patient that is incompatible with the HCP’s role or widely accepted social 
norms.  Such challenges will be rare but are on occasion justified.  Several cases have 
been raised to illustrate the difficulties of these situations in a pluralistic society.  If a 
                                                
50 Ibid., 323. 
51 White, "Making Responsible Decisions. An Interpretive Ethic for Genetic Decisionmaking," 19. 
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pregnant woman in the U.S. indicates she wants a child but not a girl for cultural reasons 
and decides to terminate upon finding out the sex of the fetus, should the HCP doing 
genetic counseling challenge this culturally backed preference?  Is this incompatible with 
a widely held U.S. norm against sex discrimination? If a deaf couple decides to terminate 
a fetus after finding that he or she will hear normally, should a genetic counselor 
challenge this preference for a child to fit the norms of the Deaf culture?  These are 
difficult situations that directly confront a counselor’s commitment to practical 
nondirectiveness.  
On the responsibilist model’s view, these are circumstances that involve real 
conflicts that must be negotiated across diverse perspectives.  On the one hand, White is 
right to limit the genetic counselor’s authority to challenge the patient in a pluralistic 
society committed to maximizing individual freedoms. For example, if the HCP’s own 
religious commitments are incompatible with patient preference, then this disagreement 
does not entitle the genetic counselor to challenge the patient’s preferences. If these kinds 
of conflicts arise consistently for the HCP, then an internal negotiation must occur 
between HCP’s stance toward his own role obligations and religious obligations.  On the 
other hand, the genetic counselor does have some bases to disagree with the patient.  The 
political and medical norms that are established to guide the use of genetic information 
are legitimate constraints on patient preferences.  An example of a political norm is the 
regulatory structure around termination of pregnancies; an example of a medical norm is 
the professional commitment to avoid doing harm to patients.  Because the norms 
concerning the medically appropriate uses of genetic information are not fully 
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established, the cases above demonstrate a kind of case law approach to the formation of 
norms.52    
 The responsibilist model of nondirectiveness creates distinctions to understand 
the variety of directive and nondirective action that take place in a genetic counseling 
session.  All of these are understood in a normative framework that acknowledge both 
doxastic and practical inferences are part of conversational scorekeeping   This does not 
mean that objectivity has no status; instead it shows that even in situations where 
standardizable knowledge is transferred, there are right and wrong ways of keeping score 
both as a HCP and a patient.  And given that normative appraisal is in play, one must 
acknowledge that in certain moments the HCP’s perspective has privileged but not 
absolute authority, and in other moments the counselees perspective is privileged even if 
open to challenge.  This stance avoids on the doxastic side the view that genetic 
information means whatever the patient says it means; at the same time its meaning is not 
wholly determined by the biomedical perspective.  In the realm of practical 
commitments, the responsibilist model acknowledges that a HCP must defer to the 
perspective of the patient to generate preference or obligations unless the patient’s 
perspective endorses commitments that are incompatible with firmly established 
professional or societal norms. 
         
Evaluation of Models: Debbie’s Case 
In the introduction, I presented Debbie’s case highlighting several issues that 
deserve attention.  One concern was the question of whether the genetic counselor should 
                                                
52 For an example of a proposal to codify these norms, see J. R. Botkin, "Federal Privacy and 
Confidentiality," The Hastings Center Report 25, no. 5 (1995). 
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have offered to leave the room during an intense moment of deliberation.  This question 
along with other aspects of the case relevant to nondirectiveness will be addressed here as 
a way to evaluate the different understandings presented above.  
The development of Debbie’s case in many ways was a textbook example of the 
teaching model.  The risk assessment is presented in a clear methodical fashion, and 
patient misconceptions about amniocentesis are corrected.  When Debbie expresses 
concern over putting the baby at risk and concern about leaving her present children with 
care giving responsibilities, the counselor tries to help her think about the situation by 
listing each of the practical outcomes.  The genetic counselor observes that Debbie is 
ambivalent and may need privacy to discuss emotional and religious matters.   
From the standpoint of teaching model this counseling session upholds 
nondirectiveness in three ways.  First, the genetic counselor does not try to direct 
Debbie’s decision making when it is clear that she is ambivalent.  This nonintervention is 
justified by the fact that the genetic counselor cannot understand Debbie’s perspective 
especially her conflicting preferences and religious concerns.  This gap in understanding 
is consistent with the teaching model assumptions about communication.  In chapter one, 
I attempted to show that the teaching model adopts the technical vision of communication 
and understandings of technical neutrality.  In this view objective information can be 
transmitted cleanly whereas subjective information has less probability of being 
transmitted because of its indeterminacy.  In semantic terms, the genetic counselor has 
offered Debbie the objective meanings and options and leaves the subjective meanings to 
the proper authority, Debbie and her husband.           
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The psychotherapeutic model would have several criticisms of how the genetic 
counselor adhered to the value of nondirectiveness, if understood as promoting 
autonomy.  First, Debbie’s counselor failed to acknowledge the basic need of the client to 
be validated as a decision maker.  No indication is given that the genetic counselor is 
assessing or articulating Debbie’s strengths as a decision maker, only the implicit trust 
conveyed in leaving the Debbie alone to decide.  The genetic counselor does not 
undertake follow-up questions about the concerns regarding responsibilities, risk and 
religion.  This omission is a failure to attempt empathic identification that allows the 
HCP to see the situation from the counselee’s standpoint.  Ignoring these issues also 
potentially conveys the message that these issues are too difficult or scary to address.  
Finally, the offer to leave the room to allow time for Debbie and her husband to discuss 
might be interpreted by the client as abandonment during a difficult moment.  From the 
psychotherapeutic standpoint, this departure is a breach of a perspectival partnership 
where the counselor and the client together try to interpret and act on the genetic 
information from the client’s perspective.  
How should the HCP have proceeded in Debbie’s case in terms of the 
psychotherapeutic notion of nondirectiveness?  If nondirectiveness involves interventions 
that promotes the patient’s autonomy, then there are numerous actions that could have 
been taken and they fall into two basic strategies: 1) understand the patient 2) support and 
build patient confidence in making decisions.  The counselor in this case should have 
spent much more time trying to understand Debbie’s concerns about leaving her children 
with care giving responsibilities. The HCP should have tried to discern how Debbie 
understood the probability of miscarriage and openness to terminating the pregnancy.  
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She should have also asked Debbie more about her religious commitments, a topic that 
will be taken up in full in the next chapter.  All of these strategies provide the counselor 
access to Debbie’s ‘interior’ and allow assessment of Debbie’s strengths and weaknesses. 
With this information, the counselor could have made a variety of comments to build 
Debbie’s self-esteem.   For example, after Debbie indicates the concern about leaving her 
children with responsibilities, the genetic counselor could say: “You are a thoughtful 
mother who clearly cares about her children.’  Or after discussing the religious content, 
the HCP could say, “You are clearly a spiritual person who wants to do right in the eyes 
of God.”   
The responsibilist model also has several criticisms of how Debbie’s case was 
handled and by association criticisms of the teaching model’s notion of nondirectiveness.  
Remember that the responsibilist account acknowledges the need for movement between 
directiveness and nondirectiveness in both the doxastic and practical aspects of the 
conversation.  First, there seems to be minimal undertaking of doxastic nondirectiveness 
on the counselor’s part.  If Debbie’s response to the risk assessment was a nod, then the 
genetic counselor should have tried to elicit more thoughts and reaction from Debbie 
about her understanding of what was said.   Although eliciting Debbie’s thoughts is a 
directive act, the request intends to promote doxastic nondirectiveness by creating space 
for Debbie to share her feelings and inferences.  If Debbie has no comment, then the 
difficulty of sorting through the numbers needs to be acknowledged and another 
explanation possibly needs to be given.  Also, if an emotional reaction is observable, then 
this needs to be considered as part of the meaning of the information.  Doxastic 
nondirectiveness in this case allows time for the meaning of the genetic information to be 
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connected to the emotional states that it causes.  Debbie’s expression of God’s will 
should have also been allowed more time to develop as an inferential pathway to 
understanding the situation.   
Second, the practical nondirectiveness enacted by the genetic counselor should 
have been supplemented by practical directiveness.  Debbie offers practical concerns that 
the counselor should have helped her develop.  For example, the genetic counselor could 
have asked what it would mean to Debbie to lose this baby in a miscarriage and does the 
risk sound high or low in relation to such a loss.  Like the psychotherapeutic model, the 
genetic counselor guided by the responsibilist model would have to receive clear signals 
from the client to extend an offer to leave.  Whether these preferences were expressed by 
Debbie’s body language are not indicated in the case.    
In evaluating the three models via Debbie’s case, it is easier to identify how the 
responsibilist model differs from the teaching model.  The teaching model has two 
modes, 1) educate the client, what the responsibilist model calls doxastic directiveness 2) 
refrain from giving advice or do not undertake practical directiveness.  In the teaching 
model, the  meaning of the genetic information is overdetermined by the HCP’s 
perspective and underdetermined by the patient’s perspective.  In terms of the decision 
making process, the patient’s perspective should be privileged, but that does not mean 
that the patient has complete access to her own situation.  The justification for this 
criticism is that no perspective has that much semantic control or grasp of meanings 
either in terms of understanding or decision making.  The meaning of the genetic 
information is not totally up to the genetic counselor; at the same time, the patient does 
not have a full grasp of her own background commitments in relation to the genetic 
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information.  The teaching model’s account of nondirectiveness is part of a larger 
problematic picture of communication as transmission.  Once the genetic information is 
transmitted objectively then a rational person needs freedom to make logical inferences to 
make a decision.  The problem with this picture is that communication and decision 
making rarely work in this tidy two-step pattern.  The responsibilist picture of 
nondirectiveness attempts to capture the more difficult conversational “scorekeeping 
kinematics.”53    
A more difficult task is to compare the responsibilist model to the 
psychotherapeutic model’s notion of nondirectiveness.  Kessler narrows directiveness to 
persuasive coercion and expands the conceptual realm between and within 
nondirectiveness.  In Debbie’s case this means that there is no directiveness that occurs 
and on Kessler’s conception of nondirectiveness, the genetic counselor fails to promote 
Debbie’s autonomy in any way above providing information.  As Kessler suggests this 
leaves a lot of interaction that cannot be sorted into the directive-nondirective slots, but I 
think this misses too much.   
The responsibilist model seeks to articulate sites of authority and the patterns of 
inferential activity as they change throughout the conversation. As a result, doxastic and 
practical directiveness are modes that are appropriate in some circumstances and not in 
others, and this depends on the conversational score and which locus of authority is 
privileged at that moment. All the models agree that persuasive coercion is never 
appropriate but to define directiveness only in terms of this sacrifices its role in 
discerning the normative balance that is needed between the directive and nondirective 
                                                
53 Brandom, Making It Explicit : Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, 142. 
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moments in the genetic counseling conversation.  For example, the perspective that is 
privileged depends on the score at that moment in the conversation; and ascriptions of 
directive/nondirective action depend on who is actually doing the inferential or emotional 
work at what moment.  Kessler’s definition of directiveness misses this dimension of the 
exchange entirely. As a result, his conception of nondirectiveness casts too large a net 
making it difficult to make important distinctions about how directive and nondirective 
actions promote autonomy.  He does acknowledge these distinctions, but they are 
difficult to fit within his model. For instance, his model calls for active counseling skills 
that are directive actions.  But he is then put in the semantic bind of needing to call 
directive actions nondirective.  The appropriate moments for doxastic and practical 
directiveness in the responsibilist model are for Kessler nondirective actions. 
At a more fundamental level, the responsibilist model trades in talk of psychology 
and validation for normativity and responsibility. This difference is indicated in the 
different conceptions of nondirectiveness.  In the psychotherapeutic model, 
nondirectiveness is rooted in the assumption that all clients need validation and need to 
be understood by the genetic counselor; whereas on the responsibilist view all clients are 
sites of authority with which meaning needs to be coordinated and decisions need to be 
facilitated.  Whether a client’s confidence in decision making needs boosting is a difficult 
assessment to make in a short session, but a counselor can safely assume that patients 
need some help taking responsibility for grasping the full implications of the genetic 
information and for the decision that needs to be made.     
The objections to the responsibilist notion of nondirectiveness are several.  I will 
address two important ones.  From the teaching standpoint, the concern should be that 
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HCPs will abuse their entitlement to be practically directive.  If genetic counselors help 
counselees make practical inferences from stated preference or obligations, the genetic 
counselor can subtly manipulate the conclusions drawn.  This manipulation is a 
possibility but the model has a guideline on this matter. If the counselor draws a practical 
inference on behalf of the client, e.g., ‘given X, then maybe you are not comfortable 
undergoing amniocentesis,’ the resulting conclusion must always be cast as a provisional 
suggestion for a practical pathway that can be challenged by the client. Also, the genetic 
counselor should be explicit that she is helping the patient think about the consequences 
of her own stated values.   
From the psychotherapeutic standpoint, the responsibilist model’s understanding 
of the directiveness/nondirectiveness distinction will not fully address the psychological 
needs of the patient.  The responsibilist model’s concern towards the issues of authority 
and responsibility promotes a sensitivity to a counselee’s status as someone who needs to 
explore meaning and make decisions, who needs to be directed in some parts of the 
conversation and who needs to direct at other junctures.  A counselee whose emotions 
consistently halt the conversation or whose psychological state appears to prevent an 
adequate grasp of the situation may not in those moments or session be able to take 
responsibility for meaning or decisions.  Making that conclusion and referring that person 
for further help easily falls within competencies of the genetic counselor guided by the 
responsibilist model.  As for dealing with strong emotional reactions by patients to 
genetic information, the responsibilist model does not presume this is a psychological 
problem but rather a common result of the information that needs to be incorporated into 
its meaning. 
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Summary 
In this chapter, I have addressed one of the central values of genetic counseling.    
Acknowledging its indeterminate status and history, I then elaborated it from the three 
models under consideration and tried to demonstrate why the responsibilist model is the 
most sufficient.  The responsibilist model proposes that directiveness and 
nondirectiveness are inevitable features of genetic counseling and that the ability to 
discern when these are appropriate is a crucial skill.  The distinction between doxastic 
and practical directiveness/nondirectiveness acknowledges the boundary between 
meaning making and decision making but makes it permeable in the sense that the 
genetic counselor can be directive and nondirective in both areas under certain 
conditions.    
I raised a question at the beginning whose answer has remained implicit: whether 
nondirectiveness should remain an integral part of the profession. In light of the 
responsibilist take on the nondirective/directive question, clearly both directiveness and 
nondirectiveness are needed to identify the changing loci of authority and activity in a 
conversation and to track who is doing what inferential work in the genetic counseling 
session.  In the next chapter, the need for these concepts will be further demonstrated in 
the concern around the issues of talking about spirituality and religion.         
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CHAPTER IV 
 
GENETIC COUNSELING AND SPIRITUAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Or, if, as we suspect based on their attitudes toward 
abortion, religious faith were important to the couple, (a 
clinician could say) this: 
God sometimes gives people special tasks in life that we 
need to do without rewards or thanks and yours is to care 
for Alexis until He’s ready to take her. And, the two of you 
have done a magnificent job in caring and loving her. You 
may not experience her love now, but a day will come 
when you will. God will take care of that. 
- Seymour Kessler and Robert Resta in “Commentary on 
Robin’s A Smile, and the Need for Counseling Skills in the 
Clinic”1 
 
In the previous chapter, the value of nondirectiveness was shown to be a contested 
and defining feature of genetic counseling.  It was interpreted from the standpoint of the 
teaching, psychotherapeutic and responsibilist models and then respectively applied to 
Debbie’s case.  The responsibilist model proposes that genetic counselors need to 
acknowledge the presence of directiveness and nondirectiveness in both meaning-making 
and decision-making processes.  A key communication skill in genetic counseling –and 
all health care communication for that matter - is recognizing when directiveness or 
nondirectiveness is appropriate based on the current conversational score.  One area 
where this skill is difficult to employ involves issues of spirituality and religion.          
                                                
1 R. G. Resta and S. Kessler, "Commentary on Robin's a Smile, and the Need for Counseling Skills in the 
Clinic," Am J Med Genet A 126, no. 4 (2004): 437. 
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If patients bring up spiritual or religious concerns in response to receiving genetic 
information, should the genetic counselor help the counselee understand the genetic 
information in religious terms?  This question can be taken one step further.  If some 
studies show that many patients want their spiritual concerns addressed in health care 
situations or if they show that acknowledging this aspect of patients’ lives improves 
health outcomes, then should genetic counselors formally assess a patient’s spiritual 
needs and concerns? Are spirituality and religious concerns different from other 
psychosocial factors that genetic counselors are trained to handle?  As Kessler exhibits in 
the above quotation, some genetic counselors are comfortable articulating a patient’s or 
parent’s situation in religious terms.  Studies have found that this is a minority position.2   
This chapter addresses two questions. The first asks whether spiritual assessment 
should be a routine part of genetic counseling sessions. Some researchers in genetic 
counseling as well as in medicine are investigating the feasibility of adopting standard 
spiritual assessment tools.  After reviewing their findings, I will offer a challenge to the 
position that spiritual assessment should be routine part of genetic counseling session.  
The second question asks how the religious concerns in Debbie’s case should have been 
handled. After interpreting this case through the lens of each of the three genetic 
counseling models, I argue that responsibilist model provides the most adequate 
understanding of and guidance for this area of interaction. 
   
Spiritual Assessment in Genetic Counseling 
                                                
2 For empirical studies that show hesitance of genetic counselors to engage in this activity, seeL. M. Reis 
and others, "Spiritual Assessment in Genetic Counseling," J Genet Couns 16, no. 1 (2007). and P. J. Boyle, 
"Genetics and Pastoral Counseling: A Special Report," Second Opin (Chic), no. 11 (2004).  
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Health care professionals are paying more attention to the spiritual lives of 
patients.3   This area of research can be divided into three main areas: 1) spirituality and 
patient/HCP interest 2) spirituality and health outcomes 3) spirituality and patient care.  
The findings from this research are being used to justify inquiries into the feasibility of 
instituting formal spiritual assessment tools.  These findings as they appear in the genetic 
counseling literature will be assessed in this section but prior to this work, an assessment 
of a representative definition of spirituality and a subsequent proposal for a more 
comprehensive definition are undertaken. 
    
Defining Spirituality 
In this section, a representative definition of spirituality used by researchers in 
medicine and genetic counseling is introduced and analyzed.  The shortcomings of this 
definition warrant the proposal of more comprehensive definition.  I offer a definition of 
spirituality that captures a wider range of attitudes that patients might exhibit in genetic 
counseling.                       
A dominant view within the medical literature identifies spirituality as the genus 
of which religion is a species.4 In most health care contexts, the concern is how to define 
                                                
3 One rough indicator of the spate of interest in this area is that 713 of 767 medical publications on 
“spirituality” and “medicine” have occurred in the last ten years. These numbers are based on a key word 
search of “spirituality”and“medicine” in Pubmed, large research database provided by the National Library 
of Medicine and the National Institutes of Health.  An interesting historical and sociological question not 
pursued here is why there has been such a surge interest. The ethical question of the benefit and harms of 
the relationship between religion and medicine has been recently addressed. See Richard P. Sloan, Blind 
Faith : The Unholy Alliance of Religion and Medicine, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006).    
4 A large literature in the humanities addresses the distinction between spirituality and religion.  Medical 
researchers do not pretend to have sorted through the thicket of these conceptual nuances. They have 
adopted a stipulative definition that serves their purposes.  Within the humanistic tradition, I think the 
biomedical community’s preference is most compatible with a Hegelian understanding of the distinction 
that he worked out in Hegel, Miller, and Findlay., and in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Peter Crafts 
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spirituality as the umbrella concept that includes religion as well other related 
phenomena.  Of the many accounts offered5, Anandarajah and Hight propose a 
representative definition: 
Spirituality is a complex and multidimensional part of 
human experience.  It has cognitive, experiential, and 
behavioral aspects. The cognitive or philosophic aspects 
include the search for meaning, purpose and truth in life 
and the beliefs and values by which an individual lives. The 
experiential and emotional aspects involve feelings of hope, 
love, connection, inner peace, comfort and support.  These 
are reflected in the quality of an individual’s inner 
resources, the ability to give and receive spiritual love, and 
the types of relationships and connections that exist with 
self, the community, the environment and nature, and the 
transcendent (e.g. power greater than self, a value system, 
God, cosmic consciousness). The behavior aspects of 
spirituality involve the way a person externally manifests 
individual spiritual beliefs and inner spiritual state.6       
This definition has relevance for the present study because it is offered in conjunction 
with the HOPE spiritual assessment tool, an instrument that guides clinicians in asking 
patients a series of questions about their spiritual lives and that has been considered in 
genetic counseling research.  One key function of this definition is that it seeks to 
facilitate a HCP’s ability to recognize and distinguish the spiritual concerns of patients.  
It identifies both religious and nonreligious forms of spirituality allowing for a diverse set 
of phenomena that could include weekly communal worship, private meditation, hiking 
or political activism, any of which can influence how individuals respond to a wide range 
                                                                                                                                            
Hodgson, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion : The Lectures of 1827, one-volume edition. ed. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).   
5 To review other definitions of spirituality in the medical literature, see J. Dyson, M. Cobb, and D. 
Forman, "The Meaning of Spirituality: A Literature Review," J Adv Nurs 26, no. 6 (1997), A. Moreira-
Almeida and H. G. Koenig, "Retaining the Meaning of the Words Religiousness and Spirituality: A 
Commentary on the Whoqol Srpb Group's "A Cross-Cultural Study of Spirituality, Religion, and Personal 
Beliefs as Components of Quality of Life" (62: 6, 2005, 1486-1497)," Soc Sci Med 63, no. 4 (2006).; W. 
McSherry and K. Cash, "The Language of Spirituality: An Emerging Taxonomy," Int J Nurs Stud 41, no. 2 
(2004). 
6 G. Anandarajah and E. Hight, "Spirituality and Medical Practice: Using the Hope Questions as a Practical 
Tool for Spiritual Assessment," Am Fam Physician 63, no. 1 (2001): 83. 
157 
 
of medical situations.  The definition acknowledges that spirituality is a phenomenon that 
influences the way patients think, feel, behave.  The cognitive dimension of spirituality is 
identifiable in what is said and thought about the broader or transcendent circumstances 
and consequences of individual and collective existence. The experiential or emotive 
dimension of spirituality is recognizable in generally positive feelings or psychological 
states, i.e. hope, love, inner peace, about relationships and circumstances.  The expression 
of these beliefs and inner states in observable behaviors articulates the last dimension that 
refers to the influence of spirituality on action.   
This definition has several strengths.  First, it avoids reducing spirituality to an 
essentially emotive phenomena marked by pseudo-claims or superstitious acts.  Whether 
this avoidance leads to an over-intellectualization will be discussed below.  Second, it 
avoids reducing spirituality to codified or institutionalized beliefs.  The cultural power of 
institutionalized religious traditions – at least in parts of the U.S. - sometimes leaves other 
forms of spirituality at the margin of our awareness.  Most clinician researchers interested 
in spiritual assessment have consistently included nontraditional religious expression in 
their stipulative definitions. Finally, an HCP guided by this definition will grasp the 
complexity of spirituality and expect it to be expressed in a variety of ways.  Patients may 
express their spirituality as a belief, “I believe that things happen for a reason;” or as a 
report of an attitude, “I’m hopeful;” or as an action such as walking to the hospital 
chapel.    
The definition has shortcomings as well. Its avoidance of emotivist or essentialist 
descriptions results in an implicitly intellectualized phenomena.  The relationship 
between cognition, emotion, and behavior imply a trickle down spirituality where beliefs 
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influence emotional states and emotional states produce certain kinds of behaviors.  The 
relationship between these dimensions is more complex than the definition implies.  A 
second weakness is its representation of the relationship between experience, emotion 
and feeling.  It suggests that experiential and emotional aspects of spirituality produce a 
set of feelings. The normative categories of dispositions or attitudes provide a more 
accurate description of these phenomena.  The third and most important weakness of the 
definition is its attenuation of the phenomena associated with spirituality.  The authors 
acknowledge that the absence of one or several features can result in a spiritual crisis.  
This reference to spiritual crisis indirectly reveals the weakness. It denotes spirituality as 
the presence of a set of features without acknowledging that spirituality is also the realm 
where these same attitudes, emotions, and behaviors can be absent or hindered.  The 
beliefs, attitudes and emotions that are mentioned can only be understood in connection 
to other attitudes such as despair, uncertainty, and fear.  Spirituality in the above 
definition substitutes one kind of stance or achievement within spirituality, an exemplary 
one, for the cultural mode of spirituality defined by circumstances where attitudes of 
hope, despair, love, sadness, joy, uncertainty and faith are lived, acknowledged or called 
upon to in response to difficult situations.        
These definitional deficiencies prompt the need for a more comprehensive 
definition of spirituality.  Daniel Sheridan proposes a way of working out the distinctions 
between culture, spirituality and religion that proves helpful both for students of religion 
and for the biomedical community.  He defines spirituality as “a mode of culture in which 
the human being transforms the problematic of the human predicament immanently 
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within the plenum and spectrum of human resources in time and space.”7  One innovation 
in this definition is that culture plays the functional role often ascribed to religion, and 
spirituality becomes a substantive domain within cultures.8  This makes culture the genus 
of which spirituality is a species:   
Culture is an open, complex, systemic whole of human 
behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting 
the distinctive achievement of human groups. The essential 
core of culture consists of traditional ideas and values. A 
culture is both a product of action and conditions further 
actions. Culture has a function, among others, to transform 
the human predicament, that is, the inherent dilemmas of 
being finitely human in time and space, possibly in the 
assisting presence of a Transcendent Other.9   
Spirituality as a mode of culture or subculture can be further distinguished between what 
he calls plenum spirituality and axial spirituality.  Plenum spirituality refers to the context 
of transformation as occurring within the whole, a monistic totality where every thing is 
interconnected.   In this spirituality, gods, humans, nature are inextricably bound together 
in a cosmic whole.  Axial spirituality emphasizes human resources as distinct from the 
whole to transform its own problematic.  The varieties of humanism exemplify but do not 
exhaust this brand of spirituality.   
After distinguishing plenum and axial spiritualities, religion is defined as a similar 
mode of culture with the addition of “the presence of an assisting Transcendent Other, 
                                                
7 Daniel Sheridan, "Discerning Difference: A Taxonomy of Culture, Spirituality, and Religion," The 
Journal of Religion 66, no. 1 (1986): 43. 
8 Sheridan’s proposal is an attempt to resolve the problem of defining religion and culture as different 
phenomena. When religion is defined broadly, i.e. Geertz’s religion as cultural system, it becomes difficult 
to distinguish it from the concept of culture.  See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures; Selected 
Essays (New York,: Basic Books, 1973), 87-125.          
9 Sheridan: 40.  Sheridan specifies several features of culture: “Underlying this conception of culture are 
four implied factors: (1) a cosmology, (2) a view of the problematic of the human predicament, (3) a goal 
of transformation of the predicament, and (4) specific means of transformation of that predicament. The 
four factors describe a worldview.” 
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which is perceived to be without space and time.”10  For Sheridan, spirituality is not a 
religion that lacks a transcendent dimension; instead, religion is a spirituality that adds a 
theistic concern.  “In this framework the Transcendent Other is seen to be ‘additional,’ 
almost in a sense not necessary since certain cultures, for example, Theravada Buddhism, 
do not postulate it.”11  He illustrates how all three concepts can be present within single 
traditions or cultures:  
Catholicism includes a "little tradition" akin to plenum 
spirituality, a "great tradition" akin to religion, and a 
"liberal" tradition akin to axial spirituality. Hinduism 
includes polytheisms akin to plenum spirituality, yoga akin 
to axial spirituality, and Vaishnavism akin to religion. 
Twentieth-century Europe included Nazism akin to plenum 
spirituality, Barthian neo-orthodoxy akin to religion, and 
Leninist Marxism akin to axial spirituality.12      
His taxonomy helps justify the preference in the medical literature for using spirituality 
as a more general cultural phenomena than religion.  The challenge is to translate these 
                                                
10 Ibid., 44.  His reference to plenum suggests spiritualities that are transformed without distinctions such as 
culture/nature.  His “axial spirituality” is an allusion to Karl Jaspers description of the axial period (800-
200 B.C.) of pivotal thinkers that transformed humanity’s self-understanding. 
11 Ibid., 45.  Sheridan’s taxonomy has some unsatisfactory consequences as do most stances at this level of 
categorization.  The most important has to do with his demarcation of religion.  By narrowing it to those 
modes of culture that look to a transcendent Other for assistance, some phenomena, e.g. most forms of 
Buddhism, that are traditionally referred to or self-ascribed as religions no longer fall under this mode of 
culture. Such phenomena would be more likely fall under plenum or axial spiritualities.  This change in 
classification would not put Buddhism or Confucianism outside the purview of scholars of religion. 
Instead, Sheridan claims that it “obviates the dilemma of trying to show that Confucianism or Nazism is a 
religion, a quasi-religion, a philosophy of life, or an ideology. On this level of interpretation, the scope of 
the ‘study of religion’ is universal both synchronically and diachronically.”(p.44-45). In other words, 
‘religious studies’ would be a form of cultural studies that approaches cultures as consisting of 
plenum/axial spiritualities and/or religions.  The benefits and costs of this approach are related to the large 
net it casts for students of religion.  One benefit is that it permits or invites comparison of cultural modes 
that seek to transforming the human predicament.  Relevant to this project, medicine and specific religions 
could be compared as distinct subcultures that seek to transform human health predicaments. One cost of 
Sheridan’s taxonomy is the new set of boundary issues that concern whether a mode of culture actually 
seeks to ‘transform the human problematic’ or merely, for example, seeks to profit or distract from the 
human predicament.  The complex circumstances and consequences of Sheridan’s proposal cannot be 
rehearsed here in their entirety. As a stipulative prospect for understanding religion and religious studies, 
his taxonomy has promise at certain theoretical levels.          
12 Ibid. 
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sociological insights into a more stipulative definition for HCPs who are trying to 
identify the spiritual concerns of individual patients. 
When HCPs attempt to the identify spirituality, I propose they look for spirituality 
in the intentional stances of patients that transform the limiting conditions of their 
knowing (e.g. cognitive uncertainty), doing (e.g. practical/moral uncertainty) and being 
(constraints of embodiment).  Sheridan’s work shows that intentional stances are not de 
novo creations of individuals but rather these stances are moves within trajectories of 
meaning bound by the historical and social possibilities/emphases of a culture but not 
completely determined by them.  An individual forges meaning out of those possibilities.  
In a pluralistic society, HCPs should not be surprised to find patients that exhibit one or 
more these modes of culture.  This helps explain how an individual patient who is an 
evangelical Christian can avow that all available medical interventions should be used 
(axial spirituality) and that God’s will is in every outcome (religion).        
Intentional stances are not reducible to beliefs and do not require self-
consciousness.  An intentional stance can be attributed because of something a person 
says, ‘This disease is God’s will,’ or it can be attributed to actions a person undertakes, 
e.g. bowing one’s head in prayer or taking a hike in the woods.  In terms of emotions, 
intentional stances – either belief or action – are related to emotions by either trying to 
affect future emotional responses, e.g. belief in afterlife mitigates despair; or by 
responding to present or past emotional responses, e.g. praying with the rosary is 
response to a present anxiety over uncertainty.  Intentional stances cannot be reduced to 
the physiological states we call emotions but they can be ‘lodged in emotions’ through 
our efforts to discipline - prospectively or retroactively - this responsive feature of our 
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bodies.13  Intentional stances can be attributed as dispositions if their reliability is 
observed over time.        
Limiting conditions are the features of the human predicament that restrict our 
capacities to respond to the world.14  Death, disability, difference, suffering, evil and 
uncertainty are examples of limiting conditions. The importance of a limiting condition 
can be evaluated in terms of the comprehensive effects of the constraint on a 
person/group/environment and the effort required to accept or overcome the limitation.  
Death for example is a limiting condition that has generated a plurality of complex 
intentional stances from religious narratives and ritual practices to DNRs and life support.  
From the standpoint of the person facing death, it has the totalizing effect of ending 
bodily existence and it is ultimately impossible to overcome.  As a limiting condition 
death ranks high as does suffering in its many forms.  Uncertainty about what is the case, 
what will be the case and what should be case marks off another important limiting 
condition whose relevance will be discussed in reference to Debbie’s case.  What it 
means to transform these conditions depends on the possibilities of spirituality within a 
culture. Some spiritualities may emphasize the acceptance rather than the avoidance of 
death; other spiritualities may try to overcome it at all costs.    
One advantage of appropriating Sheridan’s work is that spirituality is defined 
broadly enough to locate not only religion but also medicine. Both are subcultures.  If 
religion is a spirituality that is concerned with the assistance a Transcendent Other, then 
                                                
13 In informal conversation and unpublished documents, Larry Churchill has used this image of beliefs 
lodged in emotions.  
14 Thomas F. O'Dea, The Sociology of Religion, Foundations of Modern Sociology Series (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, 1966).  The notion of a limiting condition or its function equivalent has a long 
history in the sociology of religion. O’Dea’s work provides an example of a functionalist account of 
religion: “Thus functional theory sees the role of religion as assisting men to adjust to three brute facts of 
contingency, powerlessness and scarcity (and consequently, frustration and deprivation).” 
163 
 
western biomedicine is a spirituality that is concerned with transformation of morbidity 
and mortality in the presence of scientific evidence and technology.  Medicine fits 
squarely but not exclusively within axial spirituality.  Its concern with the relation 
between religious practices and health outcomes, e.g. praying for or with patients, and 
alternative modes of healing e.g. naturopathic medicine15, suggest the possibility of 
finding religion and plenum spirituality within the larger biomedical tradition. The 
benefit of locating both phenomena within spirituality is that it promotes a greater 
awareness of the HCP’s location as he or she ventures to undertake a spiritual 
assessment. 
The constraints of this project do not allow a full defense of this proposal for 
defining spirituality.  A main objection to it might be that it defines spirituality more 
broadly than common usage allows.  Any subculture that “transforms the problematic of 
the human predicament” is a spirituality. All definitions of spirituality must attempt to 
navigate between grasping too much and too little.  The one appropriated here takes 
responsibility for its expansiveness by identifying further distinctions within spirituality 
that allow different features of various subcultures to be recognized. This recognition in 
turn allows HCPs to see patients as having complex intentional stances toward medical 
care that reflect several modes of cultural influence. 
   
Initial Motivations for Spiritual Assessment 
Despite challenges in defining spirituality, medical researchers, relying on the 
assumption that people generally know what spirituality and religion is, have found that 
                                                
15 See Vanderbilt Center for Integrative Health, (Vanderbilt University Medical Center, 2007, accessed 
December 17 2007); available from http://www.vanderbilthealth.com/integrativehealth/. 
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many patients in the U.S. have spiritual/religious needs in medical circumstances and that 
some want health care professionals to address these concerns.16  Researchers interested 
in instituting spiritual assessment in genetic counseling refer to these kinds of studies as 
motivations for their efforts.  In a survey about spiritual assessment in genetic counseling 
Reis et al. refer to three studies that indicate patient interests. One finds that 77% of 
seriously ill patients think physicians should consider their spiritual concerns;17 a second 
study finds that 53% of seriously ill patients feel physicians should discuss spiritual 
needs18; a third study of adult outpatients finds that 66% of respondents believed that 
inquiries by physicians into their spiritual lives would strengthen the trust in the 
relationship.19  These results are far from conclusive, but they are significant because they 
serve as reasons to explore the possibility of doing spiritual assessments in genetic 
counseling.       
The second area of research that motivates interest in spiritual assessment 
involves investigations of the correlations between the spiritual activities of patients and 
health outcomes.  This line of inquiry asks questions not only about the effects that 
spiritual activities, e.g. prayer, have on the natural history of disease but also the effects 
that religious beliefs have on medical decision making, which ultimately has bearing on 
health outcomes.  Citing nine studies, Reis et al. interpret the cumulative effect of their 
results:  
                                                
16 Some studies cited by Anandarajah areJ. W. Ehman and others, "Do Patients Want Physicians to Inquire 
About Their Spiritual or Religious Beliefs If They Become Gravely Ill?," Arch Intern Med 159, no. 15 
(1999), D. E. King and B. Bushwick, "Beliefs and Attitudes of Hospital Inpatients About Faith Healing and 
Prayer," J Fam Pract 39, no. 4 (1994).; T. A. Maugans and W. C. Wadland, "Religion and Family 
Medicine: A Survey of Physicians and Patients," J Fam Pract 32, no. 2 (1991), O. Oyama and H. G. 
Koenig, "Religious Beliefs and Practices in Family Medicine," Arch Fam Med 7, no. 5 (1998). 
17 L. C. Kaldjian, J. F. Jekel, and G. Friedland, "End-of-Life Decisions in Hiv-Positive Patients: The Role 
of Spiritual Beliefs," Aids 12, no. 1 (1998). 
18 King and Bushwick. 
19 Ehman and others. 
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Research in the past 20 years increased our understanding 
of the connections between spirituality, religion and health. 
Spirituality has positive effects on mental, physical, and 
emotional health including coping ability, self esteem, and 
social support systems. In addition religious and spiritual 
beliefs can profoundly influence medical decision 
making.20 
The consequence of these findings appears self-evident: HCPs need to address this 
dimension of patients to improve health outcomes.  According to Harold Koenig, a 
leading scholar in the area of health care and spirituality, this dimension of patients’ lives 
is as important as their psychological state or social circumstances.  Arguing for spiritual 
assessment, he states three goals of spiritual assessments: 1) learn the religious beliefs of 
patients especially as they pertain to medical care 2) understand how these beliefs 
influence coping with illness 3) establish the spiritual needs of the patient. 21  The possible 
benefits of achieving these goals are many.  Spiritual assessment “communicates respect 
for patients spirituality,” “obtains information support system” and “may enhance the 
patient’s coping, influence patient compliance and identify individuals who may benefit 
from a referral for pastoral counseling.”22  These benefits and specified goals along with 
the studies that support them have led genetic counselors to explore the feasibility of  
spiritual assessment.  Before turning to a detailed explication of two studies in genetic 
counseling, the arguments against taking a spiritual assessment or spiritual history need 
to be rehearsed. 
Most of the conclusions above have recently been challenged in Richard Sloan’s 
Blind Faith: The Unholy Alliance of Religion and Medicine.  Calls for spiritual 
assessment in response to patient interest are based on questionable research according to 
                                                
20 Reis and others: 42. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 
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Sloan.  Through analysis of several important studies, he demonstrates that these studies 
are methodologically flawed and their conclusions spurious or at best suspect.  They tend 
to overstate patient interest and recommend spiritual assessment for most medical 
circumstances despite that patient reports are often from a narrower range of medical 
circumstance such as terminal illness. He also notes that more representative studies 
using randomized samples indicate that less than half of patients are interested in 
discussing their spiritual concerns with clinicians.23  At minimum, Sloan’s objections give 
reasons for advocates of spiritual assessment to be more careful in their use of studies to 
make claims of patient interest. 
If the interest were greater and reliably reported, would this justify greater 
involvement in the patient’s spiritual life? Sloan argues that this does not necessarily 
follow.  He compares patient requests for a spiritual discussion to patient requests to end 
chemotherapy prematurely.24  These kinds of request according to Sloan create a conflict 
between the clinician’s goal of beneficence and the obligation to respect the autonomy of 
the patient.  His analogy is not appropriate even if one avows that discussions of 
spirituality may be harmful to patients, as Sloan does.  Demonstrating that discontinuing 
chemotherapy early harms a cancer patient is a more straightforward process than 
demonstrating that talking about spirituality harms the patient.   If a strong argument can 
be made that spiritual assessment is harmful to patients, then a patient’s interest in it 
would clearly not justify its undertaking.  Sloan makes the case that spiritual assessment 
may cause harm in several ways. First, patients who are told that a religious life can lead 
to better health are implicitly being told that a failure in health indicates a shortcoming in 
                                                
23 Sloan, 237-38. 
24 Ibid., 239. 
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religious life.  This message supports what Sloan calls the “just-world hypothesis,” the 
belief that the occurrence of events, e.g. change in health status, can be reconciled to 
various modes of justice. Bad things do not happen to good people.  Endorsing such a 
hypothesis generates additional guilt when illness inevitably strikes.25  A second harm 
proposed by Sloan involves the encouragement of foregoing or discontinuing vital 
medical care for religious reasons.  He cites the case of Chad Green, a two-year-old boy 
with leukemia, whose parent substituted dietary supplements for chemotherapy. They 
defended these actions by saying that if Chad died it was God’s will.  His parents ignored 
court orders to treat their son and Chad died at the age of four.  This example 
demonstrates a harm, but it is based on the tenuous assumption that spiritual assessment 
would encourage rather than challenge this kind of reasoning in patients.  This weakness 
in the argument raises the issue of competency.  
Is spiritual assessment a task that can be done well by health care professionals? 
Or is it highly susceptible to abuse?  Sloan proposes that the authority attributed to 
physicians by patients because of their medical expertise makes discussion of religion 
with patients vulnerable to misinterpretation, manipulation and coercion.  If physicians 
take a history that is dedicated to spirituality, then patients who are not spiritual or 
religious could misinterpret this prioritization as implying that spirituality has an 
important and special relation to health.  Sloan also notes that HCPs who do not 
proselytize are still in the position to subtly influence, manipulate or coerce. This exertion 
of authority can be used to promote or discourage the use of religious or spiritual 
resources by patients.  Many of the protections that have been achieved to protect patient 
                                                
25 Ibid., 187. 
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autonomy are undermined, Sloan asserts, when spirituality becomes part of the 
physician’s responsibility.  “When physicians take on the work of the clergy, they 
become both bad clergy and bad doctors.”26  The concerns around competencies and 
abuse generate the best reasons against formal spiritual assessment especially when 
Koenig openly accepts that a benefit of spiritual assessment is to influence patient 
compliance and Reis endorses its influential role in decision making.  I will defend this 
stance in the next section.     
If patients were not interested in spiritual assessment but it was demonstrated as 
beneficial to their health or their decision making, then does this justify raising 
spirituality in medical encounters? Reis and Koenig make claims to the effect that 
spiritual assessment can improve health outcomes.  Health outcomes depend on many 
factors.  Reis suggests that spirituality has a positive association with coping, self-esteem 
and support systems.  Sloan concentrates on the methodological weaknesses of studies 
that report correlation between religious involvement and health outcomes.  Studies that 
do apply rigorous controls and thorough statistical analysis to establish a correlation are 
still left with the questions of causality. For example, what causal factors can be theorized 
about the statistical association between church attendance and reduced mortality?27  
Sloan does not direct his attention to claims about spirituality and the psychosocial 
dimension of health outcomes, e.g. that spirituality is positively associated with health 
behaviors such as coping with pain and chronic illness.28  Presumably, if these studies 
                                                
26 Ibid., 206. 
27 Ibid., 142. 
28 For sample of this literature see: A. Bussing, T. Ostermann, and H. G. Koenig, "Relevance of Religion 
and Spirituality in German Patients with Chronic Diseases," Int J Psychiatry Med 37, no. 1 (2007), M. O. 
Harrison and others, "Religiosity/Spirituality and Pain in Patients with Sickle Cell Disease," J Nerv Ment 
Dis 193, no. 4 (2005), H. G. Koenig, "Religion and Medicine Iv: Religion, Physical Health, and Clinical 
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were methodologically sound, then he would raise the concern that some patients would 
discontinue medical treatment if they were told that spirituality is efficacious in dealing 
with pain.29  This objection depends on the quality of the spiritual assessment and the 
ability of the HCP to show the patient that both are needed.  Nonetheless, Sloan raises 
important objections to the whole enterprise of spiritual assessment including its 
unintended outcomes.  
 
Explorations of Spiritual Assessment in Genetic Counseling 
In this section, I explicate and analyze research on two assessment tools that 
attend to the spiritual life of patients undergoing genetic counseling. The HOPE30 
approach (see Appendix) is exclusively focused on spiritual assessment and leaves open 
the question of whether this kind of content should be integrated into psychosocial 
assessments.  The second intervention, named the Colored Eco-Genetic Relationship Map 
(CEGRM) assesses a number of psychosocial factors including spirituality and religion.  
A detailed look at these approaches is necessary to see what exactly spiritual assessment 
might entail either as a stand alone intervention or as part of a psychosocial pedigree.  In 
my evaluation of these approaches, I suggest several reasons why genetic counselors 
should not incorporate spiritual assessment as a standard part of their practice.   
HOPE  Approach 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Implications," Int J Psychiatry Med 31, no. 3 (2001), A. B. Wachholtz, M. J. Pearce, and H. Koenig, 
"Exploring the Relationship between Spirituality, Coping, and Pain," J Behav Med 30, no. 4 (2007). 
29 Sloan cites several studies that indicate low psychiatric uptake of patients who think prayer worked for 
mental health conditions. Sloan, 187-89. 
 
30 Reis and others: 45.  
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 In 2007, Reis et al. published findings from a survey that elicited genetic 
counselors’ attitudes toward and practices of spiritual assessment in genetic counseling.  
It also reported responses to a possible instrument for facilitating spiritual assessment in 
genetic counseling called the HOPE Approach.  The researchers acknowledge that the 
survey had a low response rate and hesitate to generalize to the larger population of 
genetic counselors.  In terms of undertaking spiritual assessment in current practice, 60% 
of the 127 respondents had conducted a spiritual assessment in the past year and within 
this subset the mean frequency of performing such an assessment was 20% of the cases 
with only 8.5% conducting in more than half the cases.  Those who had performed 
spiritual assessments in the past year acknowledged being comfortable doing them and 
indicated their relevance at a significantly higher level than those counselors who had not 
done one in the past year. 
Several tentative conclusions are drawn from these results.  In terms of the 
prevalence of spiritual assessment, the findings permit the conclusion that this kind of 
exchange does not occur frequently even with counselors who have been willing to 
perform such an assessment in the last year. Three kinds of circumstances can be 
identified as prompting spiritual assessment. The first and most common (76.4%) reason 
for doing a spiritual assessment is a patient raises the spiritual or religious concerns.  This 
signal overrides the presumption that counselees are uncomfortable talking about 
religion.  A second kind of circumstance that motivates spiritual assessments is a function 
of sessions “that involve termination”(41.7%).  Further delineation is not provided to 
distinguish between discussions of the termination option at an early stage before an 
invasive test has been performed or at a later stage when the diagnosis is known and an 
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actual decision about termination has to be made.  The third set of circumstances where 
spirituality is addressed by the genetic counselor involves end-of-life issues (29.9%).31  In 
reference to the last two circumstances, Reis et al. surmise that genetic counselors might 
know more about spiritual issues in these circumstances and consequently are more 
willing to either elicit or respond to religious concern in these areas.  The identification of 
actual reasons that motivate genetic counselors to engage in spiritual assessment inform 
the normative question of whether spiritual assessment should be a standard feature of all 
genetic counseling sessions.  Along the same lines, the reasons that they perceive as 
preventing them from engaging in this domain are also relevant. 
 Although empirical findings do not settle the question, the survey does identify 
reasons that are candidates for more general arguments about the role spiritual assessment 
should play. Below is a replication of a table in the article:32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 Ibid., 44. 
32 Ibid., 45. 
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Table 1: Barriers to Spiritual Assessment in Genetic Counseling 
     
Total Sample: N  = 127 N % 
Survey Supplied Barriers (Close-ended)   
There is not enough time in the session  58 45.7 
I think the client would be 
uncomfortable discussing spirituality 
35 27.6 
I do not know how to assess spirituality 22 17.3 
I would not know what to do with the 
information 
19 15 
I do not think that the client’s spirituality 
is important 
14 11 
I am uncomfortable discussing 
spirituality 
9 7.1 
I am not a religious/spiritual person 8 6.3 
My own religious beliefs might conflict 
with those of the client 
6 4.7 
My spirituality might conflict with my 
client’s 
6 4.7 
Spiritual assessment is the job of 
chaplains and clergy members 
2 1.6 
Respondent supplied barriers (Open-ended) 
 
  
Client did not bring up spirituality  19 14.9 
Spirituality was not relevant to the 
session 
16 12.6 
I do not think assessment is necessary in 
basic GC sessions 
10 7.9 
Spirituality did not seem to be important 
to the client 
8 6.3 
The client resisted discussing the topic  2 1.6 
Spiritual assessment is not my role  1 .8 
The physician I work with is 
uncomfortable with the topic 
1 .8 
Spirituality is not assessed in follow-up 
sessions 
1 .8 
Respondents were allowed to select more than one option. 
 
  
 
 
These barriers are treated as obstacles to be overcome rather than to be accepted 
as will be shown below.   Counselors had five areas of concern: 1) insufficient skill 2) 
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insufficient time 3) client discomfort 4) counselor discomfort 5) low relevance.  A brief 
review of these will fill out the picture of why the respondents have not undertaken 
spiritual assessment.  
A significant set of obstacles revolves around the perception of having 
insufficient skills to address spirituality.  Genetic counselors acknowledge a lack of 
assessment competencies and an understanding of what to do with such assessments.  The 
authors’ response is: More education would make spiritual assessment more likely. How 
likely depends on several other factors.  If the number one barrier given is insufficient 
time, then sufficient skill would not change this constraint.  Reis comments: “While there 
is little that can be done directly to reduce this barrier, it seems likely that willingness to 
make time for spiritual assessment will increase as the perceived value of such 
assessment increases.”33 The ability to ‘make time’ implies that the perceived time 
constraint is not real or that time spent covering other topics can be reallocated to 
spiritual topics.  In my limited observations of genetic counseling sessions, the scarcity of 
time was observable in the challenges of coordinating the activities of genetic counselors, 
sonographers and OB/GYNs.  Third, over a quarter of the genetic counselors assume that 
counselees will be uncomfortable discussing spirituality. The authors highlight that this 
perception is incompatible with at least three studies that indicate patients are interested 
in discussing spirituality with health care providers. This counterevidence does not mean 
that the genetic counselors are wrong to make such attributions in any given case but only 
that they may be overestimating the level of discomfort counselees have.  Fourth, the 
                                                
33 Ibid., 47. 
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authors report that about one third of the respondents are uncomfortable with spiritual 
assessment. Citing a separate study they identify a list of possible sources of discomfort: 
Discomfort with spiritual assessment may stem from a fear 
that just as psychosocial counseling follows from 
psychosocial assessment, spiritual assessment will create a 
need for spiritual counseling…In addition, counselors may 
feel uncomfortable with the unresolved dilemmas 
surrounding spiritual assessment in health care including 
the subjective nature of spirituality, the appropriate roles of 
members of the health care team in providing spiritual 
assessment and care and uncertainty regarding the careful 
balancing of the needs for confidentiality and 
documentation of the information gained through spiritual 
assessment.34      
No challenges or possible solutions are offered to this important set of concerns that do 
not appear easily resolved.  A likely proposal would again look to the training and 
education of genetic counselors to mitigate some of these concerns.  Fifth and finally, 
another third of the respondents indicated that spirituality is not relevant to genetic 
counseling.  The reasons why genetic counselors consider spirituality to have low 
relevance is not made explicit in the study but counselors who expressed low comfort 
also indicated low relevance. Thus, the concerns above might also lead to the conclusion 
that spirituality has low relevance in genetic counseling.  These barriers, despite the 
proposals to overcome them, complicate the question of whether spiritual assessment 
should be undertaken in genetic counseling.  In their attempt to understand the different 
stances toward spiritual assessment, have Reis et al. undermined their own interests in 
promoting spiritual assessment?   
A brief discussion of the responses to the HOPE tool for spiritual assessment will 
provide elaboration of what is meant by spirituality and an indication of different 
                                                
34 Ibid. 
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responses to its various domains.  Spiritual assessment can take the form of informal 
discussions with patients or it can be a formal process of answering questions. In this 
section of the survey, Reis seeks to identify responses of relevance and comfort to a 
formal spiritual assessment tool called the HOPE questions (See Appendix).  
Anandarahajah and Hight, both physicians, created an assessment tool called the HOPE 
questions that could be used in the practices of or training of physicians.35  Each letter 
stands for a group of questions focused around specific areas of spirituality. ‘H’ questions 
elicit what are the patients’ sources of “hope, meaning, comfort, strength, peace, love and 
connection” as a non-threatening way of assessing the resources the patient possesses to 
respond to difficult circumstances.  If a patient indicates that spiritual or religious beliefs 
do provide them comfort, then the practitioner should ask questions under ‘O’ and ‘P.’ 
The ‘O’ questions concern the patient’s status as a participant in an organized religion. 
The inquiry probes the level of participation and raises evaluative questions about how 
helpful religion is to them.  Having addressed spiritual expression through organized 
religion, ‘P’ questions explore patients’ personal spiritual practices that are independent 
of their religious community.  Patients are asked to identify and evaluate their spiritual 
practices. There is also a question about whether the patient believes in God and if she 
does, how would they describe their relationship with God.  The final set of question look 
to “E”-ffects of spiritual practices and beliefs on medical care and end-of-life issues.  The 
questions address both the ways health circumstance affect spiritual activity and the way 
that spiritual needs can affect the delivery of health care.  The answers to these last 
questions have the most observable affect on the actions of health care providers, e.g., 
                                                
35 Anandarajah and Hight. 
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withholding blood products, requesting a chaplain, or praying with a patient. Anandarajah 
and Hight locate these question within a large conceptual framework that defines and 
argues for spiritual assessments.  
The genetic counselors were asked to respond to a randomized list of HOPE 
questions in two ways: 1) indicate, yes or no, whether the question was relevant in some 
circumstances 2) express how comfortable they would be asking the question on a Likert 
scale.  The results indicated that genetic counselors were increasingly comfortable with 
the questions they found most relevant.  The ‘H’ questions were relevant36 to 93.4% of 
respondents and 53.4% said they would be comfortable with asking all the questions in 
this section.  The ‘E’ questions ranked second in relevance (86%) and comfort (27.3%). 
The ‘O ‘questions were a distant third in terms of relevance (49.6%) but similar in 
comfort level (24.8%) with ‘E’ questions. Finally, the ‘P’ set had lowest relevance 
ranking (31.4%) and a significantly lower comfort rating (5%). 
The differences in relevance and comfort level between question types is striking, 
and some interpretation of these gaps is offered.  The high score for the ‘H’ question is 
explained by two factors.  First, this kind of content may already be addressed in most 
genetic counseling sessions and second, the way these questions are worded makes them 
indirectly spiritual according to the authors.  The ‘E’ questions possibly received higher 
relevance and comfort scores because genetic circumstances that bring specific types of 
medical care or raise end-of-life issues have been acknowledged in psychosocial or 
culturally-sensitive training resources.37 Concerns about intruding into patients’ private 
lives might explain why genetic counselors thought questions about organized religion 
                                                
36 This percentage is based on the amount of counselors who found at least three out of four questions 
relevant in a given section.  
37 Reis and others, 48. 
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were not relevant except in cases where genetic disorders have a high correlation with 
certain religious groups, i.e. Tay-Sachs and Ashkenazi Jews.  The questions about 
personal spirituality may have received the lowest relevance and comfort scores because 
they “address spirituality most directly.”38  Alongside a respect for privacy, this inquiry 
into spirituality proper may result in a presumption that the counselee would be 
uncomfortable talking about such personal beliefs and practices.  The reservations that 
are associated with ‘O’ and ‘P’ questions combined with the list of barriers cited above 
might explain why genetic counselors were not  ‘highly likely’ to utilize any of the 
questions from the HOPE approach.  
Although conclusions drawn from the study cannot be generalized to the larger 
population of genetic counselors, the survey provides a provisional picture of current 
practice of and attitudes about spiritual assessment.  The authors of this study - along 
with the developers of the HOPE tool - have reasons for advocating spiritual assessment 
that have been stated above in reference to findings about patient interest and health 
outcomes.  Although the studies in these areas fail to produce anything close to a 
consensus, Reis interprets the trajectory of these studies as revealing a widespread 
interest of patients to discuss religion with their health care provider.   
CEGRM 
 
 
Whereas spirituality and religion play a central role in the HOPE Approach, they 
are late additions in the research concerning the use of a psychosocial assessment tool 
called the Colored Eco-Genetic Relationship Map (CEGRM).  In 2001, Kenen and Peters 
introduced the CEGRM as a “conceptual approach and tool for presenting information 
                                                
38 Ibid. 
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about family and nonkin relationships and stories about inherited diseases in a simple 
understandable form.”39   Combining several assessment tools into one (genetic pedigree, 
genogram, ecomap), they intended initially to use the tool for research and hoped that it 
would eventually become a useful mechanism for conducting clinical interviews and 
storing genetic and psychosocial information about in standardized way.  After 
undertaking a pilot study of 20 subjects40, they published findings from a larger study of 
150 women who were members of families associated with hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer.  In this most recent study they expanded the tool to include the domains of 
spirituality and religion.   
 Referring to this domain as “Religious/Spiritual Exchanges,” the researchers 
gathered this information from 35 of the 150 women who participated in the initial 
interviews.  They describe the procedure as follows: 
During the portion of the CEGRM that focused on 
religious/spiritual support participants were asked whether 
or not they felt that religion and/or spirituality were an 
important part of their social world and whether there were 
any individuals with whom they felt spiritually connected.41     
 They elicited these feeling with prompts like: 
Some people talk about a religious sort of connection, such 
as knowledge of a shared faith, attending services together, 
or praying with or for each other. Others talk about a less 
definable more ethereal kind of connection or closeness 
with other beings or even finding a peaceful place within 
oneself. Are any of these important to you?42  
                                                
39 R. Kenen and J. Peters, "The Colored, Eco-Genetic Relationship Map (Cegrm): A Conceptual Approach 
and Tool for Genetic Counlseing Research," Journal of Genetic Counseling 10, no. 4 (2001): 289. 
40 J. A. Peters and others, "Exploratory Study of the Feasibility and Utility of the Colored Eco-Genetic 
Relationship Map (Cegrm) in Women at High Genetic Risk of Developing Breast Cancer," Am J Med 
Genet A 130, no. 3 (2004). 
41 J. A. Peters and others, "Evolution of the Colored Eco-Genetic Relationship Map (Cegrm) for Assessing 
Social Functioning in Women in Hereditary Breast-Ovarian (Hboc) Families," J Genet Couns 15, no. 6 
(2006): 482. 
42 Ibid., 480. 
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Although no formal definition of either spirituality or religion is offered to underwrite 
this prompt, it is clear that they - similar to the HOPE Approach - were proposing an 
expansive definition in hopes of capturing the full range of attitudes about spirituality.  
Their findings reveal some success on this front having received answers ranging from 
participation in traditional prayer groups to meaningful connection with pets.43   
In analyzing the addition of a spiritual/religious component, two results are 
mentioned along with an acknowledgment of the complexity of undertaking this kind of 
assessment.  By adding this domain, the researchers benefited by getting a more 
comprehensive picture of the psychosocial situation.  How exactly it improved their 
understanding is not specified. One can assume that they obtained more information and 
that they had new insights about the different kinds of social exchanges that define the 
participant’s world.  The benefit to the participants is conferred in the feeling of being 
“understood in a holistic way that promotes healing.”44  They justify this ascription by 
endorsing the idea “as defined by Egnew to relate to the personal subjective experience 
involving reconciliation of the meaning an individual ascribes to distressing events with 
her perception of wholeness as a person. “45 Without elaborating at this juncture, I want to 
point out the link between this effect of the CEGRM and the therapeutic effects of 
communication introduced in chapter one.  Carl Roger’s vision of the healing powers of 
empathic understanding is transposed to a psychosocial pedigree that can provide holistic 
understanding that promotes healing.  Finally, the researchers acknowledge that spiritual 
assessment is a complex activity that entails a large subset of domains to be explored.  
They cite several recent studies and allude to a growing awareness in the counseling 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 485. 
45 Ibid. 
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profession (and also genetic counseling) about the importance of these domains for 
understanding the client.46               
The CEGRM is an important model because it incorporates spiritual assessment 
within a comprehensive conceptualization of the psychosocial profiling of patients. Reis 
et al. identified the importance of deciding whether spiritual assessment needed to be 
treated separately or as part of the psychosocial assessments that many genetic counselors 
have been trained to perform.  The CEGRM is one way of working out that relation and 
could become part of the training process in genetic counseling.47  Spirituality and 
religion are interpreted as important connections within a larger web of social relations 
that have a bearing on health concerns.  By addressing this complex domain, both the 
genetic counselor and the patient appear to receive benefits from this deeper 
understanding.  Whether patients or clients understand their own spiritual life as only one 
component of their social identity is an important question given that religious beliefs are 
often used to interpret the whole of one’s identity.  
       
Evaluation of Harms and Benefits  
In this section, I evaluate the prospect of whether spiritual assessment should 
become a standard component of genetic counseling.  To adopt spiritual assessment 
means in this context applying an instrument like the HOPE approach in all initial and if 
necessary subsequent genetic counseling sessions.  Both potential benefits and harms 
                                                
46 Two studies they cite are: M. Stefanek, P. G. McDonald, and S. A. Hess, "Religion, Spirituality and 
Cancer: Current Status and Methodological Challenges," Psychooncology 14, no. 6 (2005).; E. A. 
Rippentrop and others, "The Relationship between Religion/Spirituality and Physical Health, Mental 
Health, and Pain in a Chronic Pain Population," Pain 116, no. 3 (2005). 
47 Peters and others, "Evolution of the Colored Eco-Genetic Relationship Map (Cegrm) for Assessing 
Social Functioning in Women in Hereditary Breast-Ovarian (Hboc) Families," 487. 
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receive examination. First, what are the potential harms of conducting a formal 
assessment?  If there are likely and significant harms, then spiritual assessment should 
not be undertaken.  If the harms are unlikely and insignificant, i.e. closer to 
inconvenience, then they must be weighed against the potential benefits.  If benefits are 
likely and significant and harms unlikely and insignificant, then the feasibility becomes 
an important question.  I conclude that there are some significant harms that are likely, 
but their severity does not preclude a weighing of possible benefits. After evaluation, the 
benefits that Reis claims would be conferred look less promising.  Thus, increased time 
allowance and high levels of competence, which would in themselves be very difficult to 
achieve, would not change the conclusion that formal spiritual assessment is not 
appropriate in genetic counseling.    
Sloan suggests above that formal spiritual assessment may cause several harms 
and similar ones are identified in the Reis study. Three will be evaluated here: 1) lack of 
relevance, 2) patient privacy, and 3) misunderstanding and manipulation of patients.  In 
the Reis survey, the top two responses to open-ended questions about barriers pertain to 
the issue of relevance.  The respondents commented that “clients did not bring up 
spirituality” and that “spirituality was not relevant to the session.”  Sloan would use these 
findings to bolster his argument that separate spiritual histories give disproportionate 
attention to one sphere of possible concern.  He does not believe that spirituality or 
religion deserve to be separated from the other activities, e.g. sports, and relationships, 
e.g. family, that are important in patients’ lives and that have associations with health 
status.  This argument is especially compelling when considering whether to institute 
routine spiritual assessments such as the HOPE approach in genetic counseling.  Genetic 
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counselors cannot assume without prior knowledge of the patient that spirituality is a 
relevant concern.  The question is whether it is harmful to bring it up without entitlement 
to this assumption.  Leaving the discomfort of declining to talk about such matters aside, 
patients may be irritated that irrelevant questions were asked and may feel harmed if time 
does not permit them to address concerns they consider important.  Sloan cites a study 
where patient interest in discussing spirituality plunged (to 10%) if discussing it meant 
that other medical concerns would not be addressed.48  Since lack of time is the number 
one barrier identified by genetic counselors in the Reis study, spiritual assessments such 
as the HOPE approach, which involves several questions, may cause harm to those 
patients who do not feel the important issues have been given enough time.  The 
CEGRM, which has only one open-ended question about spirituality, requires less time 
and is less likely to harm patients who do not consider spirituality important.  
If these instruments make some counselees irritated or uncomfortable, then one 
reason for this discomfort might be that patient privacy is not being respected.  One 
consequence of the U.S.’s commitment to separation of church and state is that many 
citizens in the U.S. consider their religious beliefs to be private or intensely personal.  For 
different reasons, many people also consider their health status to be a private matter.  
The reason that genetic counselors are authorized to routinely discuss private issues 
concerning genetic status is they have specialized knowledge in this area.  Since they do 
not have authority in matters spiritual, it raises the question of whether preemptive 
questioning is an invasion of patient privacy.  The legal answer is no.  Initiating talk of 
spirituality does not infringe on legal privacy protections unless this information is shared 
                                                
48 Sloan, 238. 
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inappropriately by the HCP.  Is this a professional invasion of privacy?  The answer here 
is yes with some qualifications.  Sloan is right to argue that setting spirituality aside as a 
special topic “implies a degree of importance based on the physician’s values, not 
necessarily the patient’s.”49  If compelling evidence mounts that formal spiritual 
assessment does lead to better health outcomes, then this might authorize the HCP to 
initiate talk in this area but the associations would need to be causal relations.  In genetic 
counseling where decision making and adapting to genetic conditions are emphasized, the 
improved health outcomes are more likely to occur in the emotional and mental health 
status of the patient who often must confront uncertainty and/or genetic limitations on 
health.  According to the results of the CEGRM, patients benefited from having their total 
perspective taken into account.  Despite this evidence, I do not think that it warrants the 
risk of invading patient privacy because patients can and do initiate discussions about 
spirituality in the sessions.  The HOPE approach creates more of a risk than the CEGRM 
because the latter is much less invasive.  At most, the HCP should invite the patient to 
discuss his or her personal concerns and list examples to suggest areas that might be of 
concern.  Spiritual or religious concerns could be one example in the list but should not 
be set out as special.  The way I have defined spirituality above shows that representative 
definitions of spirituality in the medical literature highlight plenum spirituality and 
religion and fail to recognize that patients are already participating in axial spirituality 
through their trust of human technologies, e.g. medicine, as transformative. If the session 
ends without talking about traditionally spiritual or religious concerns, genetic counselors 
                                                
49 Ibid., 193. 
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should not assume that they did not address spirituality. Instead, they should be aware 
that they addressed one kind of spirituality.                
The final harm to consider pertains to the susceptibility of spiritual assessment to 
misunderstandings, manipulation and coercion.  The emphasis genetic counseling often 
has on reproductive decision making makes this set of concerns especially relevant.  The 
likelihood of this harm is related to the competency and commitments the HCP has in this 
kind of assessment.  The indeterminacy of spiritual and religious meanings makes this 
kind of content vulnerable to misunderstanding.  For example, in Debbie’s case, how 
should the genetic counselor understand her remarks about God’s will?  Is Debbie still 
open to termination, or do her religious comments override her earlier comments?  If the 
HCP had initiated this conversation, Debbie’s comments might have been different 
because they were elicited in the context of an assessment.  If this were to occur, then 
Debbie’s understanding of herself might have changed.  The fluid and malleable status of 
many patients’ religious beliefs - especially the commitments of patients who would only 
talk about spirituality in response to the HCP’s questions - make misunderstanding likely.  
In circumstances where patients are trying to sort out their perspective, the formal 
assessment of their spiritual resources may actually inhibit this process if they do not 
usually consider such concepts in decision making.  
Misunderstanding lives in the same neighborhood as manipulation.  Although 
religious/spiritual beliefs are sometimes characterized as dogmatic and rigid, they are 
often not well grasped and their owners do not use them very much.  In the presence of 
an authority like an HCP who presumes competence to bring up spirituality, the patient is 
vulnerable to manipulation.  Manipulation in this case would involve exploiting the 
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patient’s stances on spirituality to achieve a specific outcome.  For example, as Koenig 
points out spiritual assessment can influence patient compliance.  If a genetic counselor 
has reservations about amniocentesis and termination, then the spiritual assessment could 
easily be used to manipulate a conflicted client away from this procedure.  Six genetic 
counselors in the Reis survey acknowledge that their spiritual beliefs might conflict with 
the patients’.  One can speculate that if spiritual assessment became standard practice, 
this number would rise.  A stronger claim is that a standardized practice of spiritual 
assessment is intrinsically a manipulation by the group of HCPs who institute it.  By 
making it standard, they are manipulating what Mary Douglas has called “the thought 
style” of patients.50  On this view, a spiritual assessment is a veiled attempt to manipulate 
patients to think in certain categories.  Although I do not think this is the motivation of 
those who promote spiritual assessment, it may be an unintended harm of this practice.  
Of the three set of harms evaluated, I think manipulation is the most significant if not the 
most likely.  The most likely is the encroachment on privacy but it is not as significant as 
manipulation.  Although some of the harms are significant and likely, I do not think that 
their status precludes a brief review of the benefits rehearsed above.  
At the beginning of this section, two main reasons were cited as motivating the 
interest in formally assessing spirituality.  Patients are interested in having these concerns 
addressed and acknowledging spirituality improves health outcomes.  In several studies, a 
significant percentage of patients indicated that spiritual concerns were important to them 
and that they were interested in physicians exploring their spiritual concerns.51  
                                                
50 Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame : Essays in Cultural Theory (London ; New York: Routledge, 1992), 211.  
Douglas is using the term to refer to the thought style of a culture but it is appropriate for individuals as 
well. 
51 See studies cited above. 
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Researchers in genetic counseling have cited these studies as reasons to consider 
instituting formal spiritual assessments.  One benefit this would confer is the showing of 
respect for what is important to the patient. Sloan’s objection to the premise that studies 
have shown patients are interested do not need to be repeated here.  Until rigorous studies 
show that a clear majority of patients – such studies could have a regional emphasis – 
want HCPs to raise issues of spirituality, the claim is tenuous that formal spiritual 
assessment shows respect for the patient preferences.      
The second benefit that supports formal spiritual assessment is improved health 
outcomes.  As stated above, Reis concludes in the wake of 20 years of research that 
“spirituality has positive effect on mental physical and emotional health.”52  Although 
Sloan’s arguments bring any such claim under suspicion, the more important question is 
whether a formal spiritual assessment actually promotes the positive effect that 
spirituality can have on health outcomes.  Thus, even in light of research that patients 
who are ‘spiritually active’ have better health, it remains to be demonstrated that a formal 
intervention would actually augment the association.  For example, bringing up 
spirituality routinely in the context of prenatal counseling could consistently have a 
negative effect on the psychosocial states of patients who otherwise would not have used 
spiritual or religious terms to think about their situation.  Here again the indeterminacy of 
the terms spirituality and religion makes this negative outcome more likely. When the 
HCP utters words like “religion” or “spirituality,” some patients will interpret the 
meaning from their own perspective.  A patient’s association with these terms is 
unpredictable. Other patients may wonder what the HCP means by them, whether there is 
                                                
52 Reis and others, 42. 
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an agenda behind them.  This uncertainty may bring anxiety that is caused specifically by 
the introduction of these terms in a series of  questions.  Formal spiritual assessment may 
actually undermine the positive association between spirituality and health outcomes in 
these circumstances. The inconclusive relationship between spiritual assessment and 
positive health outcomes weakens the claim that a benefit would actually be conferred by 
routinizing spiritual assessments.    
The final benefit that spiritual assessment could confer is improved patient 
decision making.  Reis points out correctly that “religious and spiritual beliefs can 
profoundly influence medical decision-making.”53  She supports this claim with two 
studies. The first reports that 45% of adult patients in a pulmonary care center, if they 
became gravely ill, would use religious or spiritual commitments in their decision 
making.  The details of this study lack specific application to the context of genetic 
counseling and raise the question of relevance.  The second study directly involves 
genetic counseling circumstances.  Patients at high-risk for breast cancer received pretest 
genetic counseling for BRCA1/2 as part of study to see whether psychosocial factors and 
spiritual faith had influence on test use.54  Women who had a low risk level of recurrence 
were less likely to be tested if they had strong level of faith than if they had low levels of 
faith.  The study indicated no difference of test use between women at high-risk level.  
What is not explicit is how this empirical study informs the normative question.  Does the 
correlation between faith level and test uptake support or undermine the position that 
genetic counselors should undertake spiritual assessment?  Advocates might say that it is 
important for patients to be aware of their spiritual status because it may be relevant for 
                                                
53 Ibid.  
54 M. D. Schwartz and others, "Spiritual Faith and Genetic Testing Decisions among High-Risk Breast 
Cancer Probands," Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev 9, no. 4 (2000). 
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their decision making regarding genetic testing.  This much can be endorsed.   A standard 
spiritual assessment would provide patients with the opportunity to achieve this 
awareness of “faith level” in relation to the specifics of the genetic circumstances.  The 
concern is that the preemptive nature of the questioning would alter the moral thought 
style of many patients, even the individuals who are self-consciously religious.  Genetic 
counselors already have a large influence on the grain of the conversation.  To add a 
spiritual assessment to the pedigree and other intake procedures gives the genetic 
counselor control over one more vocabulary. I have tried to show that the potential harms 
are significant and the benefits are tenuous.   
The responsibilist approach proposed below suggests that genetic counselors 
should be responsive to the thought style that emerges in the dialogical process.  In 
Debbie’s case, religious concerns were raised toward the end of the session.  The focus of 
the analysis will be on the way the three models purport to handle spiritual and religious 
matters. 
     
Spiritual Assessment and Debbie’s Case 
The rest of the chapter entails a brief exploration of 1) the three models’ stances 
on spiritual assessment and 2) the three models’ approaches to the spiritual and religious 
concerns in reference to a Debbie’s case. As the previous chapters have shown, genetic 
counselors have several models available to guide their communication strategies and 
tactics.  The teaching model undertakes the primary goal of educating the client by 
transmitting the genetic information with clarity and at a level appropriate to a patient’s 
apparent ability to understand.  The psychotherapeutic model has multiple goals.  The 
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genetic counselor seeks to understand the client, enhance the client’s confidence in 
decision making, promote her autonomy, resolve psychological distress and help her find 
specific solutions to the problems at hand.  The responsibilist models aims to coordinate 
the meanings of genetic information across diverse perspectives and facilitate responsible 
decision making.  I suggest how the three different models approach the case and 
conclude that the responsibilist model provides the most adequate resources for 
understanding how the HCP could help Debbie interpret the genetic information. 
Before turning to the models, some general insights and observations can be made 
about the case in relation to the issue of spirituality. The definition of spirituality 
proposed above provides the genetic counselor with a model to identify several 
spiritualities within Debbie’s complex stance.  Patients often trust more than one kind of 
spirituality when limiting conditions such as uncertainty about health status arise. That 
Debbie took time to come to the medical center implies that she is a participant in what 
Sheridan calls axial spirituality, the subculture that emphasizes human resources for 
transforming our limiting conditions. The biomedical tradition is thus understood within a 
much broader kind of spirituality that emphasizes what is sometimes called the human 
spirit. As the session unfolds, Debbie’s comments indicate that she also participates in a 
religion concerned with the will of God.  Her intentional stance towards the various 
outcomes reflects a trajectory of meaning that has at least in part been fed by Christianity. 
In Sheridan’s model, religion is continuous with axial and plenum spirituality and also 
distinct because of its concern with the assistance of a Transcendent Other.  Although it is 
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tempting to ascribe to Debbie a contradictory stance that trusts biomedicine and religion,  
Sheridan’s taxonomy allows us to see Debbie as a bricoleur55 of spiritualities.        
With this framework, specific features of the case become more coherent.  First, 
Debbie’s use of religious terms occurs as the uncertainty of her situation takes hold.  The 
genetic counselor has attempted to transform the uncertainty by offering probabilities56 
and possible outcomes. Debbie’s turn to religion is not a way of dismissing the genetic 
counselor.  It is a signal that the uncertainty surrounding prenatal diagnosis has not been 
completely transformed for her.  Her religious beliefs are an additional and available 
cultural resource to address her uncertainty. Such resources are not available like tools to 
a consumer.  They are available as intentional stances within the repertoire of a forged 
identity.  Thus, what seems like a dramatic shift in content to an observer makes sense as 
a complex perspective calling on available resources to address uncertainty.  Finally, the 
genetic counselor’s response to the religious utterance is to give Debbie and her spouse 
some privacy to deliberate.  This move does not necessarily reflect discomfort with 
religion.  More likely it reflects an enactment of nondirectiveness supported by the 
teaching model. 
 
Teaching Model 
In the last chapter, the features of Debbie’s case were interpreted through the 
categories of directive and nondirective counseling. It was established that the genetic 
                                                
55  For appropriations of Claude Levi Strauss’s notion of ‘bricoleur that have influenced me, see Jeffrey 
Stout, Ethics after Babel : The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 
74. and Churchill and Schenck: 401.    
56 Sheridan notes that culture is a paradox that generates and transforms certain human predicaments.  In 
this case, generating a risk status creates a new predicament of understanding what that means in practical 
circumstances/   
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counselor’s moves in Debbie’s case are best understood as being guided by the teaching 
model.   The genetic counselor achieves her goal by doing three things 1) offering a risk 
assessment 2) explaining amniocentesis and its risks 3) laying out the practical 
alternatives and outcomes. When these tasks are complete, the genetic counselor should 
not interfere with the deliberation process.  Ascribing to the teaching model has several 
implications for how spirituality and religion might be addressed.   
A formal spiritual assessment as defined by the HOPE and CEGRM tools would 
not be permissible under the teaching model.  The intervention is incompatible with the 
model for several reasons.  First, the spiritual and religious content is not information that 
the genetic counselor is competent to send or receive.  By initiating conversation about 
religion, the genetic counselor would be undertaking authority in an area in which he or 
she cannot take responsibility.  Some genetic counselors may feel uncomfortable raising 
spiritual concerns because the need for spiritual or pastoral counseling might arise.  This 
discomfort is an outgrowth of the lack of authority.  Second, raising spiritual issues could 
send an implicit message to the counselee that he or she should be using these kinds of 
resources to understand and make decisions.  Such a message risks being directive by the 
teaching model’s standards because it directs the counselee towards a certain kind of 
evaluative framework.  Finally, religious and spiritual content is not the kind of 
information that is easily transferred between people.  It is a subjective form of belief that 
is not easily standardized across perspectives and as a result is highly susceptible to 
confusion or manipulation.                         
Under the teaching model, a genetic counselor can correct misconceptions of 
genetic information.  Presumably, this includes misconceptions rooted in religious 
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commitments.  In Debbie’s case, she states that God’s will would be manifested in two 
different outcomes: the birth of a child with Down syndrome and a miscarriage caused by 
amniocentesis.  Is this a misconception of the situation? Should the genetic counselor 
correct it?  It would be difficult to classify Debbie’s comments as misconceptions if 
guided by the teaching model.  Debbie’s religious utterances are on this view highly 
subjective and not easily transmitted to the HCP.  The vocabularies of genetics and 
religion are incommensurate from an educational standpoint. The genetic counselor who 
follows the teaching model would not be entitled to challenge or correct this statement 
because it is not in the HCP’s realm of authority.  Efforts to help Debbie elaborate the 
concept of God’s will are also outside the competencies of the genetic counselor who is 
trained to transfer objective, scientific information.  In light of these constraints, the offer 
of privacy is a reasonable move for the genetic counselor to make.   
The psychotherapeutic model challenges the teaching models on two fronts.  First, 
the teaching model’s stance toward religion is a symptom of a larger problem of not 
trying to understand the patient.  It does not take seriously enough the ability of the 
counselor to bracket his or her commitments and achieve an empathic if provisional 
understanding of the client perspective.  By narrowing the authority of the professional to 
only matters concerning scientific knowledge and options, the teaching model isolates the 
patient.  The second set of problems with the teaching model’s approach to spirituality is 
that it ignores a valuable resource for promoting the patient’s autonomy.  In Debbie’s 
case, reference to God’s will could have been construed as empowering to make a 
decision with the confidence that she could handle any outcome because God would be 
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present.  The teaching model misses this opportunity to bolster the patient’s confidence 
and resolve the psychological anxiety of practical uncertainty.   
The teaching model makes two critical errors in its approach to religion according 
the responsibilist model.  First, it fails to appreciate the holistic structure of meaning and 
as a consequence has the false assumption that the meaning of the genetic information 
can be delivered as a tightly contained semantic package that is then applied by the 
counselee.  This misunderstanding can be accounted for in the atomistic semantics of the 
technical vision of communication.  This view of meaning underestimates the role of 
dialogical processes in actually grasping the meaning of the information. This leads to the 
second error. The teaching model fails to see the responsibilities of coordinating the 
meaning of genetic information from both the HCP’s and Debbie’s perspective.  The 
teaching model is right to recognize that inferential restraint and humility is a necessary 
part of negotiating meaning but is wrong to assume that Debbie’s beliefs are radically 
different and disconnected from the genetic information.  The two perspectives together 
can expand the meaning of God’s will in helpful ways.  For example, the genetic 
counselor could ask Debbie what it would mean for God to will that she have a disabled 
child or miscarriage. This prompt would give Debbie the opportunity to trace out the 
consequences of her statements, and it would require no theological but only dialogical 
competence on the counselors part. 
          
Psychotherapeutic Model 
Of the three models, the psychotherapeutic model would be the most likely to 
utilize a spiritual assessment tool.  Reis and Peter’s interest in spirituality is rooted in a 
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broader concern for addressing the psychosocial needs of the patient.  The HOPE 
approach does provide a thorough instrument for understanding the patient and would 
signal to them that their perspective is important.  The CEGRM is a psychosocial 
assessment tool that would be integrated into the taking of a patient’s pedigree.  It is more 
compatible with the psychotherapeutic model than the HOPE approach because it treats 
spirituality as part of a larger psychosocial picture.  Since it was conceived as being more 
useful with families that face specific heritable diseases, whether it should be applied in 
prenatal counseling remains an important question.   
 Other advocates of the psychotherapeutic model support genetic counselors’ 
initiating talking of religion.  John Weil proposes that genetic counselors should raise the 
issue of religion “since the counselee may not consider these topics to be relevant, 
appropriate, or of interest to the counselor.”57  He suggests that the counselor provide 
cues or asks questions more along the line of the CEGRM than the HOPE approach: “ 
‘Do you see yourself as a religious or spiritual person?’ Or ‘Do you have a religious or 
spiritual community that would be helpful?’ ”58  If the patient answers in the affirmative, 
then the counselor is entitled to direct the patient to think about these religious resources 
in relation to decision making and as a support mechanism.  All of these questions are a 
way of acknowledging the importance of the patient’s perspective.  If the counselee is 
conflicted by tension between personal values and her religion, the genetic counselor, 
without trying to resolve the conflict, should attempt to empathically understand the 
torment that the patient experiences. Weil rejects the assumption that an HCP needs to 
                                                
57 Weil, Psychosocial Genetic Counseling, 52. 
58 Ibid. 
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know something about the religion to deal with religious concerns.  Instead basic 
counseling skills are all that is needed to reach the goals of the psychotherapeutic model. 
  From Kessler’s and Resta’s opening quote, it appears that they are willing to 
adopt a robust religious standpoint on behalf of the patient.  In a situation different from 
Debbie’s, the commitment to empathic identification entitles them to apply a counseling 
skill that has substantive theological content, content that they may not actually endorse: 
God sometimes gives people special tasks in life that we 
need to do without rewards or thanks and yours is to care 
for Alexis until He’s ready to take her. And, the two of you 
have done a magnificent job in caring and loving her. You 
may not experience her love now, but a day will come 
when you will. God will take care of that.59  
Kessler acknowledges that this statement would be challenged by those who hold that the 
HCP should dispel false hopes rather than perpetuate them.  Kessler defers to the 
patient’s coping system and allows it to determine the meaning of the event.  The genetic 
counselor is empathically adopting the framework of the patient.    
All of these stances on spiritual assessment give insight into how Debbie’s case 
might have been handled by a genetic counselor who avows the psychotherapeutic 
model.  Imagine that a version of the CEGRM, which would be customized to prenatal 
counseling circumstances, is adopted into the psychotherapeutic approach.60 The CEGRM 
involves asking the counselee questions about their genetic identity as well as their 
psychosocial identity.  Initially questions would be asked about Debbie’s and her 
family’s health status.  Subsequently, psychosocial questions would be asked.  The 
emphasis of the psychosocial dimension is the network of exchanges in which the patient 
                                                
59 Resta and Kessler, "Commentary on Robin's a Smile, and the Need for Counseling Skills in the Clinic," 
437. 
60 The researchers who are developing the CEGRM have never indicated that it would be used in prenatal 
genetic counseling for advanced maternal age.   
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is involved. For example, with whom does the patient share information? With whom 
does she share emotional content? With whom does she share spiritual/religious 
exchanges?  These questions intend to show not only the HCP but also the patient the 
structure of a support network and the patterns of using it.  After gathering this 
information and making the appropriate inferences, the same probabilities and 
descriptions would be given.  What would happen next is more difficult to predict 
because the CEGRM changes the interaction presumably in a way that improves the 
outcome. 
This consequence needs to be highlighted because Debbie’s comments about 
God’s will and a miraculous gift may not have developed in the same way. This potential 
shift points to a tension between adopting an empathic stance and adopting a tool like the 
CEGRM.  Whereas empathic identification seeks to bracket the commitments of the HCP 
and let the patient control the conversation, an assessment tool reinforces the biomedical 
perspective’s propensity for gathering and analyzing information.  The prompts cited in 
the CEGRM study are open enough to be somewhat compatible with empathic goals, 
whereas the HOPE questions would insert too much structure into the interaction.     
Assuming that Debbie did articulate the same concerns after undergoing the 
CEGRM, the psychotherapeutic model would have several recommendations for a 
response.  These are guided by the goals that were elaborated in chapter one.  Kessler and 
Weil would recommend that the HCP promote the perspective of the counselee as a way 
of building her confidence in decision making.  This position would lead to a follow-up 
question intended to help Debbie find new insights about God’s will in her circumstance. 
Kessler’s quotations above suggest that the genetic counselor would even by entitled to 
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speak as if  he or she held Debbie’s same beliefs.  Thus a statement such as “Yes, God 
would bless any outcome” would be permissible.  After discussing these religious 
implications, the genetic counselor should offer Debbie and her spouse privacy only as a 
last resort.  Instead of abandoning the couple, the genetic counselor should help them sort 
their thoughts in a way that promotes autonomous decision making.  Debbie most likely 
would have reached the same decision.  The difference would be that her perspective 
explicitly received the support of the genetic counselor.            
Those who adopt the teaching model would have a couple of objections to the 
psychotherapeutic approach.  One objection relates to the authority of the HCP to initiate 
discussion about non-genetic matters.  Hsia’s recommendation is to only ask questions 
that facilitate better transfer of the genetic information.  Kessler’s willingness to adopt the 
perspective of the patient puts the HCP at risk of being held responsible for outcomes the 
patient later regrets.  If the genetic counselor were to implicitly endorse Debbie’s 
religious beliefs, then the counselor would overstep the bounds of relevance and 
authority.  The second objection to initiating talk about spirituality is that it does not 
serve the goal of educating the client.  Instead the learning process might be hindered 
because of the emotional and metaphysical dust that gets kicked up when discussing 
spiritual and religious concerns. Weil and Kessler would rejoin that avoiding the 
emotional and spiritual issues that inevitably arise in cases such as Debbie’s has the effect 
of abandoning the patient or sends the message that these kinds of concerns are not 
worthy of discussion.    
As stated in chapter three, the responsibilist model and the psychotherapeutic 
have overlapping stances that are supported by different explanatory strategies.  The 
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importance of understanding the patient’s perspective is paramount in both models as is 
supporting the autonomy of the patient.  Notwithstanding these common commitments, 
two problems with the psychotherapeutic approach can be raised from the standpoint of 
the responsibilist model.  First, the commitment to empathic identification can undermine 
important aspect of the dialogical process.  The HCP tries not only to suspend his or her 
perspective for the sake of understanding but attempts to adopt the perspective of the 
other for the sake of understanding.  Kessler’s opening quote is potentially harmful not 
because it makes him complicit, as the teaching model contends, but because it foregoes 
the dialogical process at a crucial moment.  Debbie needs an additional perspective that is 
honest rather than a doubling of her own perspective.  The ghost of the therapeutic vision 
of communication is seen in the psychotherapeutic model’s attempt at empathic 
identification.   
The second problem is related to the first.  The psychotherapeutic emphasis on 
promoting autonomy through empathy results in the near removal of the HCP’s 
perspective in the decision-making process.  One consequence of this de-emphasis can be 
that it actually undermines the goal of promoting patient autonomy.  This can become 
especially problematic in the area of spirituality. The challenge of bringing up spiritual 
concerns on the psychotherapeutic account is that spiritual concerns can also undermine 
patient confidence and promote heteronomy or what Karl Barth calls theonomy.61  Some 
religious narratives encourage believers to defer all decisions to God, sometimes making 
prayer the deliberative vehicle and other times waiting for a sign.  In these cases, should 
the genetic counselor try to reframe the situation to promote the client’s autonomy, or 
                                                
61 Karl Barth’s notion of theonomy stands as the ground of autonomy and heteronomy. Being bound by 
God’s word (or law) is the very source of the distinction between the latter two terms.         
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should he or she respect the patient’s obedience to a higher decision-making power?  The 
answer to this question has important normative implications.  To reframe the situation is 
a direct challenge to the patient’s beliefs; to support the patient’s deference to a sign from 
a higher power puts the HCP in the difficult situation of promoting a form of heteronomy. 
Weil would advise the genetic counselor to empathically understand the patient and 
restrain from challenging or adjudicating her commitments. The responsibilist model 
would also respect a patient’s deference to a divine authority but would ideally facilitate 
an evaluation of this stance through a dialogical process.  
     
Responsibilist Model 
Of the three of models under consideration, the responsibilist model would be less 
likely to undertake a formal spiritual assessment than the psychotherapuetic model but 
more likely than the teaching model.  Instruments such as the CEGRM and the HOPE 
approach add additional layers of structure to the dialogical process.  In a conversation 
that is already highly constrained by an intake with a pedigree, the addition of a scripted 
set of questions about spirituality has the unintended effect of perspectival creep.  The 
HCP in an attempt to learn more about the patient may unintentionally lose this 
opportunity by, so to speak, leading the witness.  From the standpoint of the responsibilist 
model, the coordination of perspectives is undermined if one of the perspectives has too 
much control over the structure and trajectory of the conversation.  This stance does not 
mean that the genetic counselor cannot mention spirituality or religion first.  The key is to 
mention spirituality in a way that minimizes its initial  inferential significance for the 
patient.  As suggested above, mentioning spirituality in a list of other kinds of meaning 
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may be the least intrusive strategy.  If spirituality or religion is important to the 
counselee, then they will hopefully interpret this as an opportunity to become more 
directive in the conversation.                
How would the responsibilist model have handled Debbie’s case in reference to 
the religious comments made?  Coordination of meanings requires a navigation and 
negotiation between perspectives.  A challenging first step for a genetic counselor -  
especially one uncomfortable talking about religion – is to continue navigating between 
perspectives after a religious claim has been made.  To paraphrase Richard Rorty, 
religion can function as a conversation stopper but in genetic counseling it need not work 
this way.62  In chapter two, I demonstrated in the concept of anaphora how navigation is 
possible with minimal understanding of what the other person means.  Thus follow-up 
questions might entail “What’s significant about that (God’s will in all outcomes) for 
you?”  The point here is that a genetic counselor does not have to adopt the idiom of the 
patient to navigate with the patient. Another important function of navigation is to track 
what Debbie has done in substituting talk of ‘miraculous gift’ for talk of babies and 
fetuses. “You have 1/106 risk of giving birth to a miraculous gift with Down syndrome” 
is a very important change in P.  The genetic counselor should try to find out what the 
inferential significance of this move is.  Brandom’s explanation of how substitutions 
contribute to meaning is important in this situation.          
 The more difficult task for the responsibilist model is to negotiate perspectives 
with Debbie.  For example, would it be acceptable to press Debbie on her statement with 
this follow-up: “Are you saying that any decision you make will be the right one”?  From 
                                                
62 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London, England ; New York, N.Y., USA: Penguin, 1999). 
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the responsibilist perspective, this measure would be acceptable because it allows Debbie 
to hear how someone else interprets her statement.  This negotiation between 
perspectives is happening as part of the process of facilitating a responsible decision.  
The two goals of the responsibilist account are both being pursued at his juncture in 
Debbie’s case.  If Debbie needs privacy at this moment, then she is expected to ask for it.  
What needs to be underscored in the negotiation process is that the genetic counselor 
must proceed with great caution because of his or her authority status.  Mary White 
articulates this well in suggesting that all challenges to the patient need to be done with 
an affirming attitude similar to those of trusted friends, teachers and therapists.               
The teaching model’s objections are not rehearsed here because they are the same 
as those levied against the psychotherapeutic model.  The psychotherapeutic model 
would endorse the responsibilist model navigation of perspectives but would question its 
negotiation process.  Because the counselee’s perspective needs bolstering, the 
negotiation process threatens to undermine the autonomy of the patient.  One of the 
underlying assumptions of the psychotherapeutic model is that the counselee is in a 
weaker position relative to the genetic counselor.  This position is justifiable, but there 
are several ways to respond to this.  Whereas Kessler and Weil seek to strengthen the 
whole person through empathy and unconditional positive regard, the responsibilist 
model seeks to strengthen understanding and decision making through dialogical process.  
Its pragmatic emphasis stands out against the psychotherapeutic model’s emphasis on 
changing psychological states. 
The responsibilist model provides the most adequate resources for responding to 
Debbie’s case.  To use Peters’ image, it is the pragmatic middle ground in understanding 
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what communication can achieve in this circumstance.  On the one hand, the teaching 
model exhibits the frustration of having inadequate discursive resources to truly 
understand one another. In response to this limitation, it underestimates the amount of 
understanding that can be achieved between the genetic counselor and the patient.  As a 
result, the HCP seeks primarily to transfer objective information in as clear and 
comprehensive manner as possible.  Other communicative resources such as religious 
vocabulary are highly subjective and susceptible to misinterpretation.  The genetic 
counselor must respect the gulf between perspectives and rely only on what can be sent 
and received effectively.  On the other hand, the psychotherapeutic model overestimates 
the amount of understanding that can be achieved between patient and HCP. Its primary 
goal is to understand the other person rather than understand the conceptual contents with 
the other person.  The shortcomings of relying on the empathic stance become 
perspicuous when addressing spirituality.  Kessler’s opening words to the chapter have a 
ring of inauthenticity that represent an unhelpful doubling of a perspective.  Adopting the 
stance of the patient in this way begs for abuse and fails to see the value in letting the 
differences inform understanding and decision making.  The strength of the responsibilist 
model is that it acknowledges the value of the different perspective and focuses on how a 
shared responsibility to dialogical processes can coordinate meanings across perspectives.   
Unlike the teaching model, it does not restrict the meanings of genetic information.  
Religious meanings are fair game. Instead, this model commits to navigating and 
negotiating the different perspectives until time runs out.      
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Summary  
This chapter has tried to accomplish two goals. Most of the attention has been 
focused on assessing the prospect of instating a formal spiritual assessment in genetic 
counseling. In this process, I offered a new definition of spirituality that includes religion 
and medicine within  it.  Next, I surveyed reasons for undertaking spiritual assessment 
and rehearsed challenges to these reasons.  The third subsection involved a detailed 
analysis of two studies that addressed the prospect of spiritual assessment in genetic 
counseling.  Finally, after evaluating the benefits and harms of standardized spiritual 
assessment, I concluded that the potential harms outweighed the potential benefits.   
The second goal of this chapter was to examine how the three genetic counseling 
models would address spirituality in Debbie’s case.  Each model’s position was explained 
and then challenged by the other two models.  In the end, the responsibilist model was 
considered to be the most adequate of three models in addressing spiritual and religious 
concerns.           
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study brought together the very practical concern of talking with patients 
about genetic information with a highly theoretical discussion about communication and 
meaning.  Drawing from the literature on genetic counseling, three models were 
introduced and then elaborated in several ways. An attempt was made to locate the 
models within larger streams of philosophical and theological thought.  The teaching and 
psychotherapeutic models of genetic counseling were located within the what Peters calls 
the spiritualist tradition and were implicated in the technical and therapeutic visions of 
communication respectively. The responsibilist model was elaborated in terms of an 
alternative vision of spirit rooted in Hegelian insights and underwritten by Robert 
Brandom’s pragmatic theory of communication.  By applying the models to the concerns 
around nondirectiveness and spiritual assessment, I tried to demonstrate how the 
responsibilist model provides a better set of expressive resources about communication to 
guide practitioners. 
Throughout the project Debbie’s case served as a site for testing the adequacy of 
the models and as a source for examples.  Chapters one and two referred intermittently to 
her case as the models were being developed; chapters three and four invested significant 
attention to the case as a way to evaluate the adequacy of the models. Much more could 
have been said.  For example, the issue around communicating probabilities has been the 
focus of significant research.  An unfortunate consequence of focusing on a prenatal case 
is that it reinforced the perception that genetic counseling is exclusively about 
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reproductive concerns.  A few other examples were used to acknowledge the rapid 
expansion of genetics into almost all areas of medicine.        
In chapter one, I introduced the teaching and psychotherapeutic models of genetic 
counseling.  The assumption of this chapter was that these models implicitly relied on 
accounts of general communication to support their theses.  John Durham Peters’ story 
about communication in the West highlighted two main traditions: the spiritualist 
tradition and the embodiment tradition. He identified two visions of communication in 
the U.S. that have inherited the problematics of the spiritualist tradition. The technical 
and therapeutic visions of communication have, on Peters’ view, dominated the U.S. 
since World War II, the same period when formative attitudes about genetic counseling 
were being pioneered.  I proposed that the teaching model of genetic counseling 
incorporated many of the views of the technical vision; and that the psychotherapeutic 
model of genetic counseling was heir to the therapeutic vision of communication.   
Locating the models within broader views of communication allowed more explicit 
theses to be identified and ultimately evaluated in reference to the specific tenets of each 
model. 
Chapter two consisted of a large-scale constructive move.  I began by 
acknowledging Mary White’s work that argues for placing sociality and responsibility at 
the center of genetic counseling, and that proposes the key concept of dialogical 
counseling.  She developed these terms with the help of H. Richard Niebuhr’s work in 
The Responsible Self.  I elaborated and extended her stance in what I called responsibilist 
model.  As an heir to what I termed the embodiment tradition, the counterpart to the 
spiritualist tradition in Peters’ account, the responsibilist model embraces communication 
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as a social practice that allows embodied selves to coordinate meanings across different 
perspectives.  Hegel’s insights into reciprocal recognition, sociality and historicity were 
acknowledged as the formative ideas in this tradition.  To provide a more detailed footing 
for the responsibilist model, I introduced and explicated Robert Brandom’s pragmatic 
theory of communication.  Using Brandom’s theory to underwrite the responsibilist 
model was in some respects an attempt to get back to the basics.  His deontic 
scorekeeping account describes what happens in rudimentary conversations and what is 
required in normative practices to grasp a conceptual content.  At the center of his model 
is the concept of dialogue.  His detailed work provides White’s dialogical counseling 
with sophisticated expressive resources that allowed the theses of the responsibilist model 
to be elaborated.         
The third chapter represented a shift from developing theoretical models to 
applying them.  I examined one of the central values in genetic counseling, 
nondirectiveness.  I demonstrated that nondirectiveness is a contested value with an 
important history.  Nondirectiveness could best be understood as a corrective to the 
eugenic policies of the U.S. and Europe in the first of half of the twentieth century.  
Against this historical backdrop, I examined how each of the models specified and 
applied nondirectiveness.  The teaching model defined it as the patient’s right to 
noninterference with decision making. This view was justified with inadequate notions of 
pedagogical neutrality and autonomy.  The psychotherapeutic model defined 
nondirectiveness as the promotion of autonomy and suggested that counseling skills 
should be actively used to encourage the patient.  This view failed to maintain a 
meaningful distinction between directiveness and nondirectiveness by defining the 
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former too narrowly and the latter too broadly.  Resisting calls to jettison 
nondirectiveness as a defining value, I showed how the responsibilist model provides a 
more nuanced understanding of the directive and nondirective stances that occur within 
genetic counseling sessions.          
The final chapter addressed the prospects of spiritual assessment in genetic 
counseling.  The interest by HCPs in spirituality has grown in the past ten years and the 
interest has spread to genetic counseling.  I analyzed a representative definition of 
spirituality and concluded that a new definition was needed.  A new definition was 
presented that used Daniel Sheridan’s distinctions between culture, spirituality, and 
religion.  His taxonomy provided a way to locate spirituality as mode of culture and to 
further divide spirituality into subspecies that included religion.  This definition provided 
theoretical backing for the medical literature’s preference for defining spirituality more 
broadly than religion.  The next section presented reasons for and against spiritual 
assessment as a general proposal for HCPs.  Richard Sloan’s arguments against the 
partnership of medicine and religion provided needed push back for researchers who too 
quickly assume that spiritual assessment will improve patient care.  In the genetic 
counseling context, very few studies have been undertaken in this area.  Two studies that 
explored the possibility of spiritual assessment in genetic counseling were analyzed and 
evaluated.  I concluded from these studies and the preceding arguments that a 
standardized spiritual assessment had more potential for harm than benefit.  The final 
section of this chapter returned to Debbie’s case to evaluate the adequacy of the three 
model’s response to the religious concerns.  I concluded that the responsibilist model 
provided the most adequate model for addressing Debbie’s religious concerns.           
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Implications 
 
Genetic Counseling and Professional Communication 
An obvious hope of this project is to have an effect on the practice of genetic 
counseling.  This purpose is not based on the assessment that most genetic counselors are 
performing poorly.  To the contrary, my limited contact with genetic counseling gave me 
the impression that they do a difficult job well.  Nor do I pretend to have the know-how 
required to navigate and negotiate in the patient education room.  Thus, an ambitious 
theoretical project like this one hopes to serve the more modest practical aim of 
supplementing knowing how with a knowing that.  In other words, I tried to make 
explicit what I think many HCPs already do when they undertake genetic counseling.  
Nonetheless, some models are better than others, and the better ones might help in the 
process of training better counselors.  I have tried to show that the responsibilist model is 
better than the two dominant alternatives.  
  What has been learned in the present inquiry can be easily extended to other 
forms of health care communications and profession/client communication more 
generally.  Several insights have been discovered in this project.  Brandom’s deontic 
scorekeeping model demonstrates how dialogue is at the root of grasping a conceptual 
content.  Against this backdrop, professional communications such as genetic counseling 
can be seen as late developments in linguistic practices that have structural challenges.  It 
appears as though the professional does not need to understand the esoteric information 
from the client’s point of view.  Brandom’s model reminds us that the professional needs 
the client’s understanding to grasp conceptual content in a particular context.  One of the 
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great challenges professionals have when talking to clients is to engage each person as a 
new dialogue partner for coordinating meanings.  Another insight from the responsibilist 
model is the distinction between navigating and negotiating perspectives.  Many service 
professionals probably have an awareness of how they navigate a conversation but less 
awareness about how they negotiate perspectives within a conversation.  Brandom’s 
theory gives new resources for discourse analysis in this area. Third, the myth of 
professional neutrality is dismissed in this project.  The myth of neutrality is the position 
that providing objective information is a neutral act.  If Brandom’s argument is accepted 
that linguistic practice is a fully normative practice, then the claim of neutrality is not 
credible.  This insight expands current notions of professional and shared responsibility.  
Finally, the notion of shared decision making is an established domain in medical ethics 
but has received little attention in terms of communication theory.  The weight Brandom 
places on dialogical processes makes his theory compatible with these ethical pursuits. 
         
Medicine and Spirituality 
The last chapter in this project has great relevance to a growing debate in 
medicine and the broader culture about the role spirituality should play in medicine.  The 
definition of spirituality offered in this project has the potential to change the way we 
think about spheres of culture such as religion and medicine.  Sheridan’s broad notion of 
spirituality allows us to see both religion and medicine ‘”as modes of culture in which 
human beings transform the problematic of the human predicament”; at the same time, 
the taxonomy allows for distinctions to be made between spiritualities.  In an age when 
religion and science are simplistically pitted against one another, it is important to have 
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categories that allow us to see their similarities and differences.  Sheridan’s framework 
can acknowledge that HCPs and patients both live in a world mediated by several modes 
of culture that shape their actual attitudes within clinical situations.  These modes bring a 
variety of meanings into the health care setting that have to be coordinated across 
perspectives.  If I think genes are the Language of God1, then an utterance of P means 
something different in my mouth than it does in your ears.  Learning to talk about 
genetics will sometimes mean learning to talk about religion.
                                                
1 Francis S. Collins, The Language of God : A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief (New York: Free 
Press, 2006). 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 4: EXAMPLE OF QUESTION FOR THE HOPE APPROACH TO SPIRITUAL 
ASSESSMENT 
 
H: Sources of hope, meaning, comfort, strength, peace, love and connection 
We have been discussing your support systems. I was wondering, what is 
there in your life that gives you internal support? 
What are your sources of hope, strength, comfort and peace? 
What do you hold on to during difficult times? 
What sustains you and keeps you going? 
For some people, their religious or spiritual beliefs act as a source of comfort 
and strength in dealing with life’s ups and downs; is this true for you? 
If the answer is “Yes,” go on to O and P questions. 
If the answer is “No,” consider asking: Was it ever? If the answer is “Yes,” 
ask: What changed? 
O: Organized religion 
Do you consider yourself part of an organized religion? 
How important is this to you? 
What aspects of your religion are helpful and not so helpful to you? 
Are you part of a religious or spiritual community? Does it help you? How? 
P: Personal spirituality/practices 
Do you have personal spiritual beliefs that are independent of organized 
religion? What are they? 
Do you believe in God? What kind of relationship do you have with God? 
What aspects of your spirituality or spiritual practices do you find most helpful 
to you personally? (e.g., prayer, meditation, reading scripture, attending 
religious services, listening to music, hiking, communing with nature) 
E: Effects on medical care and end-of-life issues 
Has being sick (or your current situation) affected your ability to do the things 
that usually help you spiritually? (Or affected your relationship with God?) 
As a doctor, is there anything that I can do to help you access the resources 
that usually help you? 
Are you worried about any conflicts between your beliefs and your medical 
situation/care/decisions? 
Would it be helpful for you to speak to a clinical chaplain/community 
spiritual leader? 
Are there any specific practices or restrictions I should know about in providing 
your medical care? (e.g., dietary restrictions, use of blood products) 
If the patient is dying: How do your beliefs affect the kind of medical care you would like 
me to provide over the next few days/weeks/month
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